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The primary mechanism used to resolve breaches of diplomatic protection is to accord states 
responsibility for due protection. This Public International Law approach works in the majority of 
cases except for very few cases such as in Libya, when incumbent governments struggle to 
maintain control over the national territory of their own states. 
 
This thesis investigates problems with the current approach and proposes solutions through virtual 
diplomacy, to safeguard diplomats from imminent attacks while enabling diplomatic functions to 
continue using modern communications. In other words, a preventative approach. However, in 
the absence of virtual diplomacy, if diplomats are attacked or injured by non-state parties in a 
conflict environment such as Libya in the post- Gaddafi period, the question of reparations and 
punishment of offenders becomes a difficult process to achieve because of the political and 
security situation in the country. The starting point will still be the principle of s t a t e  responsibility 
in terms of payment of reparations to the sending state of the injured diplomats or their families. 
The punishment of offenders will be for criminal law. This thesis contends that TJ can play a 
supporting or complementary role to state responsibility and criminal law. TJ can play role in 
terms of facilitating state responsibility for the protection of diplomats, fact finding, enabling the 
gathering of evidence and maybe even the assessment of reparations to be paid by armed rebel 
groups’ offenders such as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya whose actions have caused injury to foreign 
diplomats. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 The Duty to Protect Diplomats under Public International Law 
 
The protection of diplomats has always been an essential duty of all states, and diplomats have 
special protection according to international law. While this is partly a matter of protocol, as 
diplomats essentially represent the sending state, it is also a matter of expediency, as diplomatic 
personnel and premises are generally targeted in response to adverse international events. 
Diplomatic premises are places where diplomats perform their diplomatic function, requiring 
diplomatic status and appropriate protection. In modern politics, diplomats are a prime target of 
terrorist groups aiming to injure symbolic targets, to attract and affect public opinion, or to extort 
concessions by taking diplomatic agents hostage or threatening their lives.1 
 
The international community considers the problem of terrorist targeting of  diplomats both in 
terms of the human aspect of protecting their persons, and the functional reason for the importance 
of diplomats, who continue to play a unique and essential role in the field of international relations 
between states (despite the communications revolution of recent years). This is why states 
universally affirm the importance of protecting diplomatic privileges and immunity. Moreover, 
according to the preamble of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (VCDR) 
privileges and immunities ‘…would contribute to the development of friendly relations among 
nations, … such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the 
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States’.2 
 
Furthermore, international law provides a special duty of receiving states to protect diplomats and 
their premises,3 based on the important duties of diplomats in representing their states in receiving 
states and promoting the relationships between these states.4 VCDR grants diplomatic agents 
privileges and immunities, rendering them generally inviolable according to several articles.5 
Furthermore, the Convention states that upholding this inviolability is the duty of receiving states, 
who have a duty to protect the diplomats from any attack. Article 29 of the VCDR confirms that 
                                                          
1 Christos L. Rozakis, ‘Terrorism and the Internationally Protected Persons in the Light of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles’ [1974] 23 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 32 
2 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, (entered into force 24 
April 1964). 
3 J. Craig Barker, The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel, (Ash gate 2006) 1-2. 
4 Art 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, entered into force 24 
April 1964. 
5 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, (entered into force 24 
April 1964). 
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the receiving ‘State… shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom 
or dignity’.6 
 
International law has played a significant role in regulating relationships between states. For 
example, the 53 articles of the VCDR outline the foundations of the organization of diplomatic 
relations between the states in terms of how to start this relationship, provide the immunities and 
privileges, and even the way to end this relationship. On the other hand, the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations hips (VCCR, 1963), which is considered complementary to the VCDR in 
the area of consular immunities, contains 79 articles.7 Both the VCDR and VCCR provide 
institutional and organizational structure for the management of modern international relations to 
achieve the principle of equality of States, and the organization of the right of national sovereignty 
of States, in the interests of international peace and security, and the development of friendly 
relations. Although the VCDR has many articles to confirm the importance of having relationships 
between states, sometimes political tension might arise between states, which can result in the 
targeting diplomatic missions (which in any case play a major role in the progress of such tensions). 
 
The VCDR provides special protection not only to diplomatic personnel but also to the diplomatic 
premises. Article 22 provides for the inviolability of diplomatic premises,8 while Article 29 
confirms the inviolability of diplomatic personnel in that ‘... He shall not be liable to any form of 
arrest or detention’.9 
 This ensures that such protection is the responsibility of receiving states.10 
 
 
This inviolability includes also the archives, documents kept on the diplomatic premises,11 and 
diplomatic correspondence.12 Moreover, the private residence of diplomatic personnel and private 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (signed 24 April 1963, entered into force 1967) UNTS vol 596 p 
26. 
8 ‘1.The premises of the mission shall be inviolable... 3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and 
other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, 
attachment or execution’. 
9 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (signed 24 April 1963, entered into force 1967) UNTS vol 596 p 
26. 
10 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, (entered into force 24 
April 1964) stated that ‘The receiving State… shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his 
person, freedom or dignity’. 
11 Article 24, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, (entered into force 
24 April 1964) stated that ‘The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and 
wherever they may be’. 
12 Article 27, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, (entered into force 
24 April 1964). 
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correspondence shall be inviolable.13 Article 22(2) of the VCDR states that ‘The receiving State is 
under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission…’14 
  
To this extent, it is true to say that the protection of diplomatic premises and diplomatic personnel 
require from receiving states not only to not obstruct the diplomats from doing their function but 
also to prevent others within its territory from such obstruction.15 This duty in the circumstances of 
peace or active relations between states is easily achieved, but in the case of internal disturbances, 
tensions, and time of internal conflict, especially when the host state loses control over its territory, 
this duty becomes more difficult. Hence, the receiving state is under responsibility to protect the 
diplomatic personnel when the suspicion of wrongful action against diplomatic personnel might 
occur. 
 
The receiving state in these specific circumstance must intensify its efforts to protect diplomats, 
proving beyond reasonable doubt that diplomats enjoy full material protection. Consequently, the 
family of diplomatic personnel and members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission 
and their families are under the protection of host states unless they are the nationals of the receiving 
state or permanent residents in it.16 Article 37 of the VCDR extends this protection to the members 
of the family of diplomatic agents, members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission, 
and members of their families.17 However, the VCCR does not extend consular protection to 
family members, according to Article 40. This protection may not apply to a situation where the 
diplomats are only passing through this state or they are informal visitors. For this law to be 
applicable in this situation, the state of transit has to be given prior notice before the arrival of the 
diplomats.18 
 
                                                          
13 Article 40, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, (entered into force 
24 April 1964). 
14 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, (entered into force 24 
April 1964). 
15 Barker (n 3) 2. 
16 Amanda M. Castro ‘Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity in Family Courts: There’s Nothing Diplomatic about 
Domestic Immunity’ (2014) XLVII (353) Suffolk University Law Review 353. 
17 ‘1.The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not 
nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29 to 36. 2.Members 
of the administrative and technical staff of the mission, together with members of 
their families forming part of their respective households, shall, if they are not nationals of or 12 
permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29 to 35 
… 3.Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the 
receiving States … Other members of the staff of the mission and private servants who are nationals of or 
permanently resident in the receiving State…’. 
18 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, (9th end, Longman 1996) 114- 115; 
Kenneth K Mwenda, Public International Law and the Regulation of Diplomatic Immunity in the Fight against 
Corruption (Pretoria University Law Press 2011) 12; Rozakis (n 1) 32. 
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It is clear from the above that the VCDR clearly establishes diplomatic immunity and privileges, 
but despite the adoption of this Convention since 1961, diplomats have often been targeted over 
the decades.19 Diplomats were killed in a civil conflict in 1968 in Guatemala;20 Rebel Armed 
Forces (a leftist guerrilla organization) killed John Gordon Mein, the American ambassador, after 
a failed abduction attempt.21 Similarly, the October 8th Revolutionary Movement (a Marxist 
paramilitary organization) kidnapped Charles Burke Elbrick, the US Ambassador to Brazil, in 
1969; he was subsequently released when the demands of the hostage takers were met,22 
including the release of 129 political prisoners.23 
 
Although international law provides for crimes against diplomats, the duty of states to protect 
diplomats has become a real problem requiring intensive efforts and cooperation. The UN General 
Assembly specifically condemn attacks against diplomats such as the Security Council resolution 
condemning the murder of nine Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan.24 Further efforts were made by 
the UN to ensure certain protection for diplomats. In 1973 the UN Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents was adopted;25 this Convention acknowledges the need for more efforts by states to 
prevent and prosecute crimes against diplomats in domestic law.26 In accordance with this 
Convention, Libya enacted the Libyan Transitional Justice Law, 2014, which is explored in greater 
depth later in this study. Transitional justice historically played a significant role in achieving the 
justice in post-conflict situations. The researcher will discuss this role in Chapter 4 of this thesis to 
show the importance of such justice to guarantee the remedies to diplomats as victims. Libya also 
adopted an anti-terrorism law that specifically considers crimes against diplomats. 
 
The duty of receiving states to adopt local legislations to protect diplomats might not be enough, 
and further efforts may be needed, with inter-state cooperation. The state is under responsibility to 
prosecute the offenders or extradite them in case it finds itself unable to prosecute.27 Such 
cooperation between states is needed not only for the protection of the diplomats themselves but 
                                                          
19 Barker (n 3) 3. 
20 Ibid 3. 
21 Ibid 3. 
22 Ibid 3. 
23 Ibid 3. 
24 UNGA Sixth Committee (13th & 14thMeetings (AM & PM)) ‘Responsibility of States to Ensure Protection 
of Diplomatic Personnel, Premises Is Reviewed by Assembly’s Legal Committee’ (18 October 2010) UN Doc 
GA/L/3394. 
25 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against internationally protected persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents (signed 1973, entered into force 20 February 1977) V 1035 p 167. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (6th end, University of Cambridge Press 2008) 764-765. 
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is also significant for international security.28 
 
The adopting of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973), was a result of the rapid 
increase in hostilities against the interest of the international community of states. The inadequacy 
of this Convention is due to the challenges it faces. For instance, not all states treat this law as a 
general law, nor is it seen as a custom but rather relies on specific international treaties. Also, it 
does not specify a precise measure to which these diplomats should be protected in the receiving 
state. 
 
Furthermore, these measures may not be able to deal with all circumstances surrounding attacks 
on diplomatic agents. 
 
These efforts of the international community did not detract from violence against diplomats and 
risk surrounding them. Violence has continued and breaches of international obligations have 
increased. A high-profile case that highlights the situation since the 2000s was the siege of the 
US Embassy in Iran (1979-1981). The International Court of Justice in the case of United States 
v. Iran stated the responsibility of Iran for this violence, regarding it as serious breach of Article 
29 of the VCDR of 1961, which obliged the receiving State (Iran) to take appropriate steps to 
protect diplomats.29 The recent attacks on diplomats confirm that there still needs to be more effort 
from the receiving state to ensure that there is no targeting of diplomats. Receiving States should 
understand that no attack on diplomatic and consular missions or their staff could be justified under 
any circumstances. The 5th & 16th Meetings of the UN General Assembly in 2014 regarding 
attacks on diplomats confirmed growing concern about the targeting of diplomats. 
 
This meeting reviewed the number of attacks that happened in recent years. These attacks include 
the attack on the Indian Consulate in western Afghanistan in 2014 and the Turkish Consulate in 
Mosul in the same year, as well as the abduction in Yemen of an Iranian Embassy staff member 
in 2013 and the risk face by the diplomatic and consular missions and their staff in Syria. 
Furthermore, the representative of Costa Rica, speaking for the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC), noted that the dramatic events that had taken place in recent years 
served as a reminder that the role of representing one’s country implied a risk to those who 
                                                          
28 UN ‘Responsibility of States to Ensure Protection of Diplomatic Personnel, Premises Is Reviewed by 
Assembly’s Legal Committee’ (18 October 2010), 13th & 14th The Sixth Committee (Legal) Meetings (AM & 
PM) UN Doc GA/L/3394. 
29 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
(Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3. 
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performed it. There were also new challenges, including the impact that State surveillance and 




1.2 Recent Breaches of International Law Regarding Diplomatic 
Protection 
 
A core component of diplomacy is diplomats. The importance of protection for diplomats has 
become more necessary because of the important role that they play, particularly in the very 
circumstances in which they are targeted (i.e. deteriorating relations between states and conflict 
situations). This section does not seek to provide a comprehensive history of such events, but to 
present an overview of such incidents in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This is in 
light of the current international security situation where there is a pervasive danger of the storming 
of diplomatic premises by protesters and armed groups, damage to property and risking the lives 
of diplomats, as well as detaining or holding them hostage. One of the latest major attacks against 
a diplomat is the shooting (and killing) of Andrei Karlov, the Russian ambassador to Turkey, on 
19th of December 2016.31 This is a clear breach of the international obligation of receiving states 
(in this instance Turkey) to protect diplomats. The difference in this attack from other attacks against 
diplomats in MENA is that the killer is an organ of state - a Turkish police officer.32 The state is 
responsible for the activities of all its organs, such as the police,33 as will be explained in details in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. This attack sends a clear signal to the international community that the 
lives of diplomats are at risk. Although scholars are researching for new mechanisms to protect 
diplomats, the researcher believes intensive international efforts are required in order to resolve the 
accumulated political crisis in the MENA region and to prevent the intervention of foreign 
countries in internal affairs (legitimately or illegitimately), unless there is a real need to protect 
the security of the region and its citizens. What is desperately needed is political reconciliation and 
a united international community instead of internal division within states with foreign countries 
supporting one side against the other. In the meantime diplomats themselves could play important 
                                                          
30 UN ‘Compliance with Vienna Conventions Critical in Protection of Diplomatic, Consular Missions, 
Personnel, Legal Committee Hears as Debate Begins’ (21 October 2014) 69th session 15th & 16th Meetings 
UN Doc GA/L/3484. 
31 BBC News ‘Russian ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov shot dead in Ankara’ BBC News (London 19 
Dec 2016). Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38369962> Accessed 20 Dec 2016. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, (6th end, Oxford University Press 2007) 248. 
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The storming of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and its Consulate in Mashhad by Iranian 
demonstrators in 2016 is a challenge to the VCDR and the VCCR and threatens the foundations 
upon which these treaties rely to build international relations and maintain international peace 
and security.34 The storming of these Saudi diplomatic properties is likely a conscious imitation of 
the occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran in 
1979.35 However, in 1979 the new (post-revolutionary) Iranian government was not able to 
actively honour the obligation to protect diplomats. In the case of the Saudi embassy Iranian 
security forces intervened and ended the occupation, and the government took serious steps to 
punish those who did not prevent the attack. For example, Tehran Province’s Deputy Governor 
General for Security Affairs was removed from his position because of his handling of the storming 
of the Saudi embassy in the capital.36 This was despite the very tense international situation and 
Iranian hostility to Saudi Arabia itself; the demonstrations emerged in response to Saudi Arabia’s 
execution of the Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr and 46 others convicted of terror-related 
offenses.37 While the tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran is as old as the sectarian divide 
between Sunni and Shia, the tensions have intensified since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 
2011. This resulted in increasing persecution of the Shia minorities in Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
and the Shia majority in Bahrain by Saudi military forces, with the Saudi judicial system 
collaborating in this political project.38 
 
In October 2015, Saudi Arabia’s Supreme Court rejected an appeal against the death sentence 
passed earlier for Al-Nimr, who had called for pro-democracy demonstrations and whose arrest 
in 2012 sparked protests in which three people died. Al-Nimr had long been regarded as the most 
vocal Shia leader in the eastern Saudi province of Qatif, willing to publicly criticize the ruling Al-
Saud family and call for elections. The Saudi Interior Ministry blamed Al-Nimr, a long-time 
                                                          
34 James B. Smith ‘Former US Ambassador: What the Saudi Arabia-Iran Conflict Means for Stability’ 
Time (London, 5 Jan 2016). 
35 Nayef Al-Rasheed ‘Saudi Arabia Severs Diplomatic Ties with “Iranian Terrorism’’’ Middle East (Saudi, 4 
January, 2016) Available at <http://english.aawsat.com/2016/01/article55346171/55346171> accessed 2 May 
2016. 
36 Haaretz ‘Iranian Official Sacked Over Storming of Saudi Embassy’ Middle East News (Saudi, 10 Jan 2016). 
Available at <http://www.haaretz.com/middle -east-news/1.695260> accessed 6 July 2016. 
37 BBC News ‘UN condemns attack on Saudi embassy in Iran’ BBC News (London, 5 January 2016). 
Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35229385> accessed 2 May 2016. 
38 Ibid. 
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advocate of peaceful protest, of organising attacks on police, alongside a group of other 
suspects working as fifth-column agents of Iran.39 
 
On 4th January 2016, Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic ties with Iran and gave all personnel of 
Iranian diplomatic missions and consular staff 48 hours to leave the country.40 This severance of 
relationships affected economic as well as political prospects, immediately affecting trade routes 
and air traffic.41 If Iranian diplomats remained in Saudi Arabia after the 48-hour period of grace, 
they would lose their diplomatic immunity under the VCDR and be liable to criminal, judicial or 
even political prosecution. This action of Saudi Arabia is compliant with Article 9(2) of the VCDR, 
which states that ‘If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to carry out its 
obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the receiving State may refuse to recognize the person 
concerned as a member of the mission’. 
 
As for Saudi Arabia’s satellite states and allies, Bahrain and Sudan dutifully severed relations with 
Iran, with Bahrain also giving Iranian diplomats 48 hours to leave the country, while the UAE merely 
reduced the number of its diplomatic team in Iran, while maintaining the trade relationship 
between them.42 While both Saudi Arabia and Iran interfere in each other’s affairs, and the affairs 
of the whole MENA region, diplomatic personnel and Shia minorities bear the brunt of these 
schemes. This is most vividly demonstrated in the case of Iraq, which since 2003 has been the 
main battleground in the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Having restored diplomatic 
relations with Iran for the first time since the Gulf War (1990-1991), the new Saudi ambassador 
to Iraq in 2016 interfered by calling for the government to intervene to disband the Al-Hashad Al-
Shabi militia. His argument was that Saudi Arabia reserved the right to support Sunni paramilitary 
organizations in Iraq if Iran was to be allowed to support Shia groups.43 While there is undoubtedly 
a deep and intractable sectarian problem in Iraq, the Saudi ambassador’s comments were designed 
to fan the flames in the interests of domestic propaganda in Saudi Arabia, and not to genuinely help 
Sunnis in Iraq or to ameliorate the problematic regional situation. 
 
                                                          
39 The Guardian ‘Saudi Arabia executes 47 people in one day including Shia cleric’ The Guardian (London, 2 
January 2016). Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/02/saudi- arabia-executes-47-
people-in-one-day-including-iran ian-cleric> accessed 3 August 2016. 
40 BBC News ‘Saudi Arabia’s allies Bahrain, Sudan and UAE act against Iran’ BBC News (London, 4 




43 The New Arab ‘Iraq summons Saudi ambassador over criticism of Iran-backed militias’ The New Arab 
(Dubai, 24 January 2016). Available at <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/1/24/iraq - summons-
saudi-ambassador-over-criticism-of-iran-backed-militias> accessed 3 April 2016. 
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Beyond regional tensions, Iran expelled the UK ambassador in Tehran in November 2011 in 
retaliation for British support for tougher sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear programme; two days 
later hundreds of protesters stormed the embassy compound, smashing windows, torching cars 
and burning union jacks. The UK responded by closing the Iranian embassy in London later on. In 




Yemen has a record number of attacks on diplomats. In 2012, Abdullah Al-Khalidi Saudi 
Arabia’s Deputy Consul in the southern Yemeni city of Aden, was abducted by gunmen. Aden is 
the city closest to Yemen’s Abyan Province where government forces have been struggling to 
contain militant groups linked to Al-Qaeda. Such groups had consolidated their control over 
several towns and villages in the region;45 however, Al-Khalidi was released in March 2015. It is 
unclear whether the demanded ransom was paid,46 but the Yemeni government declares that it 
neither negotiates with terrorists nor pays ransoms to them. The Yemen government believes that 
ransoms being paid to terrorists motivates them to conduct more kidnappings. If a ransom was 
paid,47 it was likely funded by Saudi Arabia. 
 
In July 2013, Nour Ahmad Nikbakht, an Iranian diplomat to Yemen, was held hostage, before 
being released after 18 months in March 2015.48 In January 2014 in the capital, Sana’a, another 
Iranian diplomat, the economic attaché Ali Asghar, was shot dead after resisting a kidnapping 
attempt.49 In December 2014, there was a bomb attack by AQAP militants on the Iranian 
ambassador’s residence in the capital.50 
 
Kidnappings of foreigners is common in Yemen with tribes or militants affiliated with Al-Qaeda 
often demanding a ransom for their release or using them as a bargaining chip in their dealings 
with the central government. While poverty has traditionally been a major factor in such crimes 
                                                          
44 BBC News ‘British embassy in Tehran reopens four years after closure’ BBC News (London, 23 August 
2015). Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34031615> accessed 3 August 2016. 
45 BBC News ‘Saudi diplomat kidnapped in Yemen’ BBC News (London, 28 March 2012). Available at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17534644> accessed 4 July 2016. 
46 BBC News ‘Iranian ‘operation’ in Yemen frees kidnapped diplomat’ BBC News (London, 5 March 2015). 
Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31744613> accessed 3 June 2016. 
47 Hakim Almasmari ‘Saudi diplomat in Yemen freed by al Qaeda’ CNN (London, 3 March 2015). 
Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/03/world/yemen -Saudi-diplomat-al-Qaeda/> accessed 2 June 
2016. 
48 BBC News ‘Iranian ‘operation’ in Yemen frees kidnapped diplomat’ BBC News (London, 5 March 
2015). Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31744613> accessed 2 May 2016. 
49 BBC News ‘Iranian ‘operation’ in Yemen frees kidnapped diplomat’ BBC News (London, 5 March 2015). 
Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31744613> accessed 3 December 2015. 
50 Ibid. 
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(as with Somali piracy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden), Al-Qaeda and its political ideology is 




Following the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, the country became a more dangerous place for the 
lives of diplomats. Iraq became a ripe environment for the kidnapping of diplomatic personnel 
from regional and other states;52 the root problem is that the new Iraqi government did not have 
effective control over large swathes of national territory and was thus unable to protect foreign 
diplomats.53 Neither the army nor police developed active solutions to safeguard the safety of 
citizens, let alone the diplomatic missions in Iraq.54 Also, armed militias have specifically targeted 
diplomats with threats, kidnapping and assassinations.55 Naturally US diplomats have been 
particularly targeted, especially throughout the period 2003-2012.56 This problem was 
transposed to other countries engaged in conflict after the Arab Spring, notably Libya and Syria.57 
On the other hand, attacks on and abductions of diplomats in Iraq during the period 2003-2014 
abated during the second term of former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki (2010-2014).Since 2014 
(contemporaneous with the emergence of ISIS as a major phenomenon), kidnappings strongly re-
emerged.58 
 
In 2004, unidentified militants and the Islamic Army kidnapped Egyptian and Iranian diplomats; 
these diplomats were later released.59 In July 2005, three high profile cases emerged. First, the 
Egyptian ambassador Ihab Al-Sherif was killed five days after being kidnapped by the Abu-Musab 
Al-Zarqawi militant group.60 Then in the same year gunmen hurt Bahrain’s envoy to Baghdad in an 
attack;61 the Pakistani envoy to Iraq escaped unhurt after gunmen attacked his vehicle;62 and two 
Algerian diplomats were abducted and killed - the charge d’ affaires Ali Belaroussi and his deputy 
                                                          
51 Almasmari (n 47). 
52 Omar Al-Jaffal, Translator Sami-Joe Abboud ‘Who’s to blame for recent kidnappings in Iraq?’ AL monitor 
(Iraq, 29 January 2016). Available at. <http://www.al-monitor. Com/pulse/ 




56 United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security ‘Significant Attacks against US 
Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel: 1998-2012’ Available at <http://www.state.gov 
/documents/organization/211361.pdf> accessed 20 April 2016. 
57 Al-Jaffal (n 52). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 BBC News ‘Captors kill Egypt envoy to Iraq’ BBC News (London, 8 July 2005). Available at 




Azzedine Belkadi.63 In October of the same year, two Moroccan embassy employees were 
kidnapped on the highway from Amman to Baghdad. 
 
Another wave came in November, 2005 when Al-Qa’ida in Iraq posted a statement on a website 
saying that Abdel Karim el-Mohsfidi, a Moroccan diplomat, and Abderrahim Boualem, his driver, 
would be executed as an example for others challenging the ‘mujahidin’.64 A Sudanese diplomat, 
Taha Mohammed Ahmed, was hit by a stray bullet while walking in the garden of the Sudanese 
Embassy in Baghdad,65 and Hammouda Ahmed Adam, a Sudanese Embassy employee, was killed 
by unknown gunmen while driving in the Mansour district of Baghdad. On November 12, 2005, 
armed groups attacked the Omani Embassy in Baghdad, killing an Iraqi police officer and an 
embassy employee. The international dimension of the Iraqi situation also affects Russia; in June 
2006, in Baghdad, a Russian diplomat was killed and four diplomatic employees were kidnapped 
by armed groups called the Mujahideen Shura Council, which released a video showing two of 
the diplomats being killed. The group had demanded that Russia leave Chechnya and release 
Muslim prisoners.66 
 
However, the most serious development in Iraq since 2003 was the emergence of ISIS as the 
controlling militia in swathes of northern Iraq, particularly after they captured Mosul in 2014, 
establishing authority over the surrounding region of Nineveh and areas of Kirkuk and Salah-
Eddin province as well as Tikrit city, less than 100 miles north of the capital, Baghdad. Upon 
seizing Mosul, ISIS took over the Turkish Consulate in Mosul (which has been the bastion of 
Turkish influence in Iraq since the Ottoman era) and kidnapped the head of the diplomatic mission 
along with 24 staff members.67 
 
1.2.4 Other Countries 
 
The fundamental reason for non-state actors such as terrorist groups targeting diplomats in Iraq 
was that they viewed the establishment of diplomacy with the Iraqi government as legitimization 
                                                          
63 BBC News ‘Press fury at killing of Algerians’ BBC News (London, 28 July 2005). Available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4724323.stm> accessed 4 July 2016. 
64 Anthony H. Cordesman ‘Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency: The Nature of Attacks and Patterns and Cycles in the 
Conflict’ (2006) Centre for Strategic and International Studies Available at 
<http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060203_iraqicombattrends.pdf> accessed 20 June 2016 
65 Cordesman (n 64). 
66 BBC news ‘Russia ‘to kill Iraq kidnappers’ BBC News (London, 28 June 2006). Available at 
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of the US occupation (i.e. by legitimizing the government and state of Iraq).68 With the escalation 
and proliferation of terrorism throughout MENA after 2003, such incidents spilled over into other 
states, such as Algerian diplomats being kidnapped in northern Mali in 2012 (they were ultimately 
released in 2014). These diplomats had warned their government of the danger but they were 
ignored, and although the ‘Tawhid and Jihad Movement’ released two diplomats, another died in 
captivity. Furthermore, in 2013 three out of seven Algeria n diplomats kidnapped in Gao in 
northern Mali were executed due to the Algeria n government refusing to release one of the 
movement’s leaders held on terrorism charges. The other diplomats were released under secret 
terms, similar to the release of the Mauritanian businessman Moustapha Ould Imam Shafii, who 
himself had brokered earlier liberation of European hostages from the grip of Al-Qaeda in the 
 
 
Islamic Maghreb. Both Algeria and Morocco have been increasingly drawn into terrorist actions 
against diplomats in North Africa.69 
 
Jordan has been the exception with the lack of attacks on diplomats, representing the eye of the 
Middle Eastern storm. The only recorded example was the assassination of the US diplomat Larry 
Foley in Amman in October 2002 by radical Islamic groups.70 
 
1.3 Arab Spring Revolutions and the Breaches of International Law 
Regarding Protection of Diplomats 
 
From late 2010 numerous Arab countries witnessed wave of mass protests and in some cases 
revolutions and civil conflicts that came to be known as the Arab Spring, which was accompanied 
by a concomitant wave of breaches of international law, including attacks on diplomats. This 
study focuses on Libya in particular, which has had a particularly notable Arab Spring experience 
(transforming it from a moribund though stable dictatorial backwater into a civil conflict scenario 
of tentative political transition and the proliferation of armed militias). Libya has had a serious 
problem of attacks on diplomats including the case of the assassination of the US Ambassador 
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(Steven) after the US helped Libyan rebels overthrow the former regime. 
 
1.3.1 Background to the Killing of the US Ambassador to Libya 
 
In 2012 Libyans revolted against the authoritarian dictatorship of the Gaddafi regime, and brought 
down his government with the assistance of NATO military forces and financing from the GCC. 
Latent civil conflicts and interference by other states has ensured continued instability during the 
post-revolutionary period, with both the government and opposition groups committing serious 
violations of human rights along with breaches of international law.71 
 
The murder of US Ambassador Stevens in Libya in September 2012 was the first murder of a US 
Ambassador since 1979. Having earned the disapprobation of the whole Islamic world after the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq from 2003, which by 2011 was accompanied by massive 
discontent within the US, the US support of the intervention in Libya on humanitarian grounds 
was supposed to herald a new dawn of US support for democracy throughout MENA, after its 
lacklustre condemnation of its allies Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt. The US had formerly freed Libya from Italian colonization following WWII, but it had 
consistently opposed Gaddafi. Thus Ambassador Stevens personified the US commitment to a free 
and democratic Libya.72 
 
Furthermore, Stevens was an exceptional practitioner of modern diplomacy, with knowledge of 
the Arabic language, broad appeal to all sectors of the population, and an extensive number of 
friends and allies in Libya, particularly in Benghazi, where he was a major figure in the US Special 
Mission in Benghazi, and a Special Envoy to the rebel-led government that eventually toppled 
Gaddafi. The Special Mission bolstered US support for Libya’s democratic transition through 
engagement with eastern Libya, where the revolution against Gaddafi was catalysed, and a regional 
power centre.73 
 
Initially, the attack on Ambassador Steven was thought to be perpetrated by an angry mob 
responding to a video made in the United States that mocked Islam and the Prophet Muhammad but 
it is later determined to be a terrorist attack.74 
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US embassies throughout the Muslim world were subject to demonstrations or attacks in protest 
against a vulgar propaganda film made in the US that mocked the Prophet Muhammad as part of 
the surge of anti-US sentiment that followed, Stevens and others were killed by armed groups.75 
Contemporaneously, in Yemen, demonstrators briefly stormed the grounds of the US Embassy in 
Sana’a and burnt the US flag before being driven back by security forces. In Egypt, 224 people 
were injured in protests outside the US Embassy in Cairo, with some demonstrators demanding the 
expulsion of the ambassador. Smaller protests were reported in Bangladesh, Iraq, Morocco, 
Sudan and Tunisia.76 
 
The killing of the US Ambassador in Libya whilst on duty, was the first time this had happened since 
1979, creating political mayhem in the US. Many blamed the White House for instructing security 
forces to hold back when the attacks were already happening , and they claimed that President 
Obama whilst avoiding calling the attacks “terrorist”, had led to the incident occurring. This 
was denied by him when this became a key issue in the 2012 presidential campaign. 
Republicans also accused Hillary Clinton’s State Department of a failure to provide appropriate 
security and equipment prior to the attacks, which may have prevented them. Accusations were 
made that the Department of State failed to provide proper security beforehand and as a result, 
four Americans died that day. This put the Democrats in a highly precarious position. According 
to some resources this lack of security has seen bureaucratic inefficiencies taking the blame. 
According to the sources, Clinton did not approve nor deny requests for additional security.77 
 
However, analysing the issue objectively, away from the hysteria of US political discourse, the US 
never formally committed ground troops to Libya or occupied the country, unlike in Afghanistan 
after 2001 and Iraq after 2003. Thus the extensive security forces that were deployed in Libya 
were far in excess of conventional deployments allotted to protect diplomats in foreign states 
(indeed, critics of US foreign policy frequently opine that despite the official position of ‘no boots 
on the ground’, the US de facto invaded Libya with massive deployments of special forces and 
advisers). Logistically, the lack of security was considered a problem on the confusing status of 
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the compound; since it was neither an embassy nor official consulate, it was not considered in 
budgetary terms in the same way as it would have been if it were a more traditional diplomatic 
post.78 The deficient security resources in Libya and the loss of territorial control in Libya by its 
ostensible government authorities led the researcher to research on mechanisms that could have 
saved the lives of the ambassador and three other American staff during the armed conflicts.  
 
The most appropriate solution was identified as the virtual embassy, as explained in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
The motives of the armed group that attacked Ambassador Stevens are still uncertain. Their actions 
were probably driven in response to what other militants did in Cairo contemporaneously. 79Some 
may have been motivated by the call by Ayman Al- Zawahiri - the leader of Al-Qaeda thought 
to be operating in Pakistan - made a day before the event to Libyans to avenge the killing of a 
senior Al-Qaeda leader of Libyan origins in Pakistan. Although American analysts have never said 
that this video played a role in the Benghazi attacks,80 Ahmed Abu Khattala (hereinafter 
‘Khattala’), a terrorist leader and perhaps one of the leaders of the attacks, said he was influenced 
by the video. Khattala is now imprisoned by the US under indictment for the role he played in the 
attack.81 The US captured Khattala without prior notification to the Libya authorities outside 
Benghazi for the part he played in the American mission’s attack in Libya and the murder of the 
American ambassador alongside three other American staff.82 
 
Neither civilian nor military casualties were reported in the extraction of Khattala. Twenty four 
Delta Force commandos plus a few FBI Hostage Rescue Team agents arrived shortly after 
midnight at Khattala’s home in Benghazi and, using subterfuge, grabbed hold of him pushing 
him into a vehicle then sped away into the night. Khattala was charged in August 2013 for leading 
attacks which led to four Americans losing their lives. The Libyan authorities took this raid that 
captured Khattala as an attack on Libya’s sovereignty, and as such sought for him to face trial in 
Libya for his crimes. However, the US justified the raid as self-defence, as Khattala was planning 
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on more attacks. Khattala could be facing the death penalty. TJ would have been a better solution 
to the unilateral action taken by the US, as their action was in fact a clear breach of international 
law.83 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that the attackers intended to target the Ambassador or US officials 
specifically when they started any of the fires that night.84 They were a group of individuals entering 
the building and the attack was not organized; rather it was a flash mob planning to enter the 
compound to see how much harm they could inflict. They did not appear to be looking for 
Americans to harm them with malicious forethought, but seemed intent on looting and vandalism. 
It was clear that these mobs were looting and generally vandalising and destroying the compound, 
and the associated deaths were tragic consequences of this attack. Nevertheless, they were a mob, 
made up of a group of individuals, some of whom were Islamist extremists.85 However, Al-Qaeda 
claims that Stevens died of a lethal injection while they were trying to kidnap him in a planned 
operation in the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi.86 In view of all the confusion as to who 
was involved and their motive, perhaps the best way of finding answers to these questions and 
bring clarity and closure would be through a TJ process. 
 
One of the accusations made against Stevens by militants was interference in the internal matters 
of Libya. Stevens personally served as the representative of America to the Libyan National 
Transitional Council in Benghazi during the Revolution and then as Ambassador to Libya. 
Immediately upon assuming his duties he expressed his great pleasure in witnessing the people of 
Libya revolting over the rule of the former Libyan regime and he claimed to be proud of his 
participation in the renaissance of a modern Libya on its way to freedom and democracy. He 
expressed his desire to build a strong relationship between the US and Libya, and his aspiration to 
see a new Libya run under strong government institutions.87 Albeit the implicit extensive 
engagement of the US in internal state-building within Libya was presented on humanitarian 
grounds, the declarations of the US Ambassador could be interpreted as a violation of Art 41(1) 
of the VCDR, whereby diplomats are prevented from interference in internal affairs of the hosting 
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Clearly these non-state actors hold the US responsible for the perceived crimes of individual 
citizens; this is the corollary of the doctrine of Al-Qaeda that individual citizens (i.e. civilians) in 
democratic states are legitimate targets due to their culpability in the perceived crimes of their state 
(by which they attempt to abrogate the staunch protections of civilians in Islamic rules of warfare). 
Regardless of the motivations for these crimes, international law holds the receiving state 
responsible to protect diplomats from any attacks, as explained previously. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) also specifically clarified that attacks on diplomats can never be justified 
as punitive actions against the sending state. In the Iran hostage crisis, the ICJ stated that the crimes 
of the sending states did not allow the receiving state to violate the embassy of the sending state, 
noting that although the ‘Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs had alleged in his two letters to the 
Court that the United States had carried out criminal activities in Iran’ these ‘alleged activities’ 
do ‘not constitute a defence to the United States’ claims, since the Diplomatic Law provides the 
possibility of breaking off diplomatic relations, or of declaring persona non grata members of 
diplomatic or consular missions who may be carrying on illicit activities’.89 
 
However, breaking off diplomatic relations in retaliation for perceived affronts or abuses is 
counterproductive, as it is in such scenarios that the role of diplomats is galvanised and most 
important in promoting relationships between states. According to Arts 40–41 of the Draft 
articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, (2001), where the 
internationally wrongful act constitutes a serious breach by the State of an obligation arising 
under a peremptory norm of general international law, the breach may entail further 
consequences both for the responsible State and for other States. In particular, all States in such 
cases have obligations to cooperate to bring the breach to an end, not to recognize as lawful the 
situation created by the breach and not to render aid or assistance to the responsible State in 
maintaining the situation so created.90 
 
This meets the requirements of the ICJ in its decision of the case concerning the Iran Hostage 
Crisis which stated that: ‘the parties should take speedy action and make maximum efforts to 
dispel tension and mistrust, and in this a third-party initiative may be important’.91 Nevertheless, 
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the breaking of diplomatic relations is often adopted by states, especially when the receiving State 
fails to meet its duty of protecting the foreign diplomats of the sending state. Historical cases include 
the West German government forcefully condemning the failure of Guatemala to protect its 
ambassador Von Spreti in 1970, who was kidnapped and held to ransom; when the demands were 
not met and no alternative was found, he was murdered.92 
 
The breaking of diplomatic relationships between receiving and sending states is not a new form 
of reflection of their discontent for unacceptable actions taken by other states. However, such 
actions have traditionally been governed by custom and protocol since time immemorial. For 
example, the custom in ancient Mesopotamia was for a host to provide troops to escort foreign 
envoys; the lawgiver Hammurabi once refused a return escort upon being dissatisfied with the 
message brought by the envoy of Elam, which was understood to be tantamount to breaking 
relationships with the latter.93 
 
1.3.2 The Legal Qualification of the Libyan Situation 
 
Libya has been facing a prolonged political crisis since the outbreak of armed conflict in 2011. Two 
governments claim legitimacy at a time when effective control over most of the geographical 
expanse of Libya has been assumed by powerful armed groups, with all sides committing 
violations of International Human Rights Law as well as conventional domestic law, emboldened 
by impunity due to the lack of any real prospect of punishment.94 The judicial system, which is 
itself in flux, no longer works in parts of the country, with a notable shortfall in technical assistance. 
However, some state institutions and civil society organizations still work to varying degrees.95 
 
As a result of the last waves of attack on diplomats during the Arab Spring revolution, the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly confirmed the responsibility of host states to protect diplomats 
according to international law with reference to attacks on US and other envoys in Libya, Sudan, 
Egypt, Tunisia, Pakistan and Yemen, sending a clear signal of the need to intensify efforts and 
cooperation among states to prevent such assaults.96 
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The Libyan case of an attack on US diplomats seems to be much close to the historical attack on 
the case of an attack on US Embassy in Beirut in 1983, when Islamic Jihad attacked the US 
Embassy and that led to the killing of 63 people including 18 Americans. The embassy was 
bombed with 20,000 pounds of explosives. The operation was carried on by a suicide bomber.97 
Lebanon witnessed major violence during religious and political internal conflict from 1975 to 
1990, with armed groups controlling many areas as in modern Libya; the salient difference 
between the two cases is that the Libyan conflict is a form of tribal conflict (in the absence of 
religious or ethnic differences). 
 
With regard to international law, in the case of Lebanon and Libya the state  government was 
basically too weak to protect the diplomats in question in the face of powerful non-state military 
actors. Conversely, state complicity was implied in the attack on the US Embassy in Tehran in 
1979, during which six people were killed and the US Ambassador to Tehran along with 70 other 
people were held hostage.9898 
While this conflict is often described as the first encounter between the US and political Islam, the 
US in fact has a long and extensive history of normal relations with Islamic states. The Kingdom 
of Morocco was the first nation to recognise the independence of the US in 1777,99 and in more 
recent history it leveraged the political Islamism bequeathed it by the British to oust the latter from 
the Arabian Peninsula after WWII, after which British imperialism in the Middle East was largely 
confined to its de facto control over Persia and Mesopotamia.100 The problem of the US with 
the spiritual movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini that installed an Islamic theocracy in Iran, 
replacing the pro-Western secularist monarchy of the Shah, was not that it was Islamist, but that it 
was rabidly anti-Western and anti-colonial. The US was viewed as the ‘Great Satan‘ by the new 
Iranian government, and Iranians blamed it for its role in placing and keeping the Shah in power 
(after overthrowing the democratically elected leader Mosaddegh in 1953, one of whose political 
heroes was Thomas Jefferson). 
 
After the Islamic Revolution, general anti-colonial hatred of the US was galvanised by the spiritual 
significance accorded to such sentiments by the theocratic Iranian regime. The Ayatollah himself 
blessed the hostage taking at the US Embassy, further fuelling the government’s hard line against 
                                                          
97 Barker (n3) 9. 
98 Ibid 76. 
99 White House (2013). Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco. Office 
of the Press Secretary. Available at: Https: //Obama white house.archives.gov/the-press- 
office/2013/11/22/joint- statement-united-states -America-and- kingdom- morocco [last accessed 3 Jan 2018]. 
20  
the US.100 The position in Tehran was a tense one and the leader of the diplomatic mission at the 
US Embassy in Tehran had sent several messages to Washington.101 These all said that if the Shah 
left Iran for medical treatment in the US, the Embassy would fall. President Jimmy Carter agreed 
to the shah been allowed entry for treatment although with much hesitation. This then enraged 
the Iranian people who saw this as nothing more than a smokescreen to bring the Shah to the 
US and from there plot his return to lead Iran. This was only a matter of weeks before the embassy 
was attacked.102 
 
The embassy in Tehran is these days an Islamic cultural centre as well as a museum, preserved 
from earlier days when it was an infamous jail in 1979. It is a symbol of the Iranian 
revolution, and is known regionally as the "‘den of spies’." Old artefacts from this time such 
as typewriters, communication equipment, and prints of old visa photos, are displayed. Every 
year on the anniversary of the hostage incident, the Iranian government hold rallies and chant 
‘Death to America‘, just as happened in 1979.103 
  
The ICJ determined Iran to be more than negligent in these circumstances.104They had, on 1 March 
1979, claimed to be making arrangements to prevent the United States embassy from any 
takeovers or attacks; however, many Iranian authorities approved of the takeover and the Foreign 
Minister claimed the US was responsible for the event. Iran deliberately ignored requests for any 
release of hostages and should, for these reasons, make reparation for their actions.105 
 
The ICJ examined the seizure and detention of US diplomats and members of their staff by a group 
of militants (students) in Tehran in accordance with international law. However, Iran adopted 
Sharia and changed its Constitution in 1979; while Libya has never had any Islamic aspirations, 
being nominally socialist since the Green Revolution of 1969. The post-2011 political militias in 
Libya generally claim that they apply Sharia, according to which diplomats have immunity from 
prosecution, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention and the insurance of proper care and 
treatment. Also, the diplomats enjoyed freedom of religion, as explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 
                                                          
100 Francis Owtram. A Modern History of Oman: Formation of the State since 1920 (IB. Tauris 2004 
) 91. 
101 Susan Chun ‘Six Things you didn’t Know about the Iran Hostage Crisis’ CNN 
(July 16, 2015). Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/27/world/ac-six-things-you-didnt-kn ow- about-
the-Iran-hostage-crisis/index.html> accessed 5 July 2017. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
[1980] ICJ Rep 3, paras 69-79. 
105 Ibid, paras 69-79. 
21  
Only under extraordinary circumstances might envoys be detained and imprisoned, and that would 
be in the form of specific reprisals in kind. A case in point is the Prophet Muhammad’s detention, 
without physical harm, of the envoys of Mecca during the negotiations on the Treaty of 
Huddaibiya, because the Meccans had detained his emissaries. The practice of the Prophet 
Muhammad embeds within Sharia respect for the customary rules and protocols of international 
relations. The Prophet granted immunity to foreign diplomats, their families, staff and servants, and 
dealt with foreign diplomats the same as he dealt with Muslim diplomats.1
106  
 
This practice was continued by Muslim states in modern day international relations in their 
acceptance of the VCDR 1961 and VCCR 1963 on diplomatic and consular relations.107 
 
The foundations of Sharia are the Quran and the sayings (hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Various schools of Islamic jurisprudence interpret Sharia in light of these and the practice of Al-
Khulafa Al-Rashidun (the ‘Rightly Guided Caliphs’ who succeeded the Prophet, c. 632-661 AD), 
the opinions of the Companions of the Prophet, and the consensus of jurists; the Jafari school (i.e. 
Shia Muslims) attribute greater authority to the verdicts of Imams (i.e. Ayatollahs), while Sunni legal 
thought is more codified according to recognised precedents and precepts. According to Sharia, 
the Head of the State (the caliph) is permitted to enter treaties.108 
 
Iran and Libya as signatories of the VCDR 1961 and VCCR 1963 are therefore obligated to 
abide to the terms of these treaties. According to prophetic injunction, Muslims are obliged to apply 
conventions and abide by their obligations unless these clearly contradict Sharia (e.g. a Muslim 
community would be obliged to honour a military pact of defence, but not one of aggressive 
conquest for worldly purposes). Consequently, Sharia obliges ostensibly Islamic states like Iran 
and Libya to be bound by the treaties of 1961 and 1963,109 as explained in the next chapter. 
 
However, the non-state Islamist militias who claim responsibility for murdering the US 
Ambassador to Libya in 2012 might claim that any agreements made by Gaddafi are null and void 
and that it is not incumbent upon them to honour treaties made by Gaddafi as a non-Muslim leader 
(according to their understanding). 
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Returning to the practical implications in the case of Iran, the ICJ stated that ‘the Iranian security 
personnel are reported to have simply disappeared from the scene; at all events, it is established 
that they made no apparent effort to deter or prevent the demonstrator from seizing the embassy’s 
premises’.110 
 
Although Iran had undertaken to protect the US Embassy, the guards disappeared during the 
takeover and the government did not attempt to stop it or rescue the hostages. The US arranged to 
meet with Iranian authorities to discuss the release of the hostages; however, Ayatollah Khomeini 
forbade the latter to meet the US representatives. The US subsequently ceased relations with 
Iran, applied a trade embargo (including oil imports from Iran), and blocked Iranian assets, despite 
the militants not acting on behalf of the state of Iran; thus these punitive measures were purely 
because Iran had not upheld its responsibility to protect US nationals and diplomatic personnel. 
One of the demands of the hostage-takers was the return of the former Shah (to face trial); he was 
receiving medical treatment in the US.111 
 
The case of Libya in 2012 is similar to the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979 in that in both instances 
the state government was a post-revolutionary regime that failed to protect diplomats and their 
premises, in a context of massive public outrage against the US and its imperialist and Western 
associations. Iran was found to have made no efforts to protect diplomats, which was a major 
violation of Article 22(2) of the VCDR, which obliges states to make efforts to protect the 
diplomats: ‘The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the 
premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the 
peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity’. 
 
Furthermore, Iran continued its violation by not taking any further steps to protect the diplomats 
even after the decision was made the ICJ in its Court’s Order of 15 December 1979 which ask 
them to release the hostages: ‘the Government of Iran must immediately release the United States 
nationals held as hostages and place the premises of the Embassy in the hands of the protecting 
power’.112 However, the decision of the ICJ was rejected by Iran. The Ayatollah declared that 
‘The detention of the hostages would continue until the new Iranian parliament had taken a decision 
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as to their fate’.113 Conversely, the Libyan government did take genuine if ineffectual measures to 
try and protect diplomatic personnel, and has since taken real steps to avoid any further acts of 
that kind, reforming its local legislation and enacting anti-terrorism laws that unequivocally 
regard wrongful acts against diplomats as terrorism (and thus as more serious offences than 
conventional criminal categories). 
 
While this research is mainly concerned with attacks on diplomatic personnel and their premises 
in MENA, this is not the only region to witness such violence; for example, in 1999 a NATO bomb 
struck the Chinese embassy in the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade.114 
 
Furthermore, in 2001, the Canadian and Italian embassies in London were attacked by 150 anti-
globalization protesters, who smashed windows and damaged a car. However, no key incidents 
or injuries were recounted. In response to the killing of a rioter by Italian security forces at the Group 
of Eight (G8) summit in Genoa, a protest outside the Italian embassy included a tiny number of 
rockets being thrown by protesters, causing minor damage to a building near the Italian embassy. 
The protests moved later on toward the Canadian embassy where windows were smashed and a 
car was damaged.115 
 
In January 2014, the Russian embassy in Ukraine was attacked by Ukrainian protesters hurling 
eggs and paint at the building, and more seriously a petrol bomb; windows were smashed and flags 
torn down. Some protesters wearing balaclavas overturned cars with diplomatic plates.116 
 
Given that such events are becoming the norm, the traditional assumptions of diplomatic 
relationships seem to be under mortal threat, consequently threatening the entire MENA region 
and the security and peace of the whole world. The international community needs to work 
together to tackle these serious attacks against diplomats if diplomatic relationships between states 
are to be maintained. 
 
In states with a situation of internal tension, political disturbance, or civil war, diplomatic personnel 
and premises are more vulnerable to direct threats, because of the weakness of the state security 
to control prevailing conditions, and the corresponding strengthening of non-state groups. 
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1.3.3 Applicable Law for Justice for Diplomats in the Time of an Internal 
Armed Conflict – The Example of Libya 
 
The question arises as to what laws are applicable during internal armed conflict for the protection 
of diplomats. Although the VCDR is the customary international law that would apply, this 
Convention does not set out the punishment for offenders; it merely mentions the possibility of 
suitable punishment being set out in the internal laws of the state parties. This is why this research 
examines the internal laws of Libya, to find what is applicable in the case of the killing of 
Ambassador Stevens. During internal armed conflicts and the times of tension and disturbance, the 
Libyan authorities suspended all other laws and applied the state of emergency laws. By critically 
examining these laws and their applications, this research determines whether the mechanisms for 
finding justice for the diplomats in Libya are adequate. 
 
Under international law, Libya was obliged to exercise due diligence to prevent any attacks against 
diplomats and, if these measures failed to prevent attacks, to find justice for those diplomats. This 
might require the enactment of internal laws in this regard. For example, during the attack against the 
US Embassy the Libyan authorities failed to protect the US Ambassador, but they declared a state 
of emergency and enacted anti-terrorism law, as explained in the next section. 
 
1.3.3.1 State of Emergency 
 
States often declare a state of emergency under circumstances of extreme tensions and internal 
conflict.117 One of emergency characteristics is the rescue of diplomats and the protection of 
foreign diplomatic premises along with host state government buildings during times of internal 
armed conflict and political tensions, which is what happened in Libya in response to the attack 
against the US Ambassador. By declaring emergency status the Libyan authorities exercised due 
diligence to avoid more attacks.118 
 
However, the new Libyan government lost control of its armed forces and as a result could not 
protect diplomats. Armed militias with de facto authority were known to have established their own 
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illegal tribunals and prisons. Libyan authorities have no control on armed militias and cannot 
charge them for any crimes committed by them.119 This contributed to its inability to arrest anyone 
for the attacks in Benghazi in 2012. 
 
The judicial system is still weak and vulnerable, and in some areas of Libya it no longer works. The 
armed militias in effect have total impunity, and do not view themselves as being subject to 
international or national law.120 
 
Furthermore, Libya was already under the status of emergency from the beginning of the political 
tensions and internal armed conflict in Libya even before the fall of the Gaddafi regime, and long 
before the attack on US diplomats; the declaration of an emergency was thus a reaffirmation of 
an on-going chaotic situation with incoherent authority and order. The state of emergency in Libya 
is an unsuccessful system for preventing diplomatic attacks and is unable to address instability. 
 
According to international law, diplomats are duty bound to respect laws of a hosting state; 
however, emergency orders might restrict diplomats from movement, as confirmed by Article 41(1) 
of the VCDR (1961), which is generally against their customary rights, privileges and immunities 
and which is thus justified on the grounds of protecting the diplomats themselves.121 Although the 
Libyan Emergency Law did not explicitly restrict the movement of the diplomats, the state of 
emergency sometimes restricts the movement of diplomats when states explicitly set it out, which 
severely limits their ability to conduct diplomatic relations within the country.122 An alternative 
could be to leave the country and engage in e-diplomacy during the state of emergency, as discussed 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
 
1.3.3.2 Anti-Terrorism Law 
 
Libya has tried to seek a solution to adhere to its international duties to protect both diplomats and 
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embassies, which gave rise to Law No. 3 Anti- Terrorism Act of 2014. This Law specifies 
prohibited attempting to capture, prevent or impede the work of diplomatic missions . 
 
When the Gaddafi regime came to an end, the first full prosecutions carried out by the incoming 
Transitional Council were cases against previous officials accused of sabotaging diplomatic missions 
and structures. Article 12 of the Anti-Terrorism Act prevented the kidnapping, arrest and detention of 
diplomats.123 Article 14 of this law prevents forceful enter in to the premises of any diplomatic 
mission in Libya.124 
 
Although these are worthy laws set out by the Libyan legislature to guarantee that such acts are 
not committed with impunity, it is effectively a gesture with little practical import, and it was enacted 
without serious prospect of application in the current political and security reality. The Libyan 
government lacks executive power to ensure enforcement of this law, rendering it without validity. 
This comes from government’s total lack of control over Libya’s security.125 However, despite the 
enactment of this law, the reality remains that attacks (planned or executed) against diplomats 
continue in Libya.126 
 
The question arises as to whether this law can even be applied with the resumption n of a normal 
state; in such a scenario, could the US ambassador to Libya’s murder in 2012 be prosecutable 
under the Anti-Terrorism Act? It is a general and accepted practice that laws do not apply 
retrospectively. The Libyan Criminal and Penal Law in article 1states that “there is no crime and 
punishment without relevant articles”, and Article 2 of the same says that the basis for punishment 
of crimes is the written law at the point the alleged crime happened.127 Although law can apply to 
previous events if it states that it can apply retrospectively, however, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 
(2014) did not allow this, mainly because the government was desperate to seek rapprochement 
with militias that would inevitably be targeted by the legislation. This is in the interests of national 
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unity. It does though state in the introduction that one reason it was drafted was in response to 
what happened to the US Embassy along with their Ambassador in 2012, and the law has a specific 
aim to protect embassies and consulates in Libya. 
 
From the above it is clear that the Libyan authorities have tried different methods to protect 
diplomats and find justice for them, but they have been practically unsuccessful. The Libyan 
government has no authority to apply these laws because of the de facto jurisdiction of armed 
groups over much of Libya. Therefore, this research finds that the exercise of diplomatic relations 
with Libya through e-diplomacy might be a more practical solution to avoid attacks against 
diplomats during times of armed conflict and disturbance, when state governments lose effective 
control over their customary territories. 
 
1.4 Overview of the Research Problem 
 
The obligation of the receiving state to protect diplomats is a considerable challenge, especially 
when there is a situation of internal disturbances and tensions and internal armed conflict. In such 
cases, a state may lose its control over the whole or part of its territory. For example, the Libyan 
Government lost such control during the internal armed conflict and was thus unable to provide 
sufficient protection to prevent attacks on US diplomats. Such cases raise uneasy questions 
concerning state responsibility. The question is whether the receiving state still has the 
responsibility to protect diplomats despite losing effective control over territory; this question is 
particularly topical given the spate of attacks on diplomats throughout MENA over many decades, 
escalating since 2003, and given a fillip by the Arab Spring since 2011. The recent events raised 
important and normative issues about state responsibility during internal conflict, disturbances and 
tensions. 
 
Furthermore, despite the prevalence of internal tensions over the past few decades, the 
responsibility of non-state actors, particularly rebel militias, has been neglected in international 
law. This research considers such issues of law in times of tension and disturbance. Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol II states that its rules do not govern tensions and disturbance as these do not 
comprise armed conflict according to international law, 
128
as explained in Chapter 3; in most cases, 
internal law deals with such situations. Such tensions and disturbances include riots, isolated and 
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sporadic acts of violence generally covered by conventional domestic (criminal) law, but conflict 
parties (including states or governments) are also required to respect applicable International 
Human Rights Law. 
 
Justice and remedy for diplomats who suffer during this internal armed conflict and or in times of 
tension and political disturbance is the main concern of this research. 
 
Several states have tried to deal with reparation for victims in the period during and after conflicts 
by enacting Transitional Justice Law, however this does not refer directly to diplomats as victims 
nor consider their special status and diplomatic protection and the duty of host states to protect 
them. 
 
In this respect, this research will seek to: 
 
1. Determine the responsibility of Libya under international law for attacks on diplomats. 
2. Determine whether Libya effectively took all appropriate steps to protect diplomats during 
the period of tensions and disturbances and internal conflict, as stipulated under international 
law. 
3. Find effective ways of improving the law on diplomatic protection during internal 
disturbances and tensions and internal armed conflict. 
 




1. To critically analyse the cases related to attack on diplomats and any other 
circumstances posing a threat to them. 
2. To critically review the measures taken by host states before, during and after the 
attacks. 
3. To determine the responsibility of the receiving state regarding the protection of 
diplomats. 
4. To critically analyse the elements of the receiving state’s responsibility for attacks 
on diplomats. 
 
 Accordingly, the research questions are: 
 
1. Can receiving states under international law be held responsible for the attacks on 
diplomats during the internal disturbances and tensions and internal conflict when 
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host state loses control? 
2. How effective is the current legal framework for the protection of diplomats in times 
of internal disturbances and tensions and internal conflict? 
3. What is the nature of the current conceptual framework for the protection of diplomats 
under international law? 
4. Is the current system of redress under international law adequate enough to remedy 
the violent acts against diplomats? 
5. Can non-state entities be held responsible for reparations under international law? 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
 
This thesis focuses on the responsibility of the state for the protection of diplomats during the time 
of tension, disturbance and internal conflict when the state loses control over territory. It should 
be reiterated that this study is limited to the case of diplomats, and not consuls or ancillary 
diplomatic personnel; diplomats are political functionaries’ representative of their state, while 
consular officers have no such function.129 This is why consular institutions are of less importance 
(e.g. in implying recognition of states) compared to embassies, and immunities granted to 
ambassadors are markedly different from those granted to consuls.130 
 
The researcher chose both times of internal disturbance and political tensions and internal armed 
conflict because it is difficult to distinguish between these two times or situations, and also because 
of the ambiguity of the term non-international armed conflicts and unclear boundaries between it 
and internal disturbance and political tensions. 
 
1.6 Literature Review 
1.6.1 Existing Studies 
 
The intention of this literature review is to make use of earlier published material regarding the 
subject and to tap into an authoritative knowledge base. Primarily, this review makes it possible to 
congregate extended knowledge regarding the protection of diplomats and secondly the 
contribution of this review is to give people a better view about the responsibilities of the receiving 
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state for protection of diplomats in time of tension and disturbance and internal armed conflict, 
especially when the state loses control over the territory. 
Several secondary and primary resources have focused on the protection of diplomats, however 
this chapter reviews only the most important books and articles on this topic. It is important to 
mention here that the most of articles or books written in relation to the protection of diplomats 
focused on one of the important issues that faced the host or sending state within their task or 
obligation to protect diplomats: kidnapping. Diplomats are prime targets for kidnappers seeking 
ransom or symbolic victories (sometimes including executions). Some diplomatic kidnap victims 
are released as a result of negotiations, often secret, by either their own government or the 
receiving state. 
In ‘The Diplomatic Kidnappings: A Revolutionary Tactic of Urban Terrorism’, Baumann 
discussed the responsibilities of states regarding attacks on diplomats, exploring diplomatic 
kidnappings in its political and legal aspects, explaining the responsibility of state and private 
individuals in time of civil war and disorder. However, his discussion does not include the 
situation of the loss of effective control by the receiving state in times of disturbance and internal 
armed conflict. Also, this work is less relevant to the other issues that might face diplomats, 
including killing, and it is mainly concerned with cases in Latin America and Canada. 
 
This book analyses the international debate, action by the Organization of American States, and 
Congressional committee hearings within the context of urban guerrilla terrorism, international 
legal norms, and world diplomatic practice. The book sets the phenomenon of diplomatic 
kidnapping within the context of urban terrorism, and dealt with real case studies of recent 
kidnappings and some policy problems created by them for diplomats and governments concerned. 
Furthermore, legal precepts and political realities were explored in an attempt to incite from them 
some positive policy recommendations for future governmental action.131 
 
Baumann stated that the problem of kidnapping diplomats must be analysed through the legal and 
political aspects. This approach might require a comparable examination of international law, 
international organizations and international politics. There is also a need for some attention to 
each of these aspects of diplomacy and the ways in which they relate to the others and to the 
diplomatic kidnappings themselves. 
 
Chapter 1 of Baumann’s (1973) book deals with kidnappings within boundaries of revolutionary 
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terrorism. The kidnappings also have serious legal ramifications as well as just political ones in the 
area of global diplomacy. Chapter 2 examines diplomatic inviolability and the diplomat as a victim, 
examining the history of diplomatic immunity and the importance of diplomatic immunity and 
privileges. Chapter 3 considers the responsibility of the state to protect diplomats, determining 
when the state has responsibility for protection of diplomats may arise. The state has either direct 
responsibility for the actions against the diplomats (for its own acts) or indirectly (for the acts of 
others). The state is responsible for direct or indirect action whether this action was by commission 
or omission. Chapter 4 practically explains the kidnapping of diplomats in Latin America, and the 
reasons behind such kidnappings, and the right of extra-territorial asylum. Chapter 5 deals with 
the problem of kidnap attempts and ransom as an alternative to the release of diplomats. 
Chapter 6 examines several cases of “successful” ‘diplonappings’ where the kidnappers’ had 
their demands fully met, and some situations where supposed kidnapping attempts were made but 
failed, and at least two cases of kidnappings where hostages were let go even though the host 
governments refused to accede to kidnappers’ demands. The host state, because of its 
international obligations, in most cases has met the kidnappers’ requirements to release the 
diplomats, which encourages kidnappers to increase their targeting of diplomats, creating a major 
dilemma. Chapter 7 continues on the kidnapping of diplomats, showing that it is not limited to Latin 
America but also extends to North America. This chapter reviews terrorists’ technique of using 
innocent victims as negotiating tools of political blackmail and persuasion. The reason for 
targeting diplomats or politicians is that in such cases kidnappers’ demands are considered more 
seriously and are more likely to be met. 
 
Barker also dealt with the problem of the kidnapping of diplomatic personnel, showing historical 
perspectives on protection and fighting against terrorism; ‘The Protection of Diplomatic 
Personnel’132 is a useful addition to the growing literature on the topic of protection of diplomatic 
personnel, consular and other representatives of states and high ranking state officials. It is an 
important resource for any researcher looking to research on diplomatic protection staff. This book 
also links between the past and modern attack on diplomats to show how diplomats have been 
targeted by terrorists throughout history, for the same rationale though using different tactics. 
However, what was missing from Barker’s book was a demonstration of the role of diplomats 
and diplomatic ways to mediate conflicts between states throughout history, without which 
contextual background the significance of violence against diplomats is unclear, as the importance 
of the protection of diplomatic personnel is not justified without grasping their political (i.e. 
                                                          




Barker analyses the practice of abuse of the duty of protection of diplomatic personnel and their 
premises from the ancient times to the present, studying the immunity of the diplomatic personnel 
from both historical and legal aspects based on the functional necessity theory to justify the 
rationale of the immunity and privileges of diplomatic personnel. 
 
The chapters of this book are not organized as article-by-article commentaries, but in terms of 
subject matter and legal framework issues. 
 
Chapter 1 explains in detail the problem of the development in terrorist attacks against the 
diplomats and consular officials since the early 1960s. The writer focuses particularly on the 
problem of kidnapping. Barker states that although the VCDR and the VCCR are the foundation 
of diplomatic and consul law, state recognition of these conventions does not help solve the 
problem of the targeting of diplomatic personnel by non-state actors. Chapter 2 examines the 
framework of the study and the terms of diplomacy and the persons who conduct diplomatic 
mission. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the historical and theoretical aspect, with notably good material in this regard 
showing how the issue of attacks on diplomats has developed, despite the efforts of the 
international community to protect diplomats. Chapter 4 explains the legal aspect of the problem 
of diplomatic personnel kidnapping and how international law, including the VCDR and VCCR, 
the Inman Report, Omnibus Diplomatic and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 and the Crowe Report 
in the US; and the ICJ opinion have dealt with this problem and conceptualised state responsibility, 
with particular exploration of the Tehran Hostage Crisis or case concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.133 
 
The punishment of crimes committed against diplomatic personnel is widely discussed by Barker 
in the fifth chapter, showing the challenges facing the enactment of the 1973 UN Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents.134 He highlighted the historical issue of targeting diplomats and provided very important 
cases to show how these issues are going on, explaining very clearly the scope of the problem. 
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Chapter 6 deals with the problem of kidnapping from the approach of adopting a multi- faceted 
approach to resolving the problem of attacks on diplomatic personnel. In the Tehran Hostage 
Crisis, Barker analysed state responsibility for the protection of diplomats with regard to the Vienna 
Conventions of 1961 and 1963. While noting that these Conventions undoubtedly provide an 
important view of the issues dealt with, the ICJ depended on several other laws to confirm state 
responsibility ‘…Optional Protocols to the two Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on, 
respectively, Diplomatic and Consular Relations, 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, 
and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran…135 The ICJ found that Iran was 
responsible for the attack on the US Embassy in Tehran under Articles 22(2), 24-27 and 29 of the 
VCDR, and Articles 5 and 36 of the VCCR, and of Article 11(4) of the 1955 Treaty,136 and the 
applicable rules of general international law. 
 
Barker presents a very coherent analysis of states with regard to applicable law, and in many 
occasions refers to the attack on diplomats during the civil conflict or revolution. However, 
Barker’s discussion does not extend to the responsibility of the state, individuals and armed 
groups in extraordinary conditions such as the time of political tensions and internal disturbance 
and internal armed conflict, especially when the state loses territorial control. There is a gap in 
international humanitarian law where it fails to cover. Therefore, deeper study of this issue is 
needed. 
 
Barker suggests that states need to follow the example of the United State in protecting their own 
diplomats alongside the local protection provided by the receiving states (especially in developing 
countries) to diplomatic personnel and their premises. However, contrary to Barker‘s opinion, the 
US itself failed to protect its own personnel in numerous instances, as in September 2012 in 
Benghazi and Cairo in the same year and as such a new mechanism needs to be developed. 
Barker did make some key theoretical contributions, most obviously in the study’s heavy 
dependence on ‘functional necessity’ and evidence from the ICJ and the UN General Assembly. 
One of the most in depth histories of diplomatic immunity and practice was written by Frey and 
Frey,137 exploring both Western and non-Western traditions as well as the history of European 
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international law, examining how different countries and cultures dealt with the immunities and 
privileges of diplomatic personnel, and how precedents became established. 
 
The authors’ focus was not limited to the history of the diplomatic immunities aspect, but also the 
political and legal aspects, as well as the influence of certain judicial decisions in order to find 
justification for such privileges. This study was based on three theories: personnel representative 
theory, extraterritorial theory, and functional theory. These theories might be useful for 
understanding the roots of the diplomatic immunity from different aspects and solve any issue 
facing these immunities. 
 
The authors drew a very important and clear trace for scholars aiming to expand this study in 
accordance with their failed from different areas (history, international law, international relations, 
politics and culture). This study is important for those aiming to argue the necessity of diplomatic 
privilege.138 
 
The study of diplomacy from different aspects was the approach of several scholars. Krommie 
also mixed between history and law in term of granting diplomats’ immunity and privileges. 139This 
work relies on literature review and interviews. The focus of this study is limited to the current 
realities of crimes against diplomats in Suriname. Krommie focused on the way policy regarding 
the protection of diplomats is made and applied. 
 
Krommie also recommended actual policy measures to address the issue of protection of 
diplomats. The results of this paper may help policymakers to formulate effective rules and 
regulations regarding this issue and offer them a possibility for a better way of organizing the 
security of diplomats of sending states. Krommie linked between the stability of State and the risk 
against diplomats, finding a relationship between a low- risk level and the security of diplomats. 
That the diplomats in Suriname were a low - risk level in this regard compared with other states 
was because the government is generally politically stable. Krommie agreed with Barker in that 
states should take care of their own effective security system for diplomatic premises and 
residences. 
 
Furthermore, Krommie found that receiving and sending states need to cooperate and consult to 
find appropriate steps with regard to a particular situation. The research found that this cooperation 
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is easy when the relationships between the sending and receiving states are normalized. However, 
problems arise in times of international tensions or a generally deteriorating security situation in 
the receiving state, such as the encroachment of armed groups. Krommie recommends the Liaison 
Bureau to provide embassies with guidelines regarding security, and that ‘there should not be any 
difference in the information and security measures to be taken’. This suggestion may sound good 
in terms of theory but in practice it is difficult to apply, and Krommie did not take into account 
the differences in power and the situation of developed countries such as America and the UK 
and developing countries such as Libya. 
 
Indeed, stability is generally lacking in most developing countries. However, Article 29 provides 
a realistic and flexible legal framework within which governments may safeguard envoys in their 
countries to the best of their abilities, as Krommie explained. Also, Krommie suggested that the 
foreign mission staff in Suriname were personally responsible to protect their own lives in public 
and to protect their private residences and members of their households, based on the observation 
that the VCDR (1961) did not lay down penalties of particular severity for any attack or crime 
against diplomats.140 However, the some writers have argued that the shortcomings of the VCDR 
were addressed by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973, which requested for 
cooperation between States and stated that the State should deal with the crimes against 
diplomats within their local law. This approach was reiterated by the International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages (1979) and Article 5 of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) which stated that ‘Every State party shall adopt such 
measures as may be necessary, including... domestic legislation…’141 Article 6 of this Convention 
states that ‘Each State party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offences…’142 
 
Muñoz focuses on the conceptual framework of diplomatic personnel immunities to understand the 
concept of diplomatic immunity through critical analysis of international law, especially the VCDR 
(1961).143 The study of this Convention extended to its application by analysing an ICJ case 
concerning diplomatic immunity. This study, however, excluded the UN Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
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Diplomatic Agents. It relied on critical analysis as well as comparative method. The writer finds that 
because of the confusing concept of diplomatic immunity there was no equality before the law. 
Because of this lack of equality in the legal system the writer believes that the ‘concept of 
diplomatic immunity can be considered as a human right violation’. 
 
This study found that the concept of diplomatic immunity regarding personal immunity is an unjust 
one because it prevents equal treatment among the persons of a population and makes an unfair 
distinction between persons before the law. The concept is therefore not compatible with Article 7 
of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stated that ‘All are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law…equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration...’144 
 
The study further assumed that this unjust concept can be considered as a form of human rights 
abuse in the aspect that it makes dissimilarity between diverse individuals of the population and 
determines that all persons are not equals before the law, but that some people stand above the 
law. However, this study misses the reality of reasons behind granting diplomatic personnel the 
immunities confirmed by the VCDR, which stated that these privileges are granted to diplomats to 
facilitate the discharge of their duties, which means protections are required for the complete 
performance of political functions, not for individuals’ safety. Article 25 of the VCDR states that 
‘The receiving State shall accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the 
mission’,145 Also, Article 29 of the VCDR states that ‘The person of a diplomatic agent shall be 
inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention… the receiving State shall treat 
him with due respect…’146 
 
This article confirms the importance of that inviolable of diplomats from attack. Under the extension 
theory, this duty entails that the receiving state should defend foreign embassies as well as the 
diplomats within, who are extensions of the sovereignty of the sending state. 147The important role 
that diplomats play in bringing conflict to an end ensures peace and security in the international 
community. Also, there are relationships between security and diplomatic relationships confirmed 
by many studies, as shown in Claudine Krommie’s research on ‘The Protection of Diplomats in 
Suriname’.148 Elgavish focused on the history of diplomatic immunity in ancient nations, finding 
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that in the ancient nations, especially in the ancient Near East, diplomats did not enjoy immunity, 
and messengers were subject to different kinds of symbolic abuse, including murder, assault, injury 
and arrest.149 However, Elgavish’s absolute statement that diplomatic immunity did not exist in 
ancient history ignores the fact that reports of egregious abuses of diplomatic personnel (i.e. 
messengers) implied their significance as national representatives. And thus the honour and respect 
they were accorded in everyday (and thus generally undocumented) protocols, and the highly 
advanced commercial and political relationships of the ancient world would not have been possible 
without reciprocal diplomacy between nations. Additionally, Elgavish did not explore what a 
‘messenger’ was, and whether this was synonymous with the modern diplomat.150 Conversely, 
Hamilton and Langhorne documented the existence of diplomatic privileges and immunity in the 
ancient world, and the active role of diplomacy in mediating conflict. However, this book is 
historical, and it does not consider the legal aspects in any depth.151 
 
Roberts comprehensively explored historical, legal and political aspects, with details on the 
history of diplomacy and the performance of diplomatic missions, along with immunity and 
privileges, and the protection of diplomats and their premises. This book also examines the targeting 
of diplomats by terrorists and the deployment of diplomats in espionage and in relation to 
commercial security firms.152 
 
Denza in her book “Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations”,153 tried to clarify ambiguities that existed in international law by making a comment 
on each article and interpreting the customary legal context and negotiating history. This book 
includes annexes with the full text of the 1961 Vienna Convention and lists. It also provides a 
summary on how the convention has been applied by the UK, US and other nations, and gives a 
comprehensive examination of contemporary problems in the field, which includes abuse of 
diplomatic immunity and violence by terrorists. Denza examines these abuses and explores how 
state authority and diplomatic immunity interact with each other, examining the methods used to 
establish and conduct diplomatic relations in times of physical danger, and noting higher evidence 
of the disregard pertaining to rules of secrecy in diplomatic communications. Denza also researches 
on greater latitude for diplomats to ‘interfere’ in matters of the receiving State. This is done in the 
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interest of human rights protection. Denza also analyses the impact of adoption and implementing 
of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property.  
 
Denza (1976) set out many cases by making reference to state practices to try and “demystify” the use 
of customary international law, contributing to aiding implementation of the VCDR, and therefore it 
could become a major part of the Vienna Convention, as well as a good resource for both receiving 
and sending state, their ambassadors, academics and students. In the 4th edition, Denza (2008) 
confirms the increasing incidents of diplomatic targeting and also the targeting of the diplomatic 
missions, stating how important special protection is and recommending new methods to protect 
diplomatic personnel. She continues her analysis on how the Convention was applied by the UK, 
US and other states, and also provides a historical context. Denza (2008) completely updates the 
work on diplomatic law to highlight important emerging trends in applying the Convention regime. 
Also, due to the high risk of kidnapping and threat to lives the life of the diplomats, she examines 
the importance of special protections. In light of the increased security risk and the violence against 
diplomats and embassies, Denza suggested new methods of conducting diplomacy itself, such as 
virtual embassies, in order to safeguard the lives of diplomats. Denza also examines the duty of 
diplomats not to interfere in domestic affairs, excluding communal responsibility to “monitor and 
expose violations of human rights”. Also, she explores the cases which have clarified the best 
ways to control abuse, particularly those relating to abuse of domestic servants.154 
 
Scholars have written about TJ from numerous aspects, including the historical and legal, and some 
scholars tried to establish links between truth commissions and the ICC, while others focused on 
the risk of granting amnesty to human rights abusers and serious criminals. Consequently, there are 
many guides on how to apply TJ from diverse perspectives. For example, the US Institute of Peace 
issued the Transitional Justice: Information Handbook, which is a good guide for states looking 
to apply TJ, showing the optimum solutions for states relative to their circumstances. This guide 
states that every state applies a different type of TJ, dependent on the circumstances and the 
political situation of the state and the amount of violations or the abuse of human rights. Also, it 
explains the framework by which the state can choose which approach or mechanism to follow. 
However, this handbook does not present examples of successful or unsuccessful cases of TJ to 
better understand the steps states should follow.155 
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Other scholars explain the history of TJ and how it emerged. Teitel shows the evolution of the 
conception of TJ.156 Teitel distinguishing between international TJ, which emerged in response 
to the violations of human rights in international conflict during WWI, and internal TJ, which 
emerged in response to the abuse of human rights by dictatorial regimes within states. According 
to Teitel, the modern version of TJ emerged definitively after 1945, but the internationalism rooted 
in the WWI stage was only eclipsed from the 1950s onwards and throughout the Cold War. The 
post-Cold War was the second stage in the evolution of TJ, which was linked with the stream of 
democratic transitions and the modernization of the former USSR from the 1980s onwards. At the 
end of the last century, global politics focused on the greater use of conflict resolution and a 
continuing discourse of justice both in law and society. The third, or “steady-state”, phase of 
transitional justice has an inextricable link with contemporary conditions of persistent conflict thus 
laying building blocks for what has become a normalized law of violence. This research states that 
there is a close relationship between the type of justice pursued and relevant conditions limiting 
politics.157 Similarly, Paige examined the history of TJ and how the concept of TJ emerged.158 
 
Several scholars have linked TJ and amnesty. Most of them see a risk in giving amnesty to 
perpetrators of human rights abuses and believe that impunity is a key issue to be overcome. 
However, there might be a need to resort to amnesty in some cases, such as when conflict-related 
prisoners and other detainees have to be released, demilitarized, demobilized, and helped to 
reintegrate in to civil society. For example, Bell in her article The “New Law” of Transitional 
Justice159 states that the new law of TJ should not permit to resort to amnesty unless there is a real 
need for it and it should be conditional amnesty. Bell relies on the decisions of international law 
and the UN, which does not allow amnesty for international crimes.160 Similarly, Megret and 
Vagliano try to link human rights to TJ and show how the IHRL has shaped transitional processes, 
together with the importance of granting amnesty when the society is in need of it. This amnesty is 
granted in accordance with the report presented by the truth commission with the aim of achieving 
reconciliation.161 
 
Similarly, Dukic examined TJ mechanisms used by countries emerging from conflict to deal with 
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previous human rights violations. This study examines the possibility of granting amnesty to 
violators of human rights. Dukic studies the extent to which truth commissions and criminal 
processes can be conducted in a complementary manner through the analysis of Article 53 of the 
Rome Statute. Dukic states that truth commissions and criminal proceedings can be a fait 
accompli if the truth commission committees are accompanied by amnesty processes. Dukic tries 
to interpret article 53 of the Rome Statute and the conditions of trial in accordance with the 
procedure followed by the Rome Statute, finding that article 53 is not appropriate to reconcile the 
work of truth commissions and amnesty.162 
 
Likewise, Rubin linked human rights and TJ, 163focusing on the case of Afghanistan. The researcher 
reviews the contribution of the Soviet occupiers as well as rural resistance fighters. Islamist parties 
and the Taliban movement along with Pakistani volunteers and Al-Qaeda members and then onto 
“power-seeking warlords”, and the anti-Taliban coalition to measure the litany of abuses they 
have carried out since 1978. This research stated that demobilizing and reintegrating many 
thousands of irregular militia, and the creation of new security forces, are vital conditions to add 
to the peace-building agenda. The researcher also confirmed the importance of documenting the 
scale of abuses, emphasising victim suffering and not the perpetrators’ guilt, to gradually provide 
support for t h e  Afghan debate on how society can be reconcile to its history.164 
 
Lambourne established a link between TJ and peace-building, examining how conflict participants 
view TJ in the context of peace-building when high levels of violence have occurred.165 This 
research tried to develop a model of transformative justice to support sustainable peace-building. 
Also, the researcher stated that the concept of ‘transition’ to provide an interim process linking 
the future and the past together should instead be considered as a ‘transformation’ process, implying 
long-term, sustainable processes embedded in society and the adoption of psychosocial, political, 
economic and legal perspectives on justice. This could help in supporting peace-building. This 
stage of transition requires a long period of change in social, economic and political structures as 
well as internal and external relationships. It should also deal with different needs and the 
requirements of the society at this stage. This research refutes the statement that the process of TJ 
is inevitably messy and lacks adequacy when dealing with the enormous psychological and 
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physical pain following the destruction of war and indeed any act of mass violence. Lambourne 
analysed justice, reconciliation and peace-building relationships to explain the purpose of TJ. 
Lambourne also explained the importance of taking into account the needs, expectations and 
experiences of all participants involved in a conflict – these are perpetrators as well as victims, 
survivors and any others from a society who were directly affected by the violence, but who are 
a part of the peace-building process – finding that TJ by dealing with the past violation of human 
rights provides a link between the past and future. The study was aimed at developing a model of 
TJ that supports sustainable peace building.166 
Scholars have also tried to focus on the relationships between the truth commission and the ICC. 
Fischer examined international criminal justice and truth commissions and highlighted the 
boundaries of these approaches in terms of strength and limits, assessing the practical approaches 
that stem from transitional justice and reconciliation from the point of view of their relevance in 
conflict transformation and peace-building.167 
 
Similarly, Flory examined the relationship between international criminal justice and truth 
commissions and found possible cooperation building between them and the ICC. Flory showed 
how the international criminal justice and truth commissions’ complementary nature could be 
nuanced to preserve specific points inherent to these mechanisms’ nature, explaining the models of 
cooperation between international criminal justice and truth commissions and finding that TJ and 
international criminal justice have close yet conflicting relationships. Flory showed how some states 
resort to amnesty when applying TJ and the strong example it shows of a successful transition 
without prosecutions in South Africa.168 
 
Likewise, Joseph examined the relationship between retributive justice which basically refers to 
prosecutions and restorative justice which is related to truth commissions to clarify the link and 
complementarity between trials and truth commissions. Joseph showed how states apply 
different approaches to TJ according to their culture and political situations, and even the interests 
of states. This explains why some states resort to amnesty despite the existence of established 
truth commissions. However, a challenge faced by societies when applying TJ is the clash between 
non-punitive approaches to major and systematic violations of human rights and the requirements 
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of a fully working criminal justice system.169 
 
There are several case studies that focus on TJ in states in order to understand the factors that lead 
to a successful or unsuccessful experience. For example, the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission tried to identify what worked in the application of TJ and what did not work. The 
report explained what Northern Ireland went through and what led to these events, and examined 
the successful initiatives put in place up until the date the report was written in 2013, including 
initiatives accomplished even before the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998) was adopted. 
For example, the establishment of the Housing Executive, the passing of the Fair Employment and 
Treatment Law, and the Community Relations Council had already begun their essential work. 
Furthermore, the role of the national human rights institutions (e.g. the Human Rights Commission) 
was explained, and other agreements that supported the transformation of the society were 
discussed. For example, the Weston Park Agreement (2001) which was made between the 
governments of the UK and Ireland was an attempt to fill certain gaps identified in the Belfast (Good 
Friday) Agreement. The Hillsborough Agreement (2010) between the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) and Sinn Fein gave rise to the possibility to devolve policing and justice powers to the 
Northern Ireland Executive. While these agreements did not in detail address past human rights 
abuses, at the same time they did not exclude the possibility of developing such policies 
independently.170 
 
Several scholars have focused on the case of Libya as a failed experience of a transition to peace, 
with some describing the experience of Libya as a transition without peace. Kersten examined 
the TJ in Libya and the procedure of justice since the defeat of Gaddafi focused on three TJ 
mechanisms. These were  
1. retributive criminal justice; 
2.  banishing under Libya’s Political Isolation Law, and; 
3. The amnesty granted to revolutionaries under Law 38 (2012).  
 
This research explains the defeat of Gaddafi and the civil war, examining obstacles to TJ and 
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peace in Libya.171 
 
Sharqieh tried to determine the important factors behind Libya’s unsuccessful TJ experience, giving 
a clear understanding of why Libya could not move towards democracy or peace.172 The 
researcher was not only critical of the application of TJ but also provided an alternative for these 
initiatives which led to the bad experience. For example, the researcher stated the importance of 
the comprehensive TJ law and dealing with criminals in strict accordance with the rule of law instead 
of collective punishment, adding that instead of the two governments, the official one and the 
revolutionary, the latter should join the government, national institutions or other NGO- run 
programmes made available to them. The research also examined challenges faced by 
reconciliation attempts that include the misunderstanding of the definition of reconciliation as 
defined by the Libyan society, and their concern about losing their right of getting the truth if 
criminals are offered forgiveness.173 Noah focused on the mechanisms followed by the Libyan 
government to promote the role of TJ in ending the conflict and ensuring the stability of the state, 
and analysed the articles of the Draft Libyan Constitution related to TJ and the measures to which 
the State was committed. Bouhramra also analysed the Draft Libyan Constitution and confirmed the 
importance of applying TJ and not ignoring the past violation of human rights. TJ is important to 
achieve peace in post conflict. This research examines the obstacles to the success of Libyan TJ 
and peaceful transition after the defeat of Gaddafi, finding that selective justice was a major reason 
for the failure of TJ.174 TJ is important to achieve peace in post conflict. This research examines the 
obstacles to the success of Libyan transitional justice and peaceful transition after the defeat of 
Gaddafi. Selective justice was a main reason for the failure of transitional justice. 
 
Several Arab scholars and academics have contributed to the dialogue and documentation on TJ 
in MENA, such as Sabah Al-Mukhtar, Abdul Hussein Shaaban and Ahmed Shawky Benyoub, 
who examined the challenges to TJ in MENA.175 Shaaban explored the meaning of TJ to answer 
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the question of whether it was private justice or justice for the transition period, and discussed the 
international experiences of TJ in order to show how other states could benefit from these 
experiences, looking at their advantages and disadvantages.176 However, Shaaban stated that it is 
impossible to copy the experiences of others because every state has different circumstances, thus 
attempting to transpose experiences from one context to another could waste time, effort and 
money. However, Shaaban does suggest that Arab countries should have an Arabic document of 
TJ representing a common denominator (i.e. a blueprint) for Arab countries, due to their broadly 
similar political and social configuration and the potential for instability in the MENA region. 
 
Benyoub explained the practical implications of truth commissions, in the context of the 
establishment and characterization of TJ bodies, potential benefits of establishing truth 
commissions, and their importance. Also, Benyoub examined the necessity of TJ and its function. 
These studies comprise very useful investigations of TJ in MENA and how regional countries have 
experienced TJ. This knowledge could be a good resource for policymakers to benefit from the 
experiences of different approaches applied in different countries. This thesis focuses on TJ in 
MENA and European countries to identify factors in which determines success or failure.177 
 
1.6.2 Research Gaps and Expected Contribution 
 
The focus of this study is limited to the policy regarding the protection of diplomats in Libya, 
particularly in the period of internal conflict and political tensions and disturbances when states 
lose control over territory. 
Several scholars have investigated the protection of diplomats, as explained above. However, the 
study have been limited to exploring the responsibility of receiving states during political tensions 
and internal tension as well as internal armed conflict when states lose control over territory. 
Although many scholars have also tried to prove the importance of holding the armed groups 
responsible for reparation to victims in the aftermath of conflicts, there is no written law so far it 
concerns dealing with the problem to guarantee remedies for victims. Normally, domestic law 
applies in these circumstances. In this regard, TJ law, however, has not included diplomats as 
victims during or after the conflicts. This research intends to show a link between international 
responsibility and TJ as a way to guarantee effective remedies for victims, including diplomats.  
Traditionally, states have responsibility under international law to protect diplomats, which is 
reflected in two ways. The first is a domestic obligation by which the state prosecutes the people 
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suspected of committing crimes against diplomats. Second, the international law principle of state 
responsibility holds states liable for failure to protect diplomats. However, as seen in the case of 
Libya, state responsibility may not be a reasonable expectation in times of internal conflict, 
particularly when the state itself is near to collapse, with no functioning institutions or effective 
government. The main contribution of this research is to look for alternatives to state 
responsibility. In doing this the researcher suggests more pro-active use of technology (i.e. in e-
diplomacy) to enable states to conduct their diplomatic relationships during times of armed 
conflict and civil unrest, reducing the burden on the receiving state and absolving it from the heavy 
burden of responsibility for the failure to protect diplomats during armed conflicts when the state 
loses control, or the ability to subsequently charge offenders. It also reduces the cost borne by the 
state to provide extensive security and military protection to diplomats, when such resources are 
critically required elsewhere. If all else fails and harm is done to diplomats, another proposed 
remedy could be TJ if national institutions are not functioning and a diplomatic or international 
judicial solution cannot be found between the sending and the receiving country – for example, if 
the receiving country refuses to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in a case brought against it by 
the sending country. 
 
1.7 Theoretical Bases for Diplomatic Immunity 
1.7.1 Exterritorial Theory 
 
Given the premise that diplomatic missions are outside the territory of the receiving state, and 
represent a kind of extension of the territory of the sending state, the ambassador who represents 
by function the actual person of his sovereign must be regarded by a further function as being 
outside the territory of the power to which he is accredited.178 This theory has been criticized as 
impractical and failing to provide sufficient basis for the extension of exemption that would follow 
from this doctrine, which has never been accepted in practice, as both the mission and the 
diplomatic agents come within the jurisdiction of receiving state for certain purposes. In most cases 
diplomats are considered subject to the law of the receiving state as well as their own state; 
consequently, crimes committed inside diplomatic premises are normally prosecuted under the 
local law of the receiving state. Furthermore, pertaining to diplomatic agents’ personal (non-
diplomatic) affairs, such as business transactions, the use of diplomatic immunities and privileges 
would generally be tantamount to the abuse of public office.179 
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1.7.2 Representative Character Theory 
 
The representative character theory was the first theoretical justification of diplomatic immunity 
based on the theory of personal representation, whereby diplomats acting 
on behalf of the sovereign (i.e. the monarch in European tradition) of a sending state represent the 
person of that sovereign,180 thus diplomats are considered above the local jurisdiction, and any 
attack on diplomats comprises an affront to the personal dignity of their sending sovereign, and 
the receiving state must also accord the diplomat all due honour.181 
 
A sovereign seeking to promote the interest of his or her country with a foreign authority through 
the medium a person whom he has selected cannot intend to subject his minister in any degree for 
this authority, and consequently consensus to receive him or her entails an understanding that he 
or she will have those privileges which his or her principal intended he or she must obtain. The 
representative also retains privileges and immunities that are basically necessary to the dignity of 
his or her sovereignty, and to the responsibilities he or she has to complete.182 
 
Critics found that diplomats cannot have the same degree of immunity as the sending state itself, 
as this would give extraordinary liberty to diplomatic personnel in the receiving state that they would 
not enjoy in their own sending state. Furthermore, the decline of the traditional powerful monarch 
in European tradition and the evolution of democratic rule has undermined the whole premise of 
such arguments, thus making it unclear who exactly the diplomat represents. Furthermore, the 
theory extends no basis for protecting diplomats from the consequences of their private actions.183 
 
1.7.3 Functional Necessity Theory 
 
Another theory which justifies the basis of grants to diplomats of immunities and privileges is 
functional necessity theory, which is the modern tendency,184 being the most widely accepted 
current justification of diplomatic immunity.185 This basically utilitarian and pragmatic rationale 
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states that the diplomat is not subject to the jurisdiction of local courts because this would obstruct 
the functions of diplomatic relations.186 This theory renders diplomats immune to the extent that they 
can perform their diplomatic duties unhindered, with all corresponding privileges and immunities. 
 
Granting diplomats this minimum standard of privileges enables them to perform their duties 
without hindrance or interference in the receiving states. 187The assumptions of this theory comply 
with the Draft Articles as well as the VCDR, which affirm that these immunities are not for the 
diplomats as individuals, but rather to enable them to perform their diplomatic (political) 
functions.188 
 
If a diplomat acts outside of the normal sphere of conducting international relations (i.e. the 
performance of their protected diplomatic role), the question arises as to whether immunity still 
applies. Current administrative and judicial construction of diplomatic immunity illustrates that 
diplomats themselves are immune from prosecution even when committing criminal or tortious acts 
outside of their prescribed functions. A critique of this construction of the functional necessity 
theory distinguishes the treatment of the individual diplomat from that of the diplomatic process. 
In theory, diplomatic immunity originated to protect the process of furthering relations between 
nation states: the focus on immunity on the individual diplomat is not appropriate. Granted that 
the diplomats can only function officially when they are on immunity means that the diplomats 
are allowed to break the law of the receiving state in order to conduct international relations. 
‘Therefore, the current construction, providing diplomatic immunity to the individual, is 
inconsistent with the theoretical basis that accords protection only to the diplomatic’.189 
Regardless of whether diplomats are subject to the local law of the receiving state, diplomats are 
certainly given immunities in order to perform their duties completely, as confirmed by the VCDR, 
which stated that the host state must ‘... accord full facilities for the performance of the functions 




International law has always made special provision for the protection of diplomats. The issue is 
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currently topical because of the increased targeting of diplomats in MENA following the Arab 
Spring. Political instability renders the work of diplomats more important than in normal 
circumstances, while correspondingly placing them at greater risk, particularly when host states 
lose control (i.e. when conventional governance and law and order break down). Despite the 
critical importance of this issue, scholars are yet to determine an appropriate research philosophy 
and theoretical perspective to adopt when considering it. 
 
This applied research study is conducted to apply the outcomes to resolve specific problems (i.e. 
to find a convenient solution to a current specific issue).191 This research is trying to find the solution 
for the current problem of attacks on diplomats during internal disturbances and tensions and 
internal conflict when states lose control (using Libya as a case study). The outcome of this 
research may be applied in other states having similar circumstances. 
 
This research is qualitative, aiming to understand the reality of social life. While quantitative method 
generally relies on numerical data, the qualitative method usually deals with words. In other 
words, if the purpose of research is to answer ‘how’, ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions, qualitative 
approach is the most suitable. Conversely, if the nature of research is to answer the question of 
‘how many’ or ‘how much’, a quantitative approach will be a more appropriate method.192 
 
This research does not include statistics or numerical data, therefore it does not require quantitative 
methods. The research is rather based on a case study which is qualitative in nature. The research 
aims to solve the problem of attacks on diplomats during political tensions and internal conflict, 
when the government loses control over situations in the host state, by obtaining and analysing 
deep knowledge about such situations. This situation in the context of Libya may be different in 
other states, although other states which have the same situation as the research case study 
(Libya), such as other countries in MENA, may benefit from the findings of this research. 
 
As mentioned previously, Libya is used as case study in this research. Case study can be defined 
as ‘research strategy that involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple methods of data collection’.193 It aims to 
collect the information about specific situations and studies this situation from more than one angle 
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to examine the real life in order to understand the problem.194 
 
A case study is a tool not only to describe and explain the problem but also to understand in depth 
the complexity of the case and the research subject. This character of case study may be 
incompatible within experimental and survey research, but it can give the researcher more 
information about real life situations in terms of ‘how and why’ issues.195 
 
Case study is essentially qualitative in nature.196 This method is a more popular method in social 
science studies. It has been used by several scholars to understand complex issues in depth, 
overcoming the limitations of purely quantitative approaches in providing complete and in-depth 
clarifications of the social and behavioural problems.197 Case study approach can help to 
understand complex issues identified by literature review. 
 
Case study method has been utilized to consider prominent issues regarding diplomacy, 
international responsibility, and transitional justice198 Lundy and 
McGovern applied case study as an important method to explored problems in- depth.199 They 
also recommended applying participatory theory as ‘knowledge available in development studies 
and participatory theory may applied more clearly in debates and approaches in transitional 
justice’.200 However, the case study in the context of this research is used in an abstract sense and 
not as a scientific method. 
 
Critical literature review will be applied in this thesis. One of the important purposes of doing 
literature review is that it identifies the need for the research being conducted, as well as drawing 
on the existing body of knowledge. 
 
One of the important points to conduct scientific research and build on the current level of 
understanding of the research problem is based on critical analysis of existing studies and 
outcomes achieved so far. This thesis is inductive research, thus literature review is important to 
develop theory and investigate data. This aspect of the research relies on library resources, 
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including books, journals, cases, scholarly opinions, laws, and conventions. This approach is called 




The researcher in this thesis critically analyses internal legal rules and international laws of 
international responsibility, particularly the International Law Commission Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States (2001), as well as the VCDR (1961) and ICJ decisions in order to 
investigate the extent to which a host state is liable to protect diplomats in situations not described 
as armed conflicts, in addition to international legal articles regarding the responsibility of states 
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International law is ‘the law between sovereign nation-states, hereinafter, states, especially within 
the context of the laws of war, peace and security, and protection of territories’.202 This definition 
implies that law organizes the relationships between states in times of peace and war, which has 
clear implications for the sovereignty of states, which is one of the most important principles of 
international law. The system of contact between sovereign states is known as diplomacy, 
represented by negotiations between the agents of those states;203 a diplomatic agent is defined by 
the VCDR as ‘the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission’.204 
 
There are apparent relationships between international law and diplomacy. The latter has an 
essential in international relations because foreign relations are established between states through 
diplomacy. Diplomacy is based on reconciling the conflicting interests of states in order to resolve 
differences that might undermine these relationships, and through diplomacy, states can play an 
important role in interacting with the international community.  
 
Due to the importance of foreign relationships in international law and practice in the international 
community, it is universally acknowledged that diplomats should be protected, and has always been 
so (theoretically). However, numerous characteristics of modern diplomacy distinguish it from 
traditional models. Nevertheless, diplomacy and international relationships are organically and 
inseparably interlinked. Diplomacy is communication between two or more states, enabled by 
diplomats, who represent their states and who may be based at home or in the state with whom 
the relationship is held.205  
 
Due to their importance of inter-state relations, diplomats are generally assiduously protected by 
states (i.e. governments), and correspondingly they are often targeted by non-state actors such as 
militias and paramilitary organisations. In order to address this problem of targeting the 
diplomats, the researcher suggests applying TJ to achieve justice for diplomats. TJ has historically 
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played a significant role in achieving justice in post-conflict periods. The role of TJ is discussed 
separately in Chapter 4 of this thesis to show the importance of such justice to guarantee remedy 
for diplomatic victims of armed conflict. 
 
Several changes in elements of diplomacy over the history indicate the importance of diplomacy, 
such as in terms of language, the number of people conducting diplomatic procedures, and the 
purpose of diplomacy.206 
 
In addition, the personnel conducting diplomacy has extended beyond professional (typically 
legal) professionals due to improvements in communications during the 20th century. Now the 
head of state can directly engage in international diplomacy with other heads of state without 
recourse to intermediary diplomatic agents (i.e. the head of state can become a diplomatic agent), 
which would be impossible prior to modern communication methods. Another distinguishing 
characteristic of modern states is that traditional diplomacy was conducted between states on 
parity as equal partners, and typically this involved powerful states (e.g. the Berlin Conference of 
1884 was an intra-European diplomatic conference on the division of Africa among those powers, 
with no consideration of African states or diplomats).207 Now states involved in diplomacy no 
longer hold equality as a priority, and they often act the basis of economic interest in close 
collaboration with a corporate power mainly, although this has been a phenomenon for 
centuries.208 
 
Kurizaki states that the history of diplomacy is important as it can show the development of 
diplomatic establishment as a result of leaders’ response to the political situations.209 He added 
that it shows that ‘means and forms are self-enforce as political leaders and rulers have kept and 
copied them for fairly a long time’.210 It can also demonstrate the role of diplomacy in resolving 
international disputes and the problems and how it transformed complex issues to simple ones.211 
 
This research compares between the old diplomacy and the new in order to determine what has 
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changed in terms of new areas of diplomatic action, growing shared interests between states and 
international interests, improved working conditions for diplomats and the participation of women 
in diplomatic activities. Furthermore, there were different reasons for conducting diplomatic 
relationships in the past, as this chapter will show. This research observed that international public 
opinions and media, which has precipitated the emergence of public diplomacy, alongside and 
interrelated with important developments in transportation and communication systems, influence 
diplomacy. 
 
This research explores the concept of diplomacy, its roots, its developments and its 
transformations, bringing to mind a number of questions, for example: 
 
 What is the concept of diplomacy? 
 Is the meaning of this concept stable or has been changed? 
 What are the different historical stages of diplomatic policy? 
 What is the relationship between history and diplomacy? 
 
This chapter explores the phenomenon of diplomacy in the ancient world and assesses its impact. 
It additionally traces its continuous influences after the demise of the ancient societies from where 
it emerged. This research affirms that the practice of diplomacy represents a continuum, and not a 
spontaneous institution to meet the incidental needs of states. 
 
Indeed, historians regard diplomacy as a continuous practice stemming from the most ancient 
states, and it was already present with modern contours by the ancient Egyptian, Mesopotamian 
and Chinese civilization; however, it emerged with states and not communities – in other words, 
it was not present in primitive communities. Its most well documented ancient manifestations were 
in the Mediterranean civilizations (i.e. Egyptian and Greece-Roman), although Mesopotamia, 
India and China also have a long history of diplomacy.212 However, it can be argued that the 
diplomacy of these ancient states was much less efficient in the regulation of international relations 
compared to modern diplomacy, particularly if judged according to the struggle for peace and 
friendship between nations. 
 
This chapter deals firstly with the definitions of terms, including the meaning of diplomacy, 
diplomatic agents and diplomats, and then the exchange of diplomats in ancient times is explained. 
The characteristics of the diplomatic corps in the past, as well as the doctrine of the immunity of 
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diplomatic personnel, are analysed. The actual practice of diplomacy in the ancient world is then 
outlined with regard to the ancient Near East (the Egyptian, Babylonian and Hittite civilizations, c. 
1400-1150 BCE), the Greeks (c. 500-338 BCE), the Roman Empire (c. 358-168 BCE), Ancient 
India and China, and diplomacy in Islamic States. The ancient diplomacy is then compared and 
contrasted with diplomacy in the 21st century. 
 
This study does not propose to narrate a comprehensive history of diplomacy, rather it uses 
illustrative cases (e.g. the Arab-Islamic States) for comparative purposes with the 21st century, to 
explore the importance and characteristics of diplomacy and diplomats over history. The most 
obvious historical lesson is that diplomacy and its special status is as old as human civilization, 
along with violations of this accepted norm by attacking diplomats. The understanding of the 
importance of old or modern diplomacy for the security of the international community and the 
important role of the diplomats as people who bring a conflict to an end informs the fundamental 






The word diplomacy is derived from the Greek verb diploun (to double) or from the noun 
diploma.213 
 
Diplomacy is commonly understood as the practice of building and maintaining relationships 
between independent states, a process undertaken by representatives of those states. It’s most 
critical form is when mediating conflicts and negotiating international arrangements at the internal, 
regional or global levels.214 Hence, the role of diplomats comes into play when a state notifies 
another state about its desire to establish a political relationship, and negotiation beings by sending 
an envoy that represents his or her state. Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes stated that ‘The establishment of diplomatic relations 
between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent’.215 Cull 
defined diplomacy as ‘the mechanisms short of war deployed by an international actor to manage 
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the international environment; traditional diplomacy is international actor’s attempt to manage 
the international environment through engagement with another international actor’.216 In this 
way, states improve and protect their foreign policies without recourse to exploitation and war.217 
In a sense, these definitions of diplomacy focus on the following: the aim of diplomacy in dealing 
with international problems peacefully, the people who act in the delicate procedure (diplomats), 
represent states which have intentions to improve their foreign relations or using negotiation to 
manage foreign relations (particularly antagonistic ones). 
 
However, although these essential components of diplomacy are timeless, their relative 
importance has changed through history. For instance, in the 19th century, diplomacy was narrowly 
defined as negotiations between sovereign states aimed at managing their relations.218 Although 
ancient diplomacy was limited to relations between sovereign states, diplomacy in its modern 
concept expands to include ‘civil society actors—including nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), citizen journalists, and the broad public’.219 
 
The purpose of diplomacy in the ancient world was to keep good relations among states. However, 
diplomacy has developed to include the management of the business between the states and other 
international actors.220 Such relationships whatever their purpose, begins when one state notifies 
another about its desire to start a political relationship, and negotiates to send a diplomat to 
represent the state.221 The inherent necessity of such relationships and professional personnel for 
their achievement was recognized by ancient states,222 which is why diplomacy is sometimes called 
the ‘second oldest profession’.223 Hence, states have always needed to have channels to deal with 
each other.224 Diplomacy is a system of managing the contact between the states and is represented 
by negotiations between agents of states. It is a tradition arrangement which is governed by 
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International Law.225 Jennings and Watts, however, stated that the international law has no role in 
the usage of diplomacy, although ‘there is some legal importance, as they [diplomatic activities] 
may occasionally grow into customary rules of International Law’.226 
 
Unlike modern ambassadors and envoys, who are charged with myriad duties concerning political 
relations as well as economic and social areas of interest, ancient diplomats were dispatched for 
specific (usually political) tasks; once they finished this task they had to return immediately. This 
was largely because of the nature of diplomatic work, requiring intelligence, cultural sensitivity 
and interpersonal skills, and the sensitivity of information in such contexts in the ancient world; 
essentially, the ruler of a country required deep and specific information from an envoy regarding 
important matter, which could not be trusted to primitive communication systems and couriers. 
 
Modern diplomacy, and its association with international economic relations (and the arrangement 
of dynastic marriages), can be traced to the states of Northern Italy during the early Renaissance, 
where the first embassies were established in the 13th century. Examples of the practice of 
diplomacy in that era were the presentation of an ambassador’s credentials to the head of the 
receiving state and greetings from the dispatching sovereign, and proposals of marriage 
accompanied by portraits of the intended suitor or bride (as in the famous instance of Holbein’s 
portrait of Anne of Cleves, which induced Henry VIII to marry her).227 
 
However, some scholars believe that the concept of diplomacy is relatively recent; Jennings and 
Watts are of the opinion that the terms diplomacy and diplomats were not recognized until the end 
of the 18th century, 228while Bederman stated that the ancient states conducted diplomacy;229 
consequently this research explores diplomacy in the ancient epoch in detail in the following points. 
 
2.2.2 Diplomatic Agents 
 
After the research explained in previous point the definition of the diplomacy, it is important to 
define the person who conducted this diplomacy. 
 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961(VCDR) defined clearly the diplomatic 
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agents. That diplomatic agent ‘is the head of mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the 
mission’.230 Then this Convention 1961 gave the definition of both the head of mission and the 
diplomatic staff of mission. Hence, the head of the mission defined by the Art 1(a) is ‘the person 
charged by the sending State with the duty of acting in that capacity’.231 Whereas according to Art 
1(d) the members of the diplomatic staff are ‘the members of the staff of the mission having 
diplomatic rank’.232 
 
According to Barker diplomatic agents are the individuals who ‘performing the diplomatic 
function as a principle and not an incidental part of their duty’.233 This could include the legal 
advisor, part- time diplomats, attaches, counsellors, ministers, ambassadors, secretary to the 
mission.234 Barker adds that ‘the members of special missions may be considered to be diplomatic 
personnel’.235 Diplomatic agents then seem to be a very wide term and might including many of 
individuals who work in embassies and consulate or anyone represent his or her country in another 
state. 
 
Similarly, another scholar has defined diplomatic agent as ‘the term for ambassadors and the other 
diplomatic officers who generally have the function of dealing directly with host country 
officials’.236 
 
The term diplomatic agent means diplomat. Hence, it refers to a representative who lacks 
diplomatic status. The question might arise as to who then constitute non- diplomatic agents? This 
term could be used to refer to secret agents.237 
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Jangam stated that the ‘diplomats’ is a general concept which refers to the ‘all members of the 
foreign service of the Nationals’.238 Berridge and Lloyd also defined the diplomats or ambassadors 
as persons who represent their states in other states (e.g. diplomatic agents or officials in a foreign 
ministry).239 Bjola and Holmes define diplomats more generally as ‘individuals who conduct social 
relationships’.240 This definition is wide and could include any person who conducts or promote 
the relationships between the sending and receiving countries. According to Art. 3 of the Vienna 
Convention 1961, the function of the diplomat is to represent State and to protect its interests and 
the interests of its citizens and to ensure the promotion of friendly relations between the two 
countries (sending and receiving).241 Due to the role of the diplomat, the international community 
unanimously rejects the concept of targeting diplomatic agents, but the ability of states in times of 
political disturbance, tension and conflict may prevent states from protecting them. Due to the 
particularly acute breakdown of diplomatic conventions in the case of Libya it was initially the 
main focus of this study, but the dissemination of this problem in other states broadened the scope 
to Iraq and other countries, as explained in Chapter 1. 
 
The research defines diplomats as personnel who mediate relationships between sending and 
receiving countries, to promote security and stability. The question arises of the extent to which the 
word ‘envoy’ or ‘messenger’ used in the ancient world to denote a sacred office is analogous to 
the modern ‘diplomat’ and the legal protections pertaining to that position. As noted by Berridge 
and Lloyd, ‘envoy’ is synonymous with ‘diplomat’,242 but Chatterjee stated that the former, 
‘accredited to the head of State, is not considered to be personal representatives of their 
sovereign’.243 This means that the envoy does not have the same status as the ambassador, as 
manifest in protocols such as the former not being empowered to request an audience with the 
receiving head of state. Furthermore, the envoy does not render significant services on behalf of 
their State. However, the researcher believes that the envoy is essentially an ambassador. In some 
historical books the word ‘messenger’ was synonymous with ‘ambassador’, as in Hebrew.244 
Another question that arises is what the difference is between ‘diplomat’ and ‘consul’. Jangam 
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defined diplomats are any people working in diplomatic services with the duty of representation 
and negotiation, while consuls are dedicated to consular services, with the duty of protecting the 
interests of nationals of the sending state. However, the function of the diplomatic service is 
complementary to consular services,245 and consular officials might perform the diplomatic duty 
along with their consular duty. 246This means that the consul is appointed to perform for the 
commercial interests of the sending state in the hosting state, as well as to help the nationals in the 
latter. As a result of consuls assuming more roles analogous to traditional diplomats, the distinction 
between them has become ‘much less clear cut than formerly’247 
 
Whatever the definition of diplomats, it is imperative that the diplomat possess negotiation skills, 
an understanding of the law (of the receiving state) and politics and a clear aim of promoting the 
relationships with the hosting states. Diplomats need these skills and knowledge to qualify for their 
positions and to enable the carrying out of their important duty of strengthening relationships 
between the receiving and sending states, as explained in the following section. 
 
2.3 History of Diplomatic Relations 
2.3.1 The Exchange of Diplomats in the Ancient States 
 
Given the debate about the provenance of diplomacy in the modern sense, it is important to 
consider how ancient peoples dealt with diplomacy and diplomats. This research particularly 
focuses on the difficulties faced by diplomats (i.e. real or potential personal harms inflicted on 
them), exploring how states dealt with such problems. Diplomatic relations are forged by 
diplomats, Jennings and Watts stated that when the permanent legations had become a general 
institution, the term diplomatic envoy was invented.248 However, this focus on terminology is 
essentially etymological and lexical, and does not help in understanding the reality of diplomacy 
in history. 
In ancient Greece, diplomats were considered holy, and there was a religious dimension to the 
envoy’s role traced to the concept of Hermes as the messenger of the gods; however, Hermes was 
also associated with deceptive charm, trickery, cunning and deceit, reflecting the Greek 
understanding of the archetypical envoy. Envoys in this period were labelled as deceitful;249 as 
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one author puts it, the envoy was ‘an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country’.250 This 
understanding seems to have continued to the present, and the recent Wiki -leaks scandals expose 
the widespread wiretapping of diplomatic missions and embassies. However, this does not mean 
that diplomats are associated with being malevolent people; diplomacy has been ascribed both 
negative and positive roles.251 
 
To perform their role effectively, diplomats need to have essential skills, modes of conduct and 
procedures of diplomacy; Kappeler confirms that the most of these requirements have not changed 
from the ancient world to the present. These requirements are very important for ensuring 
successful negotiation with other states.252 However, these skills and the relative importance 
attached to them vary between states according to their nature, their socio-cultural legacy and the 
particular context. 
 
International law has no role in such matters. However, some qualifications are required. For 
example, knowledge and training is an important requirement for a permanent diplomatic 
appointee.253 The position of diplomats as a representative of the state is a very sensitive position, 
requiring numerous skills and attributes. In ancient states an envoy was typically chosen from 
among the ruling family or oligarchy so that the rulers had confidence in the loyalty and abilities of 
that person, which conferred legitimacy upon them in the eyes of their own and foreign states.254 
Even today, the head of a mission is more important (albeit usually more symbolic) than ancillary 
staff who actually perform the diplomatic work. 
 
 
The sending state appoints the head of mission. Such an appointment is subject to the some 
formalities. Hence, the sending state needs to inform the receiving state about the appointment of 
the head of mission. In addition, the sending state gives the head of mission credentials. The latter 
has to hand in a copy of his credentials to the ministry of foreign affairs of the receiving state once 
he or she arrives. Such formalities are not required for supporting staff of the mission. The state 
describes its desire to start diplomatic relationships via the exchange of envoys.255 
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Although states frequently appoint different heads of mission to different states, they can appoint 
the same person to cover more than one state. However, the approval of receiving states is 
required.256 
 
In both ancient and contemporary times, the sending states often send more than one permanent 
diplomatic mission to the receiving state. In the ancient period the right of a hosting state to accept 
or reject the diplomatic representative or envoy of another state was subject to the agreement of 
both states. This right is reflected in Article 4 of the 1961Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. 257The sending state who desires to start diplomatic relationships with the receiving state 
has no right to force the host state to accept its envoy. Furthermore, several receiving states 
sometimes refused to accept the representative of sending states. Such refusal may put the sending 
state in an embarrassing situation. Thus, sending states have now developed a mechanism that 
ensures that their envoys are accepted by the receiving states even before such appointment.258 
Every state has the right to send and receive diplomatic envoys, called the right of legation, 
comprising active and passive right; the former refers to the right of sending the envoys to other 
states while the latter means the right of receiving the envoys. This right is necessary to states in 
terms of respect for their sovereignty (i.e. a fundamental right), although some states regard it as 
being a condition only. 259The right to appoint or receive envoy is a prerogative of the Head of 
State (de jure). As a result, only states with full sovereignty have the right to conduct diplomatic 
relations. For example, a revolutionary who may build informal relationships with other states 
cannot send diplomatic envoys to them unless the latter recognise the authority of that 
revolutionary as a legitimate Head of State. In addition, states under the protection of other states 
also have no right of legation. On the other hand, the constitution of federal states determines 
whether they have the right of legation. For instance, while the German Empire before the First 
World War gave this right to the federal states, the USA did not.260 
Envoys duties are less exclusively political in modern diplomatic practice, although early modern 
functionary tasks remain the responsibility of embassies (e.g. attending state occasions such as 
coronations, wedding ceremonies, funerals and jubilees).261 Another fundamental change is that 
diplomatic envoys can be women in the modern world; historically, it was not a significant issue 
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for a woman to be Head of State, particularly in dynastic societies (e.g. Elizabeth I), but women 
were almost never included in diplomatic missions except as the wives of male envoys.262 
 
2.3.2 The Characteristics of the Historical Diplomatic Corps 
 
The characteristics of the diplomatic corps have not changed much for several centuries.263 
Although now seen as a professional career (rather than a gentlemanly task to be discharged 
on behalf of one’s sovereign), diplomatic appointments (particularly at senior levels) remain 
dominated by the socio -economic elite. Most of the qualities diplomats require now remain the 
same as they were in the ancient world. Essential qualities required of diplomats include: 264 
 
1 Privileged socio-economic background. 
2 Sound academic knowledge of subjects related to diplomacy, such as the arts, 
history and law. 
3 Personal charisma and refined etiquette. 
4 Proficiency in multiple languages (e.g. historically Latin and French in the 
European tradition, Persian and Arabic in Indian). 
The historical requirement that the diplomat has the financial ability to cover all expenses, 
including properties and payments of personnel, is no longer valid in the case of modern nation 
states, although this was expected in traditional societies. It should also be noted that the same 
characteristics are required for the spouse (historically, the wife) of the diplomat.266 
 
These qualities enabled diplomats to adapt easily to the affairs of the host state, spending several 
years there. However, the drawback of this was the fact that the diplomats became ignorant of the 
affairs of their home country. Hence, the formation of the ad hoc diplomatic team as a special task 
force in critical scenarios may have resulted from this drawback. Diplomats have played a major 
role in bringing peace to conflicting parties through a series of negotiations (e.g. The Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648); however, these logical negotiations took a very long time to attain completion. 
By the time of the First World War diplomats were blamed by many due to their inability to avert 
the catastrophe, and although diplomats played a significant role during the Second World War 
and its aftermath, this was with dependence on the advice of other ministries, thus ‘whereas 
diplomatic culture has changed and keeps changing, it is by no means dead, and it should not be 
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allowed to die!’.265 
 
Although, the requirement that a diplomat possess the necessary skills is very important, and this 
has been reflected in history, recently, however, 266most of developing countries have not taken 
this seriously or seem to have other aims or agendas in their appointment of diplomats sent to other 
States. For example, Saudi Arabia in 2016 resumed its diplomatic ties with Iraq after a long period 
where diplomatic ties were cut off (since 1990). It has been alleged that the Saudi diplomat, Sabhan 
does not have the required skills to enable him to strengthen the relationships between these two 
countries. The only skill he seems to possess is his military skills (he holds a bachelor’s degree in 
military science). 267The only skill he seems to possess is his military skills (he holds a bachelor’s 
degree in military science). Saudi authorities responded that their diplomat is the most suitable 
person for the job for when and where he has been sent because of his military skills, further failing 
to acknowledge his lack of the required skill set.268 Another example is that in Iraq, the 
appointment of a diplomat is not based on the skills or knowledge he possesses, rather it depends 
mainly on party quotas and patronage.269 
 
2.3.3 Immunity of Diplomatic Personnel 
 
The absence of diplomatic immunity would lead to many risks to the lives of envoys due to the 
vagaries of international affairs, which is why the international community affords diplomats 
many privileges and immunities related to the establishment of embassies.270 Attacks on diplomats 
can be traced back to the ancient world, when envoys were subjected to all kind of maltreatments 
in ancient societies, which often constituted a casus belli (i.e. because an envoy represented a state, 
mistreatment of the envoy constituted an insult to a whole state).271 Bederman stated that all 
ancient societies were thus concerned with the protection of diplomatic personnel. The host 
nations have the responsibility for the protection of diplomats, by providing safeguard 
mechanisms. For example, in Mesopotamia, the lawgiver Hammurabi (d. c. 1750 BCE), 272to 
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whom the eponymous codex is attributed, was an able administrator and an adroit diplomat. One 
of the important safeguards he legislated was to provide troops to escort diplomats. However, he 
refused to practice this mechanism with Elam’s envoy, 273and was recorded as having violated 
the spirit of diplomatic immunity by refusing to provide safe passage for the return trip of foreign 
envoys who brought him a message he did not like. This diplomatic affront and breach of this 
customary law caused the breakdown of relations with Elam.274 
However, although the lives of envoys were generally considered sacred, it was because of this 
that they were often murdered as a deliberate act of provocation, particularly if negotiations failed. 
Historical examples include envoys being killed as a result of the failure of peace negotiations 
between the Egyptians and the Persians, and when King Darius of Persia refused to kill two 
Spartan nobles in retaliation for the murder of two Persian envoys in 491 BCE it was taken as an 
example of his benevolence.275 
During the course of history, the concept of diplomatic immunity has not changed much. There 
are two principles that govern immunity; reciprocity and personal inviolability. Personal 
inviolability is the first and the oldest principle (as violated by Hammurabi, above). This principle 
states that diplomats are inherently untouchable, which requires the willingness of the host state to 
observe this condition. This concept was aided by the sacred association of envoys – as mentioned 
previously, the Greeks viewed envoys in the context of the divine messenger Hermes, and in the 
Christian era the envoys of kings and the papacy were regarded as representatives of the Vicar of 
Christ (i.e. the pope or king), and thus representatives of God.276 
 
2.4 Diplomacy Practice in the Ancient States 
2.4.1 Ancient Near East 
 
There is evidence that the first documented diplomatic practice was the Amarna letters, which were 
found in the ancient Near East. The letters are clay tablets bearing correspondence between the 
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pharaohs of the eighteenth dynasty, which governed Egypt in the 15th to 14th centuries BCE, and 
the kings of Babylon and the Hittites (and peripheral polities in the Levant). They are mostly written 
in Babylonian. These documents were evidence that Egypt had relationships with its neighbours and 
more remote entities in the period 1460-1220 BCE.277 
 
The letters reveal that diplomatic concerns of the Egyptians concerned a variety of inter-
relationships and foreign relationships. The letters are particularly informative about the history of 
the armed conflict between two kingdoms of Kadsh in 1274 BCE. 
 
The Amarna letters comment that although this armed conflict did not produce a recognized winner, 
the peace treaty was an important watershed in the hostility between Muwatallis and Ramesses 
II. Relationships were also cemented by the marriage of a daughter of Muwatallis to RamessesII. 
278These diplomatic documents are a clear testimony to the cognisance of diplomacy among the 
most ancient human civilizations. Extensive communications existed between the major polities 
of the Near East at this time in terms of trade, peace and war and dynastic interrelations.279 
 
An obvious exception to the general concept of diplomatic immunity was evident in war practices. 
While the torture and mutilation of prisoners are not surprising, the fact that high-ranking (and in 
the ancient context, diplomatic) personnel were subject to such humiliating treatment is surprising 
(e.g. Egyptian monuments boast how the corpses of noblemen were castrated).280 Palestine 
provides the solitary example of relatively humane rules of war (concerning besieged cities).281 
 
Two kinds of diplomacy are recognised by modern analysts: traditional or old diplomacy and 
new diplomacy. Old diplomacy was mainly concerned with managing foreign relationships with 
other states. This concept was developed to mean the conduct of the relationships in all aspects of 
life. The example includes managing the interest of the two states’ military, economic, cultural, 
foreign and political affairs, and other national interests. The function of diplomacy, the task of 
diplomats, the means of communication, the meaning of diplomacy all were subjected to a 
significant shift.282 
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This change required more efforts and skills from diplomats, particularly solving complex issues in 
an autonomous manner. Diplomacy is closely interrelated (although not synonymous with) 
negotiation. Diplomats need to be experienced in negotiation to ensure the successful management 
of foreign relationships. In addition, it is important for the modern diplomat to engage with the media 
and public relations in order to prevent misrepresentation283 
 
Amid the barbarity exhibited by available evidence concerning Egypt, like Syria, Babylonia and 
the Hebrews, the Persians were idiosyncratically recognized for their hospitality.284 A ministry 
was created in the Persian court charged with the care and entertainment of guests (particularly 
foreign diplomats).285 However, in terms of strategy, the Egyptians were notable for their use of 
diplomacy to avoid war. Of the 350 Ammran letters, 50 narrate the foreign diplomatic policy of 
Egypt with others in ancient the Near East region in cuneiform.286 They suggest that ‘the yoke of 
Egypt was much lighter than that of Assyria, Carthage, or even Rome’, and that these empires 
were more closely interlinked than was previously thought.287 
 
The letters deal with different matters including legal issues, the conduct of diplomatic (dynastic) 
marriages (as explained previously), trade and other co-operative matters between the kings of 
Egypt, Mitani, Assyria, Babylonia and the Hittites.288 The conclusion of the wars between 
Ramesses II and Muwatallis was a peace agreement that included ‘the exchange of political 
refugees and asylum seekers, mutual military assistant, the mutual territorial inviolability, and the 
inter-dynastic marriage of a daughter of Muwatallis and Ramesses II’.289 
 
However, Hershey stated that the international relation in the ancient world ‘wholly based upon 
force’.290 He added that ‘the nations of antiquity are usually described as living in a state, either 
of almost complete isolation or of perpetual warfare with one other’.291 
 
The monuments of Egypt attest the bloody ceremonies, sometimes observed by the Pharaohs, to 
mutilate foreigners (as explained previously); Hershey states that ‘the bodies of the slain were often 
mutilated, and rebel captive were impaled and subjected to the most horrible tortures. Those who 
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escaped such punishment were chained and enslaved’.292 Hershey add that women and children 
were sometimes treated better and their lives were safer than men, presumably because men posed 
a military threat, as reflected in the Biblical narration that the Pharaoh ordered the infanticide of 
male Hebrew babies.293 
 
The Mosaic code was a self-consciously humane law that contrasted with the ruthless and 
bloodthirsty practices of the great contemporaneous civilizations. Albeit the narrations of the 
Israelite kings are often a catalogue of bloodbaths, The Law represents a different story, including 
the prohibition of destroying trees and the prohibition of sacking cities that surrender. Although the 
mandates for the slaughter of men are liberal, the Torah treats women, children and livestock more 
gently.294 
 
Although, the researcher agrees with the scholar that force was used rather than the diplomacy 
especially between strong nations and weak nation, however, these strong countries still realise the 
importance of restoring relations hips especially to facilitate trade, as the thesis will explain later 
when it explores the diplomacy in ancient Rome. 
 
2.4.2 Ancient Greece 
 
As with most political concepts, diplomacy took a noticeably modern form under the Greeks. 
However, contemporary diplomacy differs from the Greek in many ways.295 For example, resident 
representatives and permanent embassies were not recognized in ancient Greek diplomacy. 
Furthermore, there was no established conduct of diplomacy, and differences in the manner of 
choosing envoys. The best orators were often chosen in order to conduct foreign policy, and the 
Greeks believe that this kind of person (i.e. a skilled raconteur) could resolve serious international 
problems with other countries; however, they did prefer to send a mission comprising a group of 
men rather than a single representative.296 Historians generally agree that the ancient Greeks were 
the first to develop an appropriate diplomatic communications system. 
 
The word diploma derives from Greek from word diploun which means ‘to double’, and some 
have suggested that Greek diplomats had completed two courses of study.297 
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The most archaic Greek understanding of the diplomat is the envoy Hermes, as mentioned 
previously, but by the 5th century BCE the ancient Grecians had developed the meaning of foreign 
relations in terms of declaring war, granting asylum and exchanging envoys.298 The Grecian 
diplomats were prohibited from accepting gifts from the host state (to avoid bribery), on pain of 
death. The Ancient Grecians also practiced an important principle of diplomatic law: the principle 
of non- interference.299 
 
Article 40 (1) of the VCDR refrains the diplomats from interference in internal affairs of the 
receiving state but fails to define diplomatic interference. This lack of definition could be 
confusing to an ambassador as without knowing what it means, it makes it practically difficult to 
know when they have crossed the line while carrying out their duties of protecting the interest of 
their State. However, this study posits that the definition of diplomatic interference is not important, 
and a legislator does not need to set out every single definition. The receiving State can determine 
whether actions or statements made by a diplomat are prejudicial to its sovereignty.300 
 
A large number of peace agreements were established between the Greeks and other entities. 
However, frequent conflicts erupted regarding land proprietorship and rights of access to land. 
Thus Greek diplomacy mainly concerned possessions in the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, thus 
their main diplomatic relations were with each other (between the Greek city-states), and with the 
Egyptians, Phoenicians (later Carthaginians), Persians, Etruscans and (later) Romans. Such 
relations often concerned the formation of leagues (alliances) in preparation for impending wars.301 
For example, in 431-404 BCE the Athenians and Spartans were in the alliance during the 
Peloponnesian War. Indeed, the historical evidence shows that Greek diplomacy was more than 
just a separation of allies and enemies but acknowledged varying degrees of power relationships 
and the concept of neutrality with the point of abstention from conflict defined clearly to provide 
protection against belligerent hostility.302 
 
However, ancient Greek diplomacy was not formally instituted, and was rolled out on an ad-hoc 
basis, with no resident representatives and permanent embassies. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that different Greek states appointed diplomats by different means (e.g. Athenian citizens – all adult 
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freemen – would elect the best orators to plea the city’s case in foreign relations.303 
 
There were no formal obligations to foreign diplomats except the general religious obligations to 
all foreign citizens to provide hospitality during the most archaic period. However, diplomats did 
have clear importance to the Greeks, reflecting their efforts to build relationships with others, and 
they were generally successful; unfortunately, history is only concerned with their failures (i.e. wars 
and major crises).304 
 
The Greeks recognized arbitration ‘an agreement beforehand to submit disputes to judicial 
decision’305 and deployed it in the treaties in several cases. For example, it was used to sort out the 
‘disputes touching religion, commerce, boundaries and the possession of contested territories, 
especially the numerous islands scattered among the Grecian seas’.306 
 
Natural Law guaranteed the inviolability of envoys by the classical Greek period, and the Customs 
of the Hellenes organized the relationships between the Greeks and foreigners, including the 
‘inviolability of messengers and envoys, the right of asylum or sanctuary and truces for the burial 
of the dead’; furthermore, some ethical precepts were applied to international law regarding war 
(e.g. Athenians agreed deferment of conflicts for religious purposes, and avoiding injuring 
temples).307 
 
2.4.3 Ancient Rome 
 
Unlike the Greeks a Carthaginians, the Romans had overwhelming military superiority and thus 
had little practical need for international diplomacy. Diplomacy for Rome was not an essential 
means to conduct negotiations with other states under normal circumstances.308 Thus the Romans 
had few qualms about the maltreatment of envoys, and they were sometimes held as hostages, 
imprisoned or killed.309 However, relationships with other states were important to Rome, mostly 
in order to conduct trade. The Romans thus felt the necessity to institute laws to protect the life of 
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The sending and receiving of an ambassador, is one of the important elements for international 
relations. Furthermore, the relationships between a host and guest in Rome were respected. 311It 
was the principle of benevolence to guests and self-prestige that generally ensured the respectful 
treatment of foreign diplomats under the Romans, backed by notions of filial piety. Furthermore, 
the Romans had a superior ability for administration and organization than the Greeks. Thus, they 
were more able to provide such hospitality and protection than the ad-hoc, rough-and-ready 
Greek states.312 
Diplomacy is now an essential and institutionalised way of conducting and managing relationships 
between states in order to cooperate in trade; however, the Romans did not have such 
institutionalisation for foreign affairs or an expert diplomatic corps, and other states did not send 
diplomatic representatives to Rome on a permanent basis. This was partly because the Romans 
ultimately assimilated all of the Mediterranean civilizations, and the only serious neighbouring 
power during the classical Roman period (after the fall of Carthage in 146 BCE) was the Persian 
Empire.313 
 
In ancient Rome, the word diplomacy meant a travel document that a person needed to travel 
across the Roman Empire. They then started to use this word to refer to other significant 
documents, for instance negotiations with barbarian tribes.314 
 
In the history of international politics the antique Roman civilization marks a turning point in 
several respects, most notably in that overwhelming military superiority was demonstrated to 
decisively override the flimsy protections of diplomacy: The Romans rely on force in all their 
undertakings, and consider that having set themselves a task they are bound to carry it through.315 
However, although diplomacy becomes a secondary concern in international relations, it did not 
disappear entirely.316 
 
Diplomats were chosen based on their character as honest, responsible and capable Roman men. 
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As such, thus they were typically from the patrician class, and little skill was required from them as 
any Roman international affairs were backed by the guarantee of superior force. This also enabled 
them to disregard customary courtesies in dealing with foreign envoys. For example, in 197 BCE, 
in order to pressure the Macedonian envoy to agree their negotiation within sixty days, they notified 
him that they would regard him as a spy and strip him of his immunity if the negotiations failed 
within this limited time.317 The Romans could also take hostages (typically noblemen, often the 
heirs of foreign kingdoms) who then functioned as humiliated and subservient diplomatic 
representatives; the Romans developed the practice of including the hostage clause in treaties as a 
commitment device. The Romans demanded that hostages be delivered from conquered tribes 
and nations at the conclusion of surrender agreements. If the terms were violated, the hostages 
were immediately arrested and treated as prisoners of war.318 
Although the Romans inherited academic knowledge and the mechanisms of negotiation from the 
Grecians, they ultimately depended on their military force.319 However, “The Law of Nations” 
was devised to govern international relations. This law is similar to diplomatic law, including the 
principle and approach that the envoys should practice in doing their duties, such as declaring war 
and making peace and treaties; this Law reaffirms the privileges and immunities of envoys,320 and 
it became a source of international law in the Middle Ages, ultimately informing the modern 
international rules created by European powers and the US during the 20th century, including the 
doctrine of diplomatic immunity.321 
 
2.4.4 Ancient India 
 
The Indus Valley Civilization (c. 3300-1300 BCE) had extensive trade relations (and presumably 
diplomatic ones) with Mesopotamia, as affirmed by Sumerian and Babylonian seals. More well-
documented diplomacy can be traced from the 7th century CE, when Indian kingdoms had 
diplomatic relations with Persia and China, as well as with each other. 
 
Hindu philosophy devised a special system of managing foreign relations, dividing relationships 
with neighbours into four sections: enemies, friends, mediators and neutrals.322 
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Ancient Indian relations were extensive, with documentary support for relations with ‘Antiochos 
Theos of Syria, Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt, Antigonos Gonatas of Macedon, Magas of 
Gyrene, and Alexander II of Epirus’.323 In addition, they were interested in keeping such 
relationships. That is why they sent ambassadors to other states. For example,’Seleukos Nikator, 
sent Megasthenes as ambassador to the Court of Chandragupta, and Deimachos and Dionysios 
were attached to the Court of Bindusara Amitraghata as ambassadors from Antiochus Soter, King 
of Syria, and Ptolemy Philadelphos, King of Egypt’.324 The envoys were enjoyed immunity and 
privileges. Diplomatic personnel were enjoying kind of sanctity in ancient India. The envoy should 
not be subject to murder. 325These immunities and privileges were granted to diplomats because 
of his or her great responsibility. One of important duty was to represent the State in negotiation 
with the enemy, and he or she has to resolve the disputes with the enemy. Special qualities required 
from diplomats included tact, intelligence, forgiveness and forbearance.326 It is clear that the 
immunities and privileges granted in ancient India to diplomats were based on functional necessity 
theory, despite this theory not formally existing at this time. 
 
There was clearly some cognisance of a continuous diplomatic community from the Greek and 
Carthaginian colonies in the Western Mediterranean to the Chinese Empire, via the intermediaries 
of Persia and India. When Alexander the Great (d. 323 BCE) marched east of Persia with his 
Macedonians to invade India he was not a Cortés entering terra incognita. 
 
The Indian diplomatic relationships were sometimes rooted in the policies of the fathers and 
grandfathers of incumbent rulers. Such relationships were considered noble, faithful and eternal, 
based on protecting life and property. 
 
Furthermore, there was a mediator king. This king was ready to help both fighting sides, the king 
and his wicked enemies. Such king, his territory was placed near to both of them. However, the 
ruler who his territory was in between the two fighting territories need to be impartial. The latter 
ruler is different from the former one in that the former one had an important role in the 
reconciliation between the disputing parties, while the latter had no role more than stayed passive 
to both sides. The other neighbours of the king might be classified to the; the rearward enemy, 
an ally of rearward enemy, rearward friend, and ally of a rearward friend.327 
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Foreign diplomacy was understood in terms of six dimensions: peace, strong relationships, war, 
preparedness for war and neutrality. The situation of making peace or war with other neighbours 
depended on the power of the state. Hence, if the state was militarily superior might resort to war, 
while peace was sought if the state was weak; in other words, ancient Indian foreign relations were 
based on expediency and pragmatism, whatever their pretensions to Hindu philosophy.328 
Many techniques of diplomacy are documented, such as exchanging gifts, reconciliation, sowing 
dissension and punishment. Alliances were sought by states for different purposes, one of the most 
important of which was the fear of invasion by other powers. Such mutual assistance agreements 
were often invoked and put into effect due to the monarch’s word of honour or the pressure of 
sages (holy men or Brahmins) on the government to do so. However, states often required 
guarantees such as taking hostages or swearing by fire or water, which was considered to be more 
binding in Hindu ideology.329 
 
Furthermore, diplomatic agents were the main agents in international communication. There were 
several kinds of diplomatic agents in this time, including plenipotentiaries’ ambassadors and 
charge d’affaires and simple couriers of messages between royal courts. Plenipotentiaries had 
more important responsibilities such as declaring a state of emergency or war, restoring peace, 
claiming the observance of agreements, and questioning ultimatums in emergency cases.330 
 
The ambassador who managed foreign relationships had to inform his state about the activities of 
the foreign court. This information essentially comprised espionage, including discovering the 
strong and weak points of states, particularly in terms of military capabilities, for which reason the 
exchange of envoys has always been a gesture of tentative trust. The charge d’ affaires were lower 
in rank and had limited power, usually sent abroad to perform specific duties. Envoys representing 
their state outside enjoyed a number of immunities and privileges because of their important tasks; 
furthermore, they had intrinsic rights and responsibilities as members of the Kshatriyah and 
Brahmin castes.331 
 
Classical Indian philosophy identified three kinds of war: open, concealed and silent. Each had its 
own characteristics. Open war was manifestly overt hostility and fighting at specific times in 
(then) conventional battles, while the concealed war was guerrilla warfare. The silent war was with 
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other kingdoms whereby activities were conducted in secret (i.e. assassinations and espionage, 
including creating divisions between the ministers and classes, and the dissemination of 
misinformation and disinformation). 332 
 
Diplomatic immunity of envoys as messengers and representatives (though not as spies) was 
approved in ancient India and Hindu thought. The envoys could not be killed, but they might face 
several kinds of violence. For example, a messenger could be punished, branded, maimed, 
disfigured or imprisoned. The rights of envoys, as well as their duties or restrictions, were identified 
and codified in state laws. 333The envoys also had several duties. For example, they had to remain 
in communication with their rulers, negotiate treaties aptly and observe the implementation of their 
terms, engage in intrigues, spy, suborn, and bribe officials of the enemy and win the allies. Indeed, 
envoys could be required to kidnap foreign notables or provide reconnaissance for troops and 
secret agents, as in China.334 Although Bederman states the Indian diplomacy was largely 
internal,335 there were relationships with China concerning commercial concerns.336 
 
2.4.5 Ancient China 
 
Of all the ancient civilizations, China perhaps had the most developed administrative and 
governmental systems, based on Confucian ethics of absolute obedience to the ruler and the 
supremacy of the Middle Kingdom (China) and its centrality in the world. However, the stasis of 
Chinese civilization often degenerated into civil war, and envoys played a crucial role in conducting 
negotiations between warring states; diplomats played a significant role in this regard, which is 
why diplomacy is a major concern of Chinese philosophy (e.g. Confucian and Daoist texts). 
Envoys were understood to be exercising the all-important filial piety, to their own parents and 
ancestors, their ruler and to the state.337 
One notable feature of Chinese diplomacy is that the envoy was not considered to represent the 
persona of the sovereign; he represented the authority of the emperor as did any government 
official, and was thus venerated by the masses, but the emperor’s the person was on a different 
plane. Furthermore, foreign states were regarded as tributary vassals at best and uncouth 
barbarians at worst. Thus envoys had to observe assiduously the protocols of appearing in the 
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presence of the emperor; on two occasions’ foreign ambassadors refused to prostrate themselves 
to the “Son of Heaven” and thus caused diplomatic incidents in China (the refusal of the Arab- 
Islamic envoys sent by Qutaybah bin Muslim c. 715 and the British Macartney Embassy in 
1793).338 
 
Classical Chinese civilization, whose governance was permeated with the ideals of Confucianism, 
viewed diplomacy as sacred (as manifest in the Analects of Confucius) and also granted diplomats 
immunity based on the theory of reciprocity between states prior to the unification of China by 
the Qin dynasty in the 3rd century BCE, after which foreign states were viewed as vassals. 
Consequently, all ambassadors to China were viewed as subordinate representatives of vassal 
states who duly gave obeisance. However, the gradual dissemination of Buddhist culture and ethics 
in China injected a certain commonality with other Hindu-Buddhist cultures in South and 
Southeast Asia (i.e. between India, Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, Indochina and China). Angelskår 
stated that the Chinese historically relied on religion in their relationships with others to make 
honest friendships.339 Hence China displayed its responsibility, trustworthiness, benevolence and 
superiority to others in the discourse of religion and ethics.340 However, as mentioned previously, 
the Chinese state ideology of supremacy caused it to disparage (and underestimate) foreign 
powers, with the result that Cranmer-Byng questioned whether Chinese relations could even be 
understood as being “diplomatic”.341 
 
However, Western observers have often been insensitive to the Chinese case. What are today 
considered perfectly legitimate rights of states (e.g. refusing to allow the sale of opium to its citizens, 
levying taxes on imports and exercising inspection of import goods) were regarded as intolerable 
and backward obstructions to European “free trade”.342 
 
Furthermore, Chinese court scholars were ever aware of the painful civil wars that had 
intermittently destroyed Chinese civilization, thus the diplomatic practices that had caused the 
unification of China (e.g. exchanging gifts, crafting treaties, paying tributes and fighting rebellions) 
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were regarded as the means to promote peace and harmony; this paradigm was later extended to 
include international states,343 and the Chinese were aware of the great boon that access to the 
Chinese market afforded foreigners, thus they expected some recompense in return for granting 
such access.344 The Chinese had successfully extended their diplomatic engagements and trade by 
the time of the Sung dynasty with the Arab World, Persia, India and South-East Asia. The only 
breakdown of their diplomacy arose when they refused to allow the European powers a free hand 
within China. 
 
One of important task of the envoys was to collect the information about the other countries. That 
is why the envoy was taken training to have such skills, and they were succeeding in their task. 
Hence, Chinese envoys often returned to their country with worthy intelligence. Furthermore, they 
were exchange the gifts with other as well as merchandized illegitimately in the foreign lands they 
invested.345 
 
2.5 Diplomacy in Islam and Historical Islamic States 
2.5.1 Overview of Sharia Position and the Aberrancy of Modern Islamists 
 
It should be noted from the outset for the benefit of scholars unfamiliar with the concept of law 
and the state in Islam, or with normative traditions of religious law in general, that Sharia represents 
a coherent and well-established body of jurisprudence that was used as the normative civil law for 
numerous sophisticated civilizations in history, as well as many modern states. While different 
methodologies are applied by different schools of jurisprudence, Sharia – as with any legal system 
– is not open to individual and unqualified interpretations such as those that form the ideological 
foundation for the steps taken by modern Islamist groups and other non-state actors. In Islamic 
legal tradition it is forbidden for the uninitiated members of the public such as Osama bin 
Laden (those who do not have an official ijazah or authorisation from recognised institutions to 
issue verdicts) to issue public pronouncements and opinions, particularly concerning matters of 
state. Islam has recognised the authority of the state (regardless of its ideological foundation) since 
its inception (i.e. the early Muslims dealt with the pagan and Christian states of Arabia, Africa and 
the Levant, and the Zoroastrian state of Persia). 
 
Christianity developed as a set of doctrinal concepts and religious practices among a persecuted 
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minority, but as the official religion of the Roman Empire it provided the basis of modern Western 
law, stemming from the Codex Justinianus (c. 540 AD); just as a lone wolf attack by a far-right 
ultra-Christian extremist on a minority community centre in Europe of the US has no connection 
with Christian law, it must be acknowledged for severe academic purposes that Islamist terrorism 
in terms of indiscriminately murdering civilians is not intrinsic to Islam or Sharia per se; this is 
explained in more detail below. 
 
Unlike Christianity, Islam was from its formative period embodied in a sophisticated political 
community.346 The Islamic state (or Caliphate) was equivalent to the contemporary Roman 
(Byzantine) state and thus it is generally similar to the modern concept of a state in its bureaucratic 
functions, but as the Byzantine Empire, its animating principle was faith, which is an alien concept 
to most European states as they have developed since the French Revolution. Just as pre-modern 
Europe perceived itself to be Christendom, classical Islamic political theory split the world into the 
Daar Al-Islam ( ‘Abode of Islam’), where Islam was sovereign, and the Daar Al-Harb (the 
‘Abode of War’), where it was not.347 Despite the connotations of the latter, aggressive war was 
not incumbent on the Muslim state except where foreign powers did not allow the free practice of 
Islam; in practice, Muslim polities often used religious justifications for worldly wars, just as 
Christian kingdoms (and indeed modern secular states) were wont to do. 
 
 
Islamic diplomacy pre-dates the Islamic state which originated in Madinah in 622 CE. Ja’far ibn 
Abi Talib was given the job of representing Muslim refugees in Abyssinia in 616 CE. After the 
Islamic state was established, the Charter of Madinah gave rights and responsibilities to Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike. These included a “dispute resolution, a tax system to provide for defence 
and the requirements for loyalty to the State”.348 It gave rise to a reconciliation system similar to 
the one used in most contemporary states to end the conflict between nations. The Treaty of 
Najran, negotiated to establish diplomatic guidelines was agreed between the Muslims and 
Christian tribes of that area. 349 These new conventions from the early Islamic period accorded 
diplomats immunity and privileges which had their roots in reciprocity and assumption of good 
faith, and not acting to undermine a receiving state by using espionage or indeed any other sabotage. 
Diplomats became key players in declarations of war, “exchange of prisoners and arrangement of 
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In conjunction with other Abrahamic-based religions i.e. Judaism and Christianity, Islam espouses 
ethical principles and laws covering all the different aspects of life. Because of the individual context 
of Islamic messages, which gave rise to the formation of a historical state within a generation of its 
beginnings, Sharia is more codified and extensive none more so than with regard to statecraft. 
Several “rules of war” laws and diplomatic measures took influence from Islamic principles. These 
cover disposing of war dead, the introduction of flags of peace, treatment of enemy property, 
uniforms and some other prohibited actions).351 
 
The role of Islam and its contribution to the immunity and privileges of diplomats was confirmed 
by the ICJ decision in the Iran hostage case 1979, which states that: ‘The principle of the 
inviolability of the persons of diplomatic agents and the premises of diplomatic missions is one of 
the very foundations of this long-established regime, to the evolution of which the traditions of 
Islam made a substantial contribution’.352 
 
The ICJ emphasized the contribution of Islam to diplomatic and consular law and has agreed that 
Islam has played an important role in the establishment of trends and procedures of diplomatic law. 
With regard to the Iran hostage crisis in 1979-1980, the ICJ observed that the doctrine that people 
with diplomatic mandates should not be abused as a rule owes much to Islamic tradition.353 The 
ICJ’s stance is that Sharia is based on certain principles regarding the protection of religion, 
protection of life, how to deal with property, the protection of honour. Islamic jurisprudence is taken 
from these aspects; for example, there is an order of importance in Islamic jurisprudence. The 
preservation of life comes above saving property, and if one steals to stay alive, any punishment 
may be waived (NB stealing remains prohibited, but begging is allowed in this case). Diplomacy is 
majorly important under Sharia as a way to protect life and prevent war, and betrayal and/or breach 
of treaties are highly offensive in Islamic texts due to their wider implications (e.g. contributing to 
warfare) as well as in and of themselves. 
 
Islamic legislation is very clear in terms of protecting envoys. Explicit texts and deeds of the Prophet 
indicate that diplomats cannot be killed in any way. They also ensure that the freedom of belief and 
the conduct of diplomacy are fully free.354 
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Although some scholars stated that a state of war was regarded as a usual relationship between 
Islam and other nations (i.e. Daar Al-Harb), historical evidence indicates that Islamic states have 
often sent diplomatic missions and envoys on peaceful missions also. This was particularly the 
case when conducting inter-state relations among Islamic political units which are shown by the 
exchange of envoys between central Asian monarchs like Babar and the Shah of Persia in the early 
1500’s. Even regarding medieval India, instances of exchange of envoys have been documented 
between Islamic and non-Islamic states for peaceful purposes when they were seeking friendship 
and/or alliance or even military assistance before a war. For example, Rana Sanga sent emissaries 
to Babur to seek to have the latter agree to form an alliance against Ibrahim Lodi just before the 
1527 battle of Sikri .355 
Before Islam, tribal warfare was very common among the indigenous people of central and western 
Arabia, to the point where negotiation as a concept was unknown in their interact ions except in a 
small number of limited situations. The ‘sword’ was the ultimate language among the tribes in that 
area. However, the birth of Islam introduced diplomatic relations in the Arabian Peninsula as a way 
of settling disputes, thus replacing brute force as the arbiter of inter-tribal relations. Islam became 
the most important source of protecting diplo mats throughout MENA and much of Asia in the 
subsequent centuries.356 
As explained previously, the main sources of Sharia are the Quran and Sunnah and practices of 
the early Caliphs, all of which reiterate privileges and immunities of diplomats. Also, the consistent 
practice of Muslim caliphs and governors clearly established the privileges and immunities of 
diplomats in Sharia in practice, as this research explains.357 This study shows how Islam deals with 
non-Muslims by depending on Sharia resources (the Quran and Sunnah) and the practice of 
Islamic states with diplomats on a daily basis. 
 
Given the general impetus to venerate and protect envoys in Islamic scripture and doctrine, the 
question arises of why some of the most egregious attacks against diplomats are committed by 
Islamist movements. It is beyond the scope of this study to present a Sharia-based critique of 
modern Islamist and terrorist movements such as ISIS, but in general, it is well-known among 
Islamic experts that modern political Islamism – and by extension Islamist terrorism – arises 
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from the trends of political development in MENA as a whole. Prior to the 1980s, the prevailing 
model was conservative Arab-Islamic monarchies (e.g. in the GCC) versus quasi-socialist 
anticolonial movements of the pan-Arab nationalist type, of which Nasser in Egypt, Gaddafi in 
Libya and the Ba’athist Party in Iraq and Syria are examples; non-state variants of this trend were 
already committed to terrorist actions targeting civilians (e.g. Palestinian terrorist movements of 
the 1960s and 1970s), analogous to their equivalents in Europe – the Red Brigades in Italy and 
Red Army Faction which was based in West Germany. During this time, Western powers 
supported quasi-Islamic movements fighting against socialist state forces, alongside conservative 
Arab monarchies in the GCC; a later manifestation of this was the US-facilitated establishment 
and support for Al-Qaeda fighting the USSR in Afghanistan during the 1980s. 
 
Militant Islamism is widely utilised in global great power politics, it is rooted in modern, secular 
political ideologies and not in classical Islamic tradition. For centuries the institutions of classical 
Islamic learning have in most cases been systematically undermined and starved of funding, while 
money has poured into the coffers of the ideologues of Islamism and (by extension) violence and 
terrorism, with the result that Osama bin Laden – the product of a secular education specialising 
in engineering is perversely seen as a representative of the Islamic faith, which despite all of its 
diversity, cosmopolitanism and sophistication is primarily associated in modern political discourse 
with suicidal attacks on innocent civilians.358 
 
Despite their lack of Islamic learning and the fact that their practices are often blatantly contrary to 
Sharia (e.g. suicide is unequivocally prohibited in Sharia, never mind suicide bombing), Islamist 
movements have succeeded in some countries in attracting small but dedicated bands of followers, 
generally from depressed socio-economic conditions with undeveloped civil societies such as in 
Libya and Iraq, who perpetrate Islamist violence, including against diplomats. The attack on 
Stevens in Libya is generally attributed to Ansar Al-Sharia (‘Helpers of Sharia’), usually 
considered a branch of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda ideology is based on the assumptions whereby both 
close and distant enemies of Islam had to be fought, and armed warfare was the only way to make 
political change. According to O’Bagy, they reject the Modern Western state and seek to establish 
an Islamic caliphate based on Sharia law.359 
Furthermore, they believe in militant, aggressive jihad as a way in achieving their vision of an 
Islamic state, with no regard for the existence of de facto Muslim or non- Muslim states, contrary 
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to the foundations of Sharia; their primary targets are thus the regimes of the modern Middle East, 
whom they regard as stooges of Western imperialism (stemming from their intellectual pedigree 
as leftist anticolonial movements, as explained previously); thus their attacks on Western interests 
are in fact targeted at local regimes.360 
 
2.5.2 Diplomacy and Protection of Diplomats in the Quran 
 
The Quran enjoins peace making and the establishment of friendship and peace with foreigners in 
international relations. Islam appreciates the need of the people to debate and discuss their 
ideological differences in a peaceful way and with mutual understanding.361 
 
Inter-state relationships between states were significant in Islamic tradition, and the Quran 
describes the differences between peoples and their formation of societies as part of the divine 
cosmology.362 
 
The call for Islam was one of the diplomatic purposes of the Islamic state. The Quranic version 
orders people to call for friendly and wise ways.363 
 
The role of diplomats was not limited to the time of war. The diplomat’s role was based on the 
Quranic verse364 That God makes a link between the good words that bind the heart of the people 
with a blessed tree that bears fruit that benefits people.365 
 
With the revelation for the new faith, the diplomatic conduct was the first task commissioned to the 
Prophet Muhammad, which Muslims believe he achieved based on honest, truthful wisdom and 
prudent policy, not subterfuge, deception and aggression.366 However, evidently groups such as 
Al-Qaeda and ISIS have no respect for those they regard as non-Muslims (including the vast 
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majority of Muslims themselves), and they do not see the need to be trustworthy or honest. 
 
The Quran makes many references to the term aman or safe conduct, which has become an 
important part of diplomatic immunity. Diplomats and refugees are the main beneficiaries of aman. 
A legally binding privilege that obligated the state to protect the diplomats until his departure from 
territory. The state may revoke aman and it may expel a diplomat, but it cannot violate it. While in 
the view of commentators there is an exception of the absolute immunity for diplomats if they are 
found guilty of a hudud crime (e.g. murder),367 there is no specific statement in the Quran or Sunna 
for this exception.368 
 
According to Sharia nothing prevents immunity by treaty.369 That means Libya is obliged to protect 
diplomats in accordance with its international obligation (under VCDR 1961) in accordance to 
Sharia. The Quran and Hadith forbid the betrayal of a covenant, particularly a guarantee of 
protection for a protected person such as a non- Muslim. The Quran further prohibits murder in 
itself (outside the context of an officially authorised war, which brings into effects its own rules 
and regulations prohibiting the murder or mistreatment of non-combatants, livestock and property 
etc.):”And do not kill the soul which Allah has forbidden, except by right”.370 The Quran goes 
further by regarding the killing of a person equal to killing all people, emphasising the importance 
of the right to life.371 
 
The armed groups who targeted diplomats whether in Libya or other places are clearly aberrant 
and un-representative of Islamic religion and normative civilization. Nevertheless they pose a 
threat that must be dealt with. While the Islamic state is not allowed to attack non-Muslims not 
hostile to Islam, including those “  
who do not oppress Muslims, nor try to convert Muslims by force from their religion, or expel 
them from their lands, or wage war against them, or prepare for attacks against them”,372  
                                                          
367Hudud offences are criminal behaviour against God. It is crimes against God whose punishment is clearly 
stipulated in the Quran and the Sunna. E.g. theft, highway robbery, drinking alcohol, unlawful sexual 
intercourse (and) false accusation of unchastity. See Etim E. Okon ‘Hudud Punishments in Islamic Criminal 
Law’ (2014) 10 (14) European Scientific Journal May 227.  
368 Frey and Frey (n93)361; Barker (n3)58; Bassioun (n107) 609. 
369 Bassiouni (n107) 609. 
370 Quran (Al Isra 33). Except by right means ‘(i.e. murder is forbidden but the death penalty imposed by the 
state for a crime is permitted.)’ Juan Cole ‘Top Ten Ways Islamic Law forbids Terrorism’ (2013) Informed 
Comment. Available at <https://www.juancole.com/2013/04/islamic -forbids- 
terrorism.html> Accessed 3 July 2017. 
371 Quran (Al-Maeda Verse No: 32). ‘if anyone killed a person not in retaliation of murder, or (and) to spread 
mischief in the land - it would be as if he killed all mankind’ 
372 According to several traditional scholars, ‘jihad is only permitted if Muslims havbeen attacked. It does not 
justify fighting against people who are not fighting them’. See Mainstream Muslim Scholar ‘ISIS (Islamic state 
of Iraq and Syria) Origins, Ideology, and Response’ (2016) National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies 
83  
Terrorists in the name of Islam have enslaved minorities and indeed normal Muslims and murdered 
indiscriminately those traditionally granted special protection in the Quran itself, such as 
Christians and Jews. For instance, it is incumbent on the Muslim state to defend churches and 
synagogues, whose protection is a justification for the existence of war according to the Quran.373 
 
Based on their ignorant misinterpretations, Islamist terrorists notoriously target protected 
minorities and desecrate their places of worship. However, if offences (i.e. attacks against 
Muslims) occur, Muslims are allowed to defend themselves and also to protect their religion, within 
clearly articulated parameters governing the laws of war. Muslims are not allowed to attack non-
Muslims whom they have signed peace pacts with, or non-Muslims living under the Islamic 
State’s protection.374 Islamist groups in some cases selectively interpret the Quran literally, 
without going back to the history of the verse, although in most cases their appeals are emotive and 
not based in scripture at all.375 Eager to find some scriptural grounding for their totalitarian ideas, 
terrorists and Islamophobias are united in their conviction that Islam itself is a violent and barbaric 
religion bringing death and destruction to mankind, which is belied by historical reality and 
abhorrent to people of sense, and which has a total disregard for textual and historical context, 
and reputable Islamic scholarship. For instance, they cite a phrase from a verse speaking about the 
Meccans who waged war against the Muslims saying, ‘Slay them wherever you find them’,376 
ignoring both the immediately preceding verse: ‘Fight in the cause of God only those who fight 
you and do not commit aggression’, and the subsequent verse: ‘But if they cease fighting, then let 
there be no hostility except against oppressors’. Their spurious interpretations and misquotations 
lack academic merit,377 but they brainwash deluded, aggrieved and dispossessed young Muslims 
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who are misguided into perpetrating suicidal, hopeless crimes as a result. 
 
According to Islam, aman should be granted for foreign people (Diplomats) even if they are non-
Muslims when they enter into the territory of the Islamic states with the permission of the ruler. The 
safety or aman granted to diplomats includes the inviolability of their blood (it is not permissible 
to kill the diplomats or assassination or bombing or be taken as a hostage), property and honour 
(e.g. it is forbidden to gossip about them or cast aspersions on them or their conduct unless one is 
brining formal legal proceedings against them). 
 
It is not allowed to kill the person who is a foreigner, a Christian, or any other religion, because 
that is treachery, and Islam forbids treason, so it cannot grant minorities safety and then sanction 
their murder (like Pharaonic Egypt and the Israelites). The Prophet promised severe punishment 
for a Muslim who violates the inviolability of the life of a minority who was given aman.378 
However, the earthly punishment is a punishable sentence that requires the punishment of the 
offender in kind, with double the customary wergild (blood money) for murder if he intended to kill 
the victim, and half of that amount if it was accidental (i.e. manslaughter).379 However, Sheikh 
Khalid Al- Musheeq stated that the Muslim does not punish with death penalty for killing a dhimmi 
(a historical term referring to non-Muslims living in an Islamic state with legal protection) because 
the condition of the equality for the punishment is not available (according to him, a Muslim is not 
equal to a non-Muslim), but he should pay double money blood for killing a non-Muslim.380 
 
The Muslims are obligated to fulfil the covenant with others,381 as this research explains later in this 
section. 
Consequently, Ansar Al-Sharia’s pretensions to be following Islam by murdering the US 
Ambassador in Libya are ludicrous. The Quran shows that whatever the sending state situation is 
with the receiving state, the messenger is protected and his life is immune, and ambassadors cannot 
be held responsible for any acts or messages sent by their head of state.382 The Quran narrates 
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the negotiation between the Prophet Solomon (c. 992-952 BC) and Balqis, the Queen of Sheba.383 
When called upon to renounce idolatry and worship the God of the Israelites, Balqis was advised 
by her chiefs to fight Solomon; however, she prudently decided to send messengers to him with 
gifts to see his reaction,384 as the Quran describes:  
 ‘”But verily! I am going to send him a present and see with what (answer) the messengers 
return”’.385  
However, Solomon considered this to be a bribe and an insult. Thus he refused the gifts and made 
the delegation return to the Queen.386 He responded  
”Go back to them, and be sure we shall come to them with such haste as they will never be able to 
meet: we shall expel them from there in disgrace, and they will feel humiliated”.387 
 
These verses can be taken to mean that emissaries were seen as ordinary and archetypal ways of 
diplomatic communications between all heads of state be they Muslim or non-Muslim and that 
the emissaries were immune from any anger of the host state thus not held responsible for acts or 
messages sent by their head of state. Thus, even when Solomon was offended, he did nothing to 
the messengers but send them back to their home land.388 
 
2.5.3 Diplomacy in the Prophetic Era (570-632 AD) 
 
The purpose of diplomacy in the time of Prophet Muhammad was to spread the message of God 
to the whole of mankind and to create a peaceful environment in surrounding territories.389 
 
In the Muslim view, Prophet Muhammad was instructed to deliver the message of Islam through 
peaceful argument and rational persuasion and to call people to Islam in the light of divine revelation. 
Diplomacy in Islamic discipline represents a way of life and is not to be considered a professional 
activity is simply serving the purpose of the mission. Muslims should meet their obligation and 
responsibility with faith,390 recalling that the Muslim delegates who went to Abyssinia in the early 
years of Islam enjoyed immunity.391 
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While, the word ‘diplomat’ was unknown in the early Islamic state, their Arabic equivalents saafir 
or rasul are synonymous with the words ambassador, envoy or diplomatic agent. Saafir 
(‘ambassador’) is derived from the root safara which means ‘conciliation’ or ‘peaceful 
settlement’.392 
 
The Prophet Muhammad was successful in strengthening the relationships with other states even 
after battles, utmost chaos, enmity, hatred and clashes of religions, races and cultures, between the 
different tribes of people around him.393 
 
In the Constitution of Madinah, for the first time in Arab history a political unit consisting of 
different confronting tribes and religions was diplomatically constituted, re-affirming pre-Islamic 
concepts not contrary to Islam while ensuring Islamic values were protected, including diplomatic 
protection of non-Muslim minorities, mainly, the Jews.394 
 
During the early period in Madinah the Prophet refused to sanction retaliatory attacks against the 
Quraish of Mecca, who had brutally oppressed and ethnically cleansed the Muslim community, 
and only authorised jihad (which literally means ‘struggle’) in its military form when a verse was 
revealed urging the Muslims to fight against those who were persecuting them; and to stop fighting 
when the aggressors inclined to peace.395 Subsequently, the Muslims won the Battle of Badr and 
then lost the Battle of Uhud when the armies of the Quraish advanced on Madinah; in both cases 
they were guided and bound by the contemporaneous revelations of the Quran, strictly regulating 
and indeed censuring their conduct.396 
 
Following this, in 6 AH the Prophet Muhammad led 400 Muslims on the ancient pilgrimage to 
Mecca, without any weapons or symbols of war according to the primordial traditions of the rite. 
The Quraysh prevented their entrance into Mecca, and sent delegates to Mohammad asking him to 
                                                          
392 Yasin Istanbuli, Diplomacy and Diplomatic Practice in the Early Islamic Era, (Oxford University Press 
2001) 124. 
393 Ibid 124. 
394 Bassiouni (n107) 609; Rehman (n 106) 129. 
395 “There is no compulsion in religion” Quran Surah Al-Baqarah (2:256); Maulana Muhammad Ali, The 
Religion of Islam: a comprehensive discussion of the Source, Principles and Practices of Islam, (4th end, Al-
Azhar Al-Sharif 2011) 321. 
396 ‘Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Verily, Allah does not like 
transgressors’ (Quran, Surah Al-Baqarah, 2:190). ‘Do not transgress’ (2:190) means by initiating the fighting, 
or by fighting those protected by a peace treaty, or by fighting thos e who never received the call to Islam, or to 
commit mutilation or to kill whomever it has been forbidden to kill. Imam Al- Baydawi, Tafsir Al-Baydawi, 
(1st edn, Dar Ihya Turath Al-Arabi 2012). 
Prophet elieved that ‘making a generous peace was often a better remedy for aggression than annihilation of 
the aggressor, because it may bring about a real change of heart in the enemy’. See Maulana Muhammad Ali, 
The Religion of Islam: A comprehensive discussion of the Source, Principles and Practices of Islam, (4th end, 
Al-Azhar Al-Sharif 2011) 321. 
87  
return to Madinah. When Muhammed then sent an envoy back to the Quraysh, they abused him 
and drove him away, whereupon he sent his companion Uthman ibn Affan, a nobleman who was 
known for his calmness and tolerance,397 who related Mohammad’s message to the Quraysh 
leaders. This was, he told them, his diplomatic mission. This well-judged diplomatic act led to the 
Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, which was a pivotally important peace treaty. While the Quraish appeared 
to have the best of the Treaty, (e.g. Muslims who renounced Islam were allowed to return to 
Mecca, while Meccans who became Muslim were not allowed to emigrate to Madinah). Violation 
of the peace by either party or their allies would render the treaty null and void. This is what 
happened when Bani Bakr, tribal allies of the Quraish armed by them, fought against the Khuza’a, 
a tribe allied with Madinah. Consequently, the Muslims advanced on Mecca from Madinah and 
(the fourth time the Muslims marched on an enemy) and took the city with negligible resistance 
and conflict, having promised security to non-combatant inhabitants beforehand. All of this was 
according to customary diplomatic norms as familiar to the Quraish as to the Muslims.398 
 
The diplomatic practices in the foundation of Islamic legislation and warfare thus guarantee the 
general impunity of envoys, which led to the Quraysh stopping their pre- Islamic practice of 
abusing delegates.399 In Madinah there was a specific yearly budget allocated to hospitality for 
receiving missions and envoys. The Islamic state recognized that delegations, ambassadors and 
envoys are important to promoting successful relations with other countries and that negotiation 
is necessary for a peaceful environment and stability, which required special immunity for 
diplomats,400 enshrined in protocols of the Islamic state and under Islamic jurisdiction.401 Indeed, 
extending ancient Arabian notions of hospitality as a sacred duty, diplomats were generally 
venerated and held in honour and esteem both as guests, responsibilities and agents of inter-state 
peace and development.402 All governors were obliged to safeguard and facilitate diplomats in the 
exercise of their functions.403 This was the general rule, and the scenario from which Sharia 
positions on the subject are derived, although there were particular incidents in which diplomacy 
                                                          
397 Rahmanizadeh (n357) 42. 
398Mohammed bin Jarir Al-Tabari Abu Jaafar, The Statement is Based on the Interpretation of the Qur’an; 
Tafseer Al-Tabari (Ibn Taymiyyah Library 1958) 239-250; Ismail bin Omar bin Katheer Al - Dameshqi Abu 
Fida Imad Eddin, Tafseer Ibn Katheer (Dar Taiba 1999) 344-360; Mohammed bin Ismail Abu Abdullah Al – 
Bukhaari, Sahih Bukhari, (1st end , Dar Taouq Al-Najat 1999) 2734; Abu Dawood Sulaiman ibn Al-Ash’ath 
ibn Ishaq ibn Bashir Al-Shajad ibn Amr Al-Azzadi Al-Sijistani, Sunan Abi Dawood, (Modern Library, Sidon 
1992) 2765.  
399 Rahmanizadeh (n357) 42. 
400 Ibid 42. 
401 Jaeez, Azhar, Ahmad and Abdurhman(n 366) 1. 
402 Rahmanizadeh (n357) 42. 
403Mahmood Ahmad Gazi, Zahir Riwaya Trans, Kitab Al-Siyar Al-Shaybani , The Shorter Book on Muslim 
International Law (Adam Publishers and Distributors 2004) 40.  
88  
could break down and escalate into conflict, as explained previously with regard to the Quraish. 
Furthermore, there were some instances of tribes in Madinah failing to honour their pledges of 
mutual defence or paying the poor-due, and engaging in subterfuge against the commonwealth, 
which resulted in the treaties with them being declared null (e.g. some Jewish tribes of Madinah 
and the tribes who rebelled during the caliphate of Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq).404 Such instances involved 
parties considered to be under the auspices of Madinah, while ‘foreign’ envoys were treated 
according to customary regulations as protected persons in Daar Al-Islam.405 
 
Indeed, clearly Sharia evidence indicates that the killing or maltreatment of diplomats is 
emphatically prohibited, according to the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad Under the most 
egregious provocation, when Abu Musailama Al-Kadhab claimed prophet hood and half of 
Arabia,406 insulting the custodians of the Ka’abah,407 the Prophet Muhammad said he would have 
executed them was the killing of messengers not prohibited (in Sharia).408 It should be noted that 
while compatible with notions of the sovereignty of the Islamic state, courtesy, and international 
political pragmatism, the Sharia prohibition of harming envoys is based on the sanctity of their 
blood (i.e. their lives),409 and the Quranic injunction:”whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for 
corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one - it 
is as if he had saved mankind entirely”.410 
 
As such, harming diplomats is intrinsically prohibited, and against the Islamic principle of 
respecting promises and not breaking treaties with others.411 Furthermore, imprisoning or 
confining diplomats was prohibited by the Prophet.412 
 
These Quranic injunctions and hadiths are explicit references to the obligation to protect those 
given permissions to enter the Islamic state safely and who have a treaty with Islamic states, whether 
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they are non-Muslims resident in Islamic states or foreign people who come to visit the Islamic 
state and their ambassadors. Consequently, the question arises of why Islamic armed groups claim 
they are following Islam in their deeds and the killing of ambassadors, and whether the 
perpetrators of attacks on diplomats feel bound by Sharia when their victims are non-Muslims, as 
explored in the next section.  
 
2.5.4 Modernist Reinterpretations (‘Islamism’) 
 
As alluded to previously, the interpretations of Islamist terrorists who kill civilians and protected 
people are alien to the traditional Islam, and Sharia explained above. Insofar as they have a 
coherent ideology, they are adherents of the Wahhabi-Salafi trend of Islamic reform that rejects 
the historical experience of Islam and the time-honoured interpretations of the classical schools 
of jurisprudence.413 This trend, which began in the desert wastes of Najd in the 18th century, was 
rejected by the inherited and established institutions of Islamic learning,414 but it was supported and 
propagated by British (and later American) imperial interests to destroy the remnants of Ottoman 
civilization in the Middle East and later to deploy misguided Muslim fanatics in the service of great 
power wars against the Soviet Union. The trend of declaring historically Muslim states apostate 
was continued by Sayyid Qutb in the 20th century, which became the foundation of modern 
Islamist movements, including Al-Qaeda, wielded by Western powers as a reactionary and 
economically liberal club against the forces of socialism.415 It is notable that Qutb’s writing 
became popular during 1950, at the height of quasi-socialist pan-Arab nationalism under Nasser 
in Egypt.416 According to Qutb, jihad is an offensive struggle: while this is not an entirely new 
idea, he popularized it, certainly in the modern context – for this reason he has been compared to 
Luther relative to Catholic civilization.417 
 
Fundamentalist Salafism (or Wahhabism) came to be known as associated with Qutb’s writings 
in the 70’s; along with the Shia equivalent pioneered by Ali Shariati during the Iranian Revolution, 
the concept of offensive jihad and murdering non-Muslims including diplomats – was promulgated. 
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A generation of disaffected youth in the moribund postcolonial dictatorships of the Arab world 
‘ardent for some distant glory’ took up the idealistic clarion of this movement and were duly 
deployed in national and international military struggles.418 Given that Qutb’s writings were 
already considered very influential in the late fifties and sixties, the Iranian revolutionaries would 
have almost certainly been aware of them.419 Indeed, despite the pathological hatred and 
intolerance of Sunni and Shia Islamists, they have a notable tolerance for Ali Shariati and Sayyid 
Qutb, respectively. Indeed, the current Ayatollah Khamenei translated the works of Qutb’s into 
Persian, and is thought to be highly influenced by them.420 The revolutionary generation of the 
1970s is are now in positions of power and influence throughout the Middle East.421 
 
Do the perpetrators of attacks on diplomats feel bound by Sharia when their victims are non-
Muslims? 
 
The murder of Stevens and his colleagues in the US Consulate in Benghazi was a crime committed 
in the name of Islamic jihad against non-Muslims. However, these actions were in violation of 
classic norms of Islamic jihad for many reasons, most notable of which is that jihad must be declared 
by properly instituted and authoritative states, not by individuals or groups – clearly, if it were left 
to individuals to declare war society would be in chaos. Furthermore, war does not abrogate the 
absolute responsibility to protect diplomats – rather it underscores its importance as conducive 
to the ultimate eponymous goal of Islam – ‘Peace’. Furthermore, it is not possible to wage war 
against a non-Muslim country where Muslims can freely practice their religion, as can those 
Muslims in the US.422 
 
Conversely, some analysts view Islam as an inherently belligerent and terrorist religion that poses 
an existential threat to Western neoliberal civilization;423 such views form the mainstay of 
sensationalist media reportage on Islam and Middle East conflicts, and remain popular in some 
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academic circles, although the heyday of this paradigm was when it was highly conducive to US 
foreign policy interests during the 2000s. More tempered analyses acknowledge that modern 
jihadism is a relatively late development and that one of the great spiritual traditions of world 
history is not a maniacal death cult.424 Furthermore, the ICJ itself acknowledged that the tradition 
of Islam contributes along with other religions to the broadening of rules of contemporary public 
international law on diplomatic and consular inviolability and immunity.425 Although there are 
ideologues of the view that law has no religion, and that Islam, in particular, should be denied 
any traction in legal discussions,426 however for pragmatic reasons it is necessary to acknowledge 
that Islam exists as a geopolitical force.427 
 
 
2.6 Diplomacy in the Historical Islamic States 
2.6.1 Diplomacy under the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (c. 632-661 AD) 
 
As noted previously, the Islamic laws of war are broad yet humane considering treatment of 
combatants and civilians. They also cover the treatment of crops and farm stock. Modern principles 
of international public law in the arena of international affairs and warfare are closely resembling 
of traditional Sharia, and the original Arab-Islamic nation took cognisance of the principles. 
 
The early Islamic state was well aware of duties under treaties as required under Islamic 
doctrine.428 The Caliphs Abu Bakr granted safety to, those who had a treaty with Islamic states, 
were told by him in his farewell speech that he had instructed Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan (one of the 
founders of the Umayyad dynasty) when he led a military expedition to Syria: “in case envoys of 
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the adversary come to you, treat them with hospitality”.429 
 
In 638 CE, when the second Caliph Umar Ibn Al-Khattab contracted a treaty with the rulers of 
Jerusalem, and assured safety [aman] for not just the lives of people of Jerusalem but also their 
property. They also were given the freedom to practice their religion and assured they would not 
face forcible conversion. Neither would their churches or crosses be harmed.430 
 
This era witnessed many diplomatic meetings between the Muslim and non- Muslim states. Saad 
ibn Abi Waqqas (595-664 AD), who went to China, sent by the Prophet Muhammad was sent 
again in the year 651 AD as the head of a Muslim delegation to the Chinese Emperor, Gaozong of 
Tang, dispatched by Uthman Ibn ‘Affan (579- 656 AD), the third Caliph.431 
 
2.6.2 Diplomacy in the Abbasid Caliphate (c. 750-1258 AD) 
 
 
The Umayyad state (c. 661-750) was characterised chiefly by an aggressive expansion policy with 
neighbours (extending the Arab-Islamic empire to Iberia in the West and Sindh in the east), but it 
did have conventional diplomatic relations with states further afield. For instance, it was reported 
that the eighth century saw over thirty missions from the Muslim state to the Chinese Empire.432 
However, a sea change was marked by the increasing sophistication of the Abbasid 
state,433particularly with its policy of regional autonomy and decentralisation inaugurated by Harun 
Al-Rashid (786-809 AD), one of the influential Caliphs of the Abbasid era who wrote the book 
on statecraft Al-Kharaj (‘The Treasury’). This tome is still a valuable reference when issues of 
foreign relations are considered under Sharia. 
 
During the Abbasid period, the primary purpose of the Islamic state’s relationships with other 
nations was to regulate peaceful commerce, as the task of defending frontiers was delegated 
mainly to local governors who became semi-independent dynasties (e.g. the Ghaznavids in Central 
Asia).434 The locus of Islamic civilization shifted indelibly to the East from this time.435 Diplomats 
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were exchanged during this time for a variety of political, commercial and social purposes, 
including merely exchanging valuable gifts, such as the famous exchanges between Harun Al-
Rashid and Charlemagne.436 
 
The Abbasid Period witnessed an expansion of the relationships with others and enacting treaties 
with other states; many peace agreements were arranged, albeit this was part of the Abbasid grand 
strategy of isolating the Umayyads in Spain437 and squeezing the Byzantines in the Levant and the 
Mediterranean.438 The later Abbasids also played a dangerous diplomatic game of divide and rule 
in Central Asia with numerous Turkic dynasties, who in turn sent their own diplomats to Baghdad 
to engage in various intrigues.439 The subversion of diplomacy by ill will ultimately destroy these 
polities: attempts to deceive the Mongols by a Muslim trading mission were tolerated, but 
subsequently, the outrageous mistreatment of a Mongol delegation by a Khwarazmian governor 
in Otrar led to the Mongol invasion and destruction of classical Islamic civilization in Central Asia 
during the 13th century. 
 
However, aided partly by refugees from this disaster, Islamic civilization flourished in India and 
Southeast Asia from this time. By the 13th century, Muslim merchants (mainly from Yemen, 
Kuwait and Gujarat) had established their guilds in the south eastern geographic area directing 
much of China’s maritime trade. In fact, the Muslim population which was made up of traders 
from diverse ethnic backgrounds, were crucial players in the linking of China’s markets to those in 
the Mediterranean.440 
 
The 13th and 14th centuries were a watershed in Asian and world history. The Mongol empire’s 
emergence in Asia and Eastern Europe, plus the forming of Islamic states in southern Asia, as well 
as the growth in commerce in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean gave rise to the formation of 
complex political, religious, and commercial networks that linked the Far East to Europe. The 
significant political transformation was also taking place in southern Asia at this time.441 
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In the 13th century, the Moroccan traveller Ibn Batuta reached the banks of the Indus River. Ibn 
Batuta was given a civil role and was well looked after life at the court of Muammad. Tughluq (the 
ruler of the Delhi Sultanate in northern India). In 1341, Ibn Batuta was appointed as an ambassador 
of the Delhi Sultanate, and was sent with fifteen members of the Yuan court’s embassy to the 
Sultanate on their return trip to China accompanied with “a bounty of gifts, including slave girls, 
velvet cloth, musk, a jewelled robe, embroidered quivers, and swords”. Ibn Batuta’s account of 
this mission to China gives us much information about diplomatic and commercial relations 
between the Delhi Sultanate and China, as well as the Yuan court’s maintained interest in keeping 
close trading ties with India, and the sheer scale of maritime trade and diplomacy between India and 
China in the fourteenth century. The life of the ambassadors was not safe in these times as they were 
at risk of being killed or taken prisoner. For example, Ibn Batuta when sent on another north 
Indian diplomatic mission to the Yuan court, but before the mission reached Cambay, Hindu 
insurgents murdered many in his mission, and Ibn Batuta himself was robbed and captured but 
managed to escape and reached China.442 Ibn Batuta’s journey, though a failed mission, gives us 
an important information about the unsafe passage of diplomats between northern India and 
China.443 
In the early part of the fourteenth century, Muslim forces entered the Deccan region and southern 
India, initially establishing small outposts but, in 1347, established the Bahaman Sultanate (1347–
1527).444 
 
2.6.3 Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire (c. 1260-1922 AD) 
 
The Ottomans arose in about 1260 and ultimately survived from the middle ages to the 20th 
century, playing a major role in global history in the process.445 The Ottoman Empire was the most 
recent manifestation of a recognisably Islamic state.446 
 
In terms of diplomatic history, the Ottomans had particular relationships and protocols with certain 
powers. For instance, in the 15th century, only French envoys were allowed to communicate oral 
information from their King to the Sultan; this included diplomatic correspondence, and the Sultan 
did not accept communications from other Christian states. For example, in the early 16th century 
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populist fanaticism was so influential in the Papal States that the See of Rome could not conduct 
relations with the Sultan or send a written letter by the envoy to him. 
 
In the 15th century and after the conquest of Constantinople the Ottoman Empire started to open 
to Europe and receive the European ambassadors. There were resident ambassadors from France 
(1535), England (1553) and the Netherlands during the 16th century, seen as preferable trading 
partners to the crusading Spaniards and Portuguese. These foreign ambassadors who were 
received by Ottomans were granted immunity and privileges. However, the Ottoman state did not 
send ambassadors to foreign countries until the 17th century when it sent its first residential 
diplomatic mission.447 The Ottoman Empire’s relationships were limited to states viewed to be 
of equivalent status; during the 15th and 16th centuries the Ottoman Empire did not send 
ambassadors to Vienna, as the Austrian Emperor’s status was considered lower than that of the 
Ottoman Sultan; clearly this hubris was detrimental to the conduct of diplomacy, which may partly 
explain the perpetual warfare between those states during this period.448 
 
Beginning in the 16th century, the Muslim world saw a time of relative political consolidation. 
The largest and most influential Muslim empire of its time viewed from the historical path of 
international law was the Ottoman Empire,which had a 500-year reign in Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East.449 The Ottoman Empire was a crucial player in shaping the European political map 
in the 16th and 17th centuries and indeed was able to keep its unique diplomatic character until the 
end of the 18th century. Although diplomats had no formal education nor attended a specific 
diplomatic training institution, a more informal diplomatic protocol and tradition developed 
during the period.450 
 
The lack of Ottoman residential ambassadors in major European capitals until the end of the 18th 
century is often cited as proof of negligence by the Ottomans when it came to diplomacy. However, 
it is more accurate to view Ottoman methods as a synthesis of abstract Islamic principles with 
“Ottoman realpolitik”. In other words, they made their own diplomacy principles following Islam’s 
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pillars. They were the only medieval Muslim nation to have had the experience of close contacts 
with European powers, be the contacts peaceful or otherwise. Since founding a small 
principality, Ottomans were surrounded by Muslim and non-Muslim rivals, and they were 
continually confronted with Crusader attacks along with natural enemies from their own 
belligerence. The prohibition of forming alliances with the Ottomans promulgated by the Church 
diplomatically isolated Turkey from Catholic powers and this was a constant worry for Ottoman 
statesmen. I t  w a s  for this reason, that they could not ignore the power-balance in the area and 
good diplomacy was deemed vital in the conduct of relations with the nations of European. Even 
at the height of Ottoman military power during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, they did 
not only rely on brute force, but cultivated allies in the Christian world, particularly France, which 
it leveraged against the Holy Roman Empire (the forerunner of modern Germany).451 
 
Like all aspects of the Ottoman state, Ottoman diplomacy was based on Sharia,452 extrapolated 
to international relations with non-Muslims. These covered conditions of war, peace and truce.453 
Diplomatic relations of the Ottoman Empire with other nations were generally cordial, although 
prior to the 18th century they were conducted on an ad hoc basis.454 Ottoman treaties were 
generally for limited terms and framed within the classical paradigm of Daar Al-Harb and Daar 
Al-Islam explained previously. From the 18th century onwards, however, the relative strength of 
the Ottoman Empire fell behind relative to European powers, as a result of which the empire 
imitated Western standards of diplomacy (as well as other things). By the 19th century, the 
diplomatic conduct was shaped entirely by the major European States. Following the Paris 
Conference in 1856, the European nations considered the Ottomans fit to benefit from their public 
law, but this ended the unique ‘Ottoman’ diplomacy. As Europe had its own diplomatic traditions, 
the Ottomans had no choice but to accept them.455 
 
This laid the foundations for the Ottoman Empire to develop into a modern European nation state, 
which was manifest in increasing Turkish nationalism culminating in the ethnic cleaning of the 
Ottoman dhimmis throughout former Ottoman provinces. This was analogous to the way 
nationalism was transplanted to South Asia, resulting in millions of deaths during the Partition of 
India in 1947. In both cases, expelling protected, covenanted minorities is in direct contradiction 
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to Sharia. In addition, current Muslim states are all members of the UN, and the 1945 Charter of 
the UN prohibits the threat or use of force except in self-defence, a rule which has now acquired the 
status of customary law. Muslim states could not have adhered to this rule had Sharia required them 
to partake in offensive jihad.456 Even in the most expansionist phase of the Ottoman Empire, its 
court scholars could only attempt to justify military aggression on one of two bases identified from 
the Quran by Mawdudi: (a) to preserve the Muslim nation from elimination; and (b) to liberate 
oppressed Muslims/ people not free to practice Islam.457 The traditional dichotomy of the Daar 
Al-Islam and Daar Al-Harb ended with the last gasp of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s.458 
 
In the 19th century when the European nations adopted territorial sovereignty, the normative 
framework made by Muslim jurists was largely abandoned even in Muslim- majority states. 
However, certain ethical values of older Sharia, such as the universal brotherhood of Muslims, 
continued to have great emotive appeal among grassroots Muslims of the time, as seen by the 
existence of international Islamic organizations like the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC). Muslim jurists operating in the normative field of what  was older Sharia, did however, 
make small yet essential steps in reconciling the norms of modern international law to those of 
pre-modern Islamic international law.459 
 
In the mid-20th century Muslim jurists declared that Daar Al-Harb had no normative significance, 
and argued it was only an empirical category with jihad only being authorized against actively hostile 
non-Muslim states. The increase in international law and its institutions like the UN that claimed 
to guarantee the independence of all states, secure self-determination of all those previously 
colonised, and protect human rights, majorly changed the political world in which Muslims found 
themselves. This difference in the international environment, according to these jurists, meant that 
war and conquest was no longer the default rule in international relations but rather was it one where 
peace and friendship was the new the default rule. Consequently, according to this view, Islam 
could fulfil its global aspirations attained from international guarantees of religious freedom and 
commitment from non-Muslim states to keep a neutral stance with respect to Islam. In summary, 
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according to the theologians and jurists, any state committing itself to provide Muslims with the 
freedom to practice their religion and allowed the freely accessible teaching of Islam could not be 
considered part of Daar Al-Harb.460 
 
2.7 Diplomacy and Diplomatic Protection in the 21st Century 
 
Attacks on diplomats were outlawed by Sharia and international norms long before they were 
proscribed by international law.461 Over a long period of time, Islamic countries have signed 
agreements and treaties with non-Muslim countries. These agreements have included many 
obligations, rules, conditions and principles in a manner that represents an evolution of diplomacy 
in Islamic international law.462 The diplomat of another state (which has a treaty with a Muslim 
country) who enters an Islamic state with the permission of a state should be granted aman 
(protection). However, the archaic and general term aman has been replaced with the clearly 
delineated responsibilities of ‘protection’ in the 21st century. 
 
The vast corpus of Sharia was jettisoned by postcolonial regimes in the Muslim world, along with 
the Islamic principles and doctrines explained at length previously. Despite nominally regarding 
Sharia as a source of legislation, political entities in many Muslim countries (e.g. Iran and Libya) 
encourage populist Islamism and anticolonial sentiments to violate Sharia norms, which has effects 
ranging from the prohibited denigration of and attacks on diplomats and diplomatic premises to 
murder and other terrorist activities.463 In most Muslim- majority countries the incumbent 
governments are effectively pro-Western, but Iran officially adopts Sharia, and the Islamic 
Republic has been latently hostile to the West since its inception.464 
 
Libya signed several international treaties binding on the protection of diplomats and the Treaty of 
Amity with the US (1796), which remains in force de jure.465 According to Article 11 of this 
Treaty, the two parties, declared that the harmony between the two countries should be interrupted 
because of religious views.466 The two countries agreed that no pretext arising from religious 
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opinions would ‘ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries’. 
Also, Libya joined the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, and it on 7 June 1977.467 
This means that Libya has agreed to grant diplomats immunity and privileges according to 
international law and Sharia, as explained earlier. 
 
The breach of the Convention and the targeting and killing of diplomats was clearly affected 
by popular discontent and political tension between the states, which are the underlying threats to 
the safety of diplomats in MENA generally. The main duty of diplomats is to strengthen the 
relationships between sending and receiving states, which has been rendered particularly difficult 
by political developments since 9/11. US foreign policy (and the powerful interests that shape it) 
has been anchored in facing the ‘threat’ of Islamist terrorism and by extension MENA and its 
people in general, which has naturally caused a reflexive suspicion and hatred of Islam, Muslims 
and Muslim- majority states, and a corresponding escalation in antipathy toward the US and the 
local regimes perceived to be its stooges.468 In the 21st century, the relationships between Islamic 
states (i.e. MENA) and Western countries are structured on the basis of fear and mistrust.469 
 
This was acknowledged in 2009 by President Obama.470 In a speech delivered at Cairo University, 
he cited passages of the Tripoli Agreement signed by President John Adams, he noted that the 
history of US amity with the Muslim world had been badly damaged.471 Regardless of the general 
political implications and reasons for this impasse, the lives of diplomats have been critically at 
risk since 9/11, and particularly since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis, diplomats have faced different kinds of attacks in MENA, including 
murder, kidnapping and hostage taking. The particular attack on Stevens in Benghazi in 2012 was 
contemporaneous with the backlash against a private film made in the US gratuitously insulting 
the Prophet Muhammad as explained in Chapter 1, although the official US report subsequently 
claimed that the event was not related to this film.472 Logistically, the attack was planned by 
militant groups with Al Qaeda ties. 
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This occurred when Libya was s473474 In August 2013, the US government filed numerous charges 
against as yet unnamed participants. In the attack and in June 2014 US Special Forces 
apprehended the Ansar Al-Sharia leader Khattala in Libya. He was charged with masterminding 
the attack, although he denies any involvement in it. In November 2014, after two years of 
hearings and investigation, the Republican- led House Select Committee confirmed that there was 
no security failure prior to the event and appropriate correspondence by the US military and 
CIA.474 
 
While those who attacked the US diplomats in Libya clearly based their actions on a populist anti-
American hysteria, clearly, they were acting contrary to the dictates of Islamic law; just as errant 
Buddhist monks, attacking Rohingya people are violating the most basic precepts of Buddhist 
law. Aside from the ideologues of terrorist groups, authoritative Islamic scholars in the 21st 
century are unanimous in outlawing attacks on diplomats, regardless of the religious ideation of 
those individuals or their sending states.475 They reiterated this position in a fatwa issued in direct 
response to the murder of Stevens in Libya, citing the Quran, Sunnah and practice of Rightly-
Guided Caliphs to confirm the prohibition of killing diplomats and attacking embassies, as 
articulated in Ibn Al-Qayyim’s rulings on the people of dhimmah.476 Indeed, any non-Muslim not 
actively engaged in militant hostility is to be safeguarded and conveyed to safety according to 
Sharia, particularly if any Muslim accords that person a promise of safety; this was even applied 
to slaves, for whom there are extensive specific regulations in Sharia.477 
 
The intrusion of foreign embassies and harming their diplomats and employees is not permitted 
under any circumstances, and this is an infringement against people who have entered safety.478 
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Where there are grievances against foreign states there are particular channels whereby Muslims 
should lodge their protests – from verbal advice and remonstrance to the declaration of war by 
states – but it is absolutely forbidden for individual Muslims to take it upon themselves to violate 
the rights of others, particularly protected minorities and diplomats. It should be noted that Sharia 
is fundamentally instituted to safeguard five fundamentals of human rights: religion/ faith (din), life 
(nafs), lineage/ progeny (nasl), intellect (‘aql) and property (mal)479 ”And whatever [wrong] any 
human being commits rests upon himself alone, and no bearer of burdens shall be made to bear 
another’s burden”.480 
 
In 2013, the Grand Mufti of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and head of the Supreme Council of 
Scholars, Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Al-Sheikh, issued a lengthy statement to warn against the danger 
of the method of atonement, and he warned against the killing of diplomats.481 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Council of Scholars in Saudi Arabia condemns the ‘assassination of ambassadors’ 
and described it as a major sin.482 
 
Muslim scholars warning Muslims from joining militant Islamist groups and agreed to the 
prohibition of their behaviour, convictions and seriousness.483 These groups are conventionally 
referred to as ‘takfiri’ in Arabic, which means they declare mainstream Muslims to be apostate. 
This is the core of the problem, as for the deluded fanatics who join these groups for numerous 
complex socioeconomic, psychological and personal reasons, the mainstream scholars of Islam 
(and the governments they often represent) are apostates, and they reject normative Islam itself as 
inherited from traditional Islamic civilizations as a corruption of an imagined pristine and 
puritanical form of archetypal Islam. 
 
Islamic principles, Sharia, and international law unanimously affirm the protection of diplomats 
and forbid terrorism in general, which is why most Muslim states are signatories to the Vienna 
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Convention as well as conventional international agreements in line with the UN. This has often 
involved renewed interpretations of Islamic principles on the protection of diplomats and aligning 
them with t he modern international law, as seen in the various statements from Muslim leaders 
and scholars. 
 
Furthermore, in the 21st century there are changes in the way of conducting diplomacy between 
states, with the increasing capabilities of modern communications technology offering great and 
largely untapped sources of diplomatic activity. Technology can play an important role in 
facilitating the tasks of diplomats and strengthening relationships between states. Developed 
countries successfully embodied the technology in diplomatic relationships while developing 
countries such as Libya still have insufficient experience and understanding of how to embody 
technology in the diplomatic field. An increasing role for e-diplomacy in redrawing the relations 
between states cannot be avoided, including safeguarding the lives of diplomats, as explained in 




Diplomacy has been manifest in many different forms over the years, but it has always existed 
since the first human civilizations in the ancient Near East, India and China. It has changed in terms 
of meaning, language, function, purpose, a  method of appointing envoys, and mechanisms for 
conduct. 
 
The inviolability of diplomats remains important. Such inviolability is governed by two principles. 
There is the principle of reciprocity and that of personal inviolability. The latter regarded a diplomat 
as a holy person. This idea was taken from religion. The former principle meant that an envoy 
would be safe if nothing happened to his counterpart, given that such personnel were typically from 
the ruling oligarchy, and sometimes from the royal family (although usually when compelled, in a 
hostage scenario of international relations). 
 
The sacred nature of the diplomat has undergone a change in rationale but not in substance. The 
ancient Greeks regarded the envoy as a sacred person because of his associated with Hermes, but 
in the modern world the diplomat is sacred because he represents the state, which in turn represents 
the markets. Thus ordinary citizens may be considered collateral damage, but the envoy remains a 
sacred cow in the modern international system; the reason why the life of a soldier is basically 
considered fair game while that of an ambassador representing a combatant nation or arms 
companies is sacrosanct is a question for moral philosophers, but it certainly shows that the 
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fundamental importance of the diplomat has not changed, although his (or her) role has. 
 
Modern diplomacy remains a continuation of that practised in ancient states, if for no other reason 
than that states have historically needed to communicate with each other. Although they 
fundamentally sought self-preservation and peace, the international system of diplomacy has 
often failed, claiming many millions of lives in the process; however, although the failures of 
diplomacy are spectacular in magnitude and horror (e.g. WWII), the everyday successes of 
diplomacy in averting war and destruction have gone unsung. 
 
The meaning of diplomacy has developed from being limited to states only to include non-state 
organizations. Furthermore, the languages of diplomacy have changed (e.g. since the 18th century 
French and Persian have faded in importance and prestige in diplomacy while English has become 
hegemonic). In addition, the number of people who conduct diplomacy has increased; a diplomatic 
mission typically includes a ceremonial figurehead – often a Secretary of State or a member of a 
royal family – with a cohort of professional diplomats conducting the real legal work of diplomacy 
behind the scenes. As governments have become more responsive to markets (and correspondingly 
number to the influences of tradition, monarchy and religion), so diplomacy has correspondingly 
come to be much more heavily affected by economic concerns and less by ideological 
considerations. 
 
The fundamental change in diplomacy since the Second World War has been due to technology, 
which has made communication immeasurably simpler, and which has reduced the need for 
diplomats in fundamental and overt communications between states. Due to its associated with 
refined etiquette and procedures, diplomatic corps and activities are a bastion of traditional forms 
and modes of conduct; thus complex legal arrangements in international treaties made by lawyers 
are symbolised by Presidents or Ministers signing international diplomatic agreements with 
fountain pens in leather-bound ledgers. 
 
However, the real and immediate need for diplomacy has always been tied in with technology. A 
watershed moment in the transition from traditional to modern diplomacy was Nevile 
Chamberlain’s famous radio speech announcing the commencement of the Second World War in 
1939 as a consequence of not receiving word in response to ‘a final note’ handed to them by ‘the 
British Ambassador in Berlin… stating that unless we heard from them by 11 o'clock that they were 
prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland a state of war would exist…’484 
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This case is interesting in numerous respects; the government had been preparing for war for 
months, yet the extremely traditional procedure of the ambassador in Berlin handing a paper 
missive to the German Government was used to declare war. The German Government accepted 
the ultimatum of war in the action of not responding to the note. This was then relayed to London 
(by telegraph or telephone) and the Prime Minister then communicated the outbreak of war to the 
nation (and Empire) by the most commonly accessed technology at the time, ‘wireless’ (radio). The 
Second World War thus began with one diplomat handing a piece of paper to another in Berlin, 
and ended with atomic bombs. 
 
In some respects, the advance of communications technology has rendered diplomacy more 
public, but in others, it has reduced the machinations of the professional diplomat to attendance at 
state dinners and covert and potentially shady business facilitation. This research has found that 
although even states that considered themselves superior to others, such as the Roman or Chinese 
empires, these countries still maintained diplomacy for economic purposes, and this remains the 
case today. 
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“Communication is to diplomacy as blood is to the human body”, and there has never been a good 
diplomat who was a bad communicator.485 Diplomacy is still primarily conducted between the 
national governments of each state, because they hold the keys to the law and power that enables 
things to happen; and the most vital discussions are still conducted on a face- to- face basis, as this is 
seen as the most appropriate way to establish the level of trust allowing high-level decisions to be 
taken.487
486 However, technology has always played a role in international relations. The invention 
of new technological devices (e.g. transport and telecommunications) has meaningfully affected 
the procedure of diplomacy. 487One of the important effects of the IT revolution is “that diplomacy 
has lost its position as the main facilitator of contact and communication across state boundaries”. 
488Another effect is that “the ease of relaying instructions has circumscribed the actions of 
diplomats”. Moreover, direct contacts between national leaders has increased in frequency with the 
advance in communications. “Shuttle diplomacy” among domestic politicians and leaders has 
become a common feature in many circumstances. George Ball, a senior US diplomat, lamented 
that jet planes, telephones and the bad habits of presidents and administrative personnel have 
mainly restricted ambassadors to “ritual and public relations functions”.489 Furthermore, a former 
British ambassador wondered whether “jet-set politicians” need the pedestrian ambassador 
anymore.490 
 
Although communication is seen as an essential part of diplomacy, and the exact form of 
diplomatic communication varies according to time and place, communication itself is 
constant.491 In this regard diplomacy has been defined as ‘the communication system of the 
international society’.492 The development in technology started after the Cold War, which 
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challenged the role of the state as the primary actor in the international system.493 One example of 
this is the ‘hotline’ established between the White House in Washington and the Kremlin in 
Moscow shortly after the Cuban missile crisis of 1961,494 which meant the two leaders could 
communicate on a secure phone line instead of going through their diplomats. The IT revolution 
has affected all the aspects of life, including diplomacy. A revolution can be defined as “any 
major social and political transformation, sufficient to replace old institutions and social relations 
and to initiate new relation of power and authority”.495 With regard to technological revolutions, 
the premises of diplomatic communication were transformed with the advent of the telegraph 
during the 19th century (e.g. enabling direct communication between Queen Victoria in the UK 
and the Viceroy of India), but diplomacy itself was still the preserve of ambassadors, who were 
themselves empowered by the advent of steamships and railways. By the 1930s diplomatic pouches 
were being conveyed by air, but most communications still moved by sea as late as 1945. The 
development of modern telecommunications, air travel and IT during the second half of the 20th 
century greatly accelerated the ease and speed of movement and communication.496 
 
Numerous technological developments over more than a century have revolutionized 
communications and greatly facilitated diplomatic functions between ministries, the executive and 
embassies, as well as between states themselves, yet the essential norms of diplomatic activity 
have not fundamentally changed, despite the longstanding anticipation of a revolution in 
diplomatic affairs. In 1977, the Canadian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gordon Smith 
announced the advent of virtual diplomacy, describing the dynamic change by explaining how 
technology shortened time and costs such that the time taken to establish embassies or diplomatic 
posts to undertake diplomacy had been cut to a plane ticket, computer and dial tone, and maybe 
a diplomatic passport.497 The effect of technology was not limited to peace-time but also applied 
in time of conflict, which have always been critical in diplomacy. In a period of conflict, diplomats 
often have difficulty accessing information. Indeed, diplomats are often less informed than their 
home government, or are dependent on the same sources of information, such as the global news 
networks or websites. Hence, diplomatic reporting on the ground from conflict-zones often 
remains a symbolic activity performed from behind the walls of a heavily guarded embassy, 
repackaging information gathered from websites or at best through the narrow bullet - poof 
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windows of armoured military vehicles.498 
 
According to some analysts, the functionalities of modern technology suggest that foreign 
ministries are no longer necessary, and diplomatic representation abroad can be coordinated by 
other agencies of the state’s central administration.499 The projection of a digital future 
increasingly sets the tone and direction of states diplomacy. Its impact cuts across every other 
foreign policy issue, e.g. the protection of diplomats. The result will be a different type of 
diplomacy, both in terms of the problems it deals with and the way it is organized.500 
 
Several countries rely on informal networks to facilitate good relations and high-level contact 
absent in formal diplomatic ties. Over the last twenty years (i.e. the evolution and popularization 
of Internet), there has been a change in both role and function of diplomacy whereby technology 
has played a major role developing the inter-connection of states. While there are some challenges 
facing Arab countries in this regard, as this chapter explains, opportunities exist to conduct relations 
between states without f o r m a l  diplomatic ties, and the anomaly of the situation whereby states 
communicate without normal legal channels has received only slight attention.501 
 
In times of armed conflict and political disturbance, conducting relationships with states becomes 
difficult, and the protection of diplomats becomes complicated; this is special true for receiving 
states, particularly in the case of insurgency, as witnessed in numerous MENA contexts, 
particularly in Libya. The volatile situation in the Middle East often highlights the vulnerability and 
risk of diplomatic premises and missions, which often become key targets rather than zones of 
neutrality. Consequently, facilities are often evacuated at the onset of perceived unrest, and 
permanent institutions generally scaled back, and in the event of conflict, closed. Therefore, there 
is a real need to find new mechanisms through which to conduct diplomatic relationships, in a way 
that does not endanger the lives of diplomats. Virtual diplomacy might be the solution. 
 
Technology has been used by many diplomatic personnel to liaise with the public. For example, 
British ambassadors are very active on Twitter, something that would be considered undignified 
according to traditional norms, a trend set by William Hague during his term as Foreign Secretary. 
Russia’s Foreign Ministry has more than 40 Twitter accounts, and Israel is actively pursuing the 
use of e-diplomacy. Even China, which has heavy censorship of social media at home, is interested 
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to use social media platforms as a diplomatic tool abroad.502 
 
Another significant example is the “Virtual Embassy of the United States to Tehran” in Iran. The 
US State Department developed the Virtual Embassy after the closure of its physical Embassy. 
Whilst this Embassy has the same status as other traditional US embassies there is one major 
difference: its diplomacy operates on a virtual level, as discussed in this chapter.503 Also, President 
Trump presents the political situation of the US Executive toward other countries using Twitter, 
including for serious issues such as North Korea, the Iranian nuclear programme, the status of 
Jerusalem, and Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorist organisations.504 Based on this case, perhaps 
the technological facilitation of knee-jerk reactions by domestic politicians makes the role of 
ambassadors within foreign states even more essential, to conduct genuine diplomacy and avoid 
the conflicts that may inadvertently be stirred up by inappropriate online publications and 
dissemination of inflammatory remarks intended for domestic political consumption. 
An embassy is essentially a place in a foreign state where a diplomatic mission represents the 
interests of an outside state by mutual consent. Many o f  the functions of diplomatic missions can 
be conducted in a virtual place (i.e. online), without the need for a bricks-and-mortar footprint. 
There are many obvious advantages of this, including substantial savings on the costs of lavish 
embassies and diplomatic and support staff, as well as increased safety from physical threats during 
times of conflict; consequently, the question arises of whether the traditional embassy can be 
largely or wholly replaced by the virtual embassy, given the great improvements in modern 
communications. 
 
This chapter examines the informal institutions, used to maintain diplomatic ties in MENA, 
addressing the growing body of literature on the significance of informal politics within MENA 
between the US and other countries. It attempts to develop this by showing the importance of its 
use as an alternative mechanism to diplomatic premises in MENA, especially in the time of armed 
conflict and tension. Political sensitivities and conflict-related expediency mandate that states 
deal with each other through informal networks instead of established formal institutions to cover 
routine issues. 
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3.2 The Importance of Technology in Diplomacy 
 
There is a stark difference between the way diplomacy is practised in this millennium and the way 
it was practised before the introduction of IT, which can be seen as largely related to “the death of 
secrecy”. Even before the hacking by Edward Snowden and Julian Assange, judicious diplomats 
were recognizing that “strictly between ourselves” and “off the record” were nothing more than 
empty pleasantries. Young cadets in diplomatic academies today are taught never to write 
something in a diplomatic message that they would not want to see in the next day’s headlines.505 
 
The complexity of the tools diplomats must be able to use and diversity of the audiences they have 
to address needs genuine specialist skills. Just to keep abreast of the public arena in which 
contemporary diplomacy operates needs “ high- performance social media skills and the ability to 
interpret the output of big-data analytics”. 
 
It also needs the level of proficiency in the use of focus groups and polling expected of a corporate 
marketing professional. Being a jack of all trades and master of none is not a winning hand in the 
modern- day diplomatic game, but “technology is making diplomacy a more dynamic, a far more 
exciting and creative profession”.506 
 
The first, and probably the most important, change is a shift in balance from a “government- to-
government” to a “people-to-people” diplomacy. Communication between political leaders by 
diplomatic proxy is still a vital role, but nations and their governments no longer play the preeminent 
role in our lives they did 100 years ago. Being a government official is no longer a uniquely 
privileged status, rather it exposes one to intense scrutiny and suspicion.507 In keeping with 
historical tradition, embassies were limited in their adoption of new media,508 but this became more 
important when it was recognised that one of the main purposes of the digital diplomacy is to 
advance foreign policy goals by influencing public opinion in the host country; in other words, to 
broadcast sending state foreign policy aims.509 However, even in terms of traditional diplomacy, 
the new media has enabled diplomats to perform their function even when the relationships with 
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host states have been otherwise restricted. In the case of Syria, the relationship between the Syrian 
government and the American public was restricted by limited political relations between the 
governments of both countries. However, the Syrian Ambassador to the US used his personal 
blog to communicate with the American public, focusing on the topics of Syrian art and culture. In 
addition,
510 despite these instances of embassies using Twitter, Facebook and blogs, the purpose 
was primarily to disseminate propaganda (i.e. communicate) rather than to listen to and engage in 
a conversation (i.e. consult).511 
 
Social media began to be taken more seriously academically in the aftermath of the revolutions, 
uprisings and the ensuing political unrest in the Middle East in 2011, during which social media 
acted as a catalyst for grassroots political movements known as the “Arab Spring”. Largely 
because of this historical event, many studies called attention to the untapped potential of social 
media in mobilizing social and political activism against repressive regimes. However, the use of 
social media in diplomacy precedes the revolutionary upheavals of the Arab Spring and relates to 
an important conceptual innovation. Digital diplomacy represents a novel and practical extension 
of the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy. It builds on the first concept by expanding 
platforms on which governments launch campaigns of nation branding. It boosts the latter by 
enabling multi-directional communication between diplomats and foreign public. In short, digital 
diplomacy was linked from the very beginning to the credo of the “new” public diplomacy of 
maximizing engagement with increasingly interconnected foreign populations and moving away 
from one-way information flows toward dialogue and engagement.512 
 
Social media is now a powerful symbol of the new public diplomatic domain. Its application to 
diplomacy has been hailed as transforming international politics. Not only is it able to transcend the 
formal chains of diplomatic communication, but by allowing ordinary people into the spotlight of 
politics and letting their voice be heard, it also allows diplomats to directly engage foreign public in 
a sustained dialogue.513 Diplomats are now able to promote both a unidirectional message and to 
carry on enlightening conversations with large sectors of the populace of the countries in which 
they operate.514 
 
Public diplomacy helps build a certain image of the country for foreign audiences by directing their 
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attention to certain topics, while downplaying others through well-selected news. Diplomats can 
thus construct an issue as salient and worthy of attention for their audience by repeatedly providing 
relevant information on that issue. Compared with traditional mass media, social media boasts a 
great advantage in “grabbing headlines” due to its reach, frequency, usability, immediacy and 
permanence.515 
 
If a government aims to develop a good relationship with a foreign audience, it first needs to be 
“out there” in the relevant public sphere. Diplomatic presence does not directly lead to a better 
image or favourable opinion, but without enough exposure, the public diplomatic strategy will
ultimately fail. Traditionally, “presence” comes mainly from mass communication, cultural 
exchanges, or educational programmes. The birth of social media has extended the scope of 
diplomatic presence over both space and time. For example, the digital outreach team of the State 
Department has directly engaged citizens in the Middle East by the posting of messages discussing 
US foreign policy on popular Arabic, Urdu, and Persian language Internet forums.516 In the digital 
age, the expansion of presence has become an even more critical condition for diplomats to make 
their voice heard. The credibility and authority of diplomats would likely suffer if they failed to 
stay abreast of the constantly changing digital technologies. Not only would their message not 
be heard, but also they would lose out to competing information campaigns.517 
 
Social media, with its interactive features, has much to offer in diplomatic relationships between 
states, including generating a quasi-continuous dialogue between diplomats and foreign public. 
Two-way conversations allow diplomats to readjust the focus of their agenda, reduce 
misinformation and enhance mutual understanding. This particular feature enables social media to 
realize the goal of public diplomacy in a different way from traditional methods.518 
 
The most important advantage of public diplomacy is that it brings with it a major shift in the 
approach one takes to it. It means you avoid taking actions and making statements you are 
unwilling to stand by in public, and dovetails into the change in focus towards public diplomacy 
explained previously. 519The sheer volume of information has led to an increased 
professionalization and specialization in every productive sphere, whether it be medicine or 
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marketing, and diplomacy is no exception. In the past, the role of a diplomat was to be a “well -
rounded gentle man” with a broad education so as to be able to sustain elite dinner table 
conversations, but requiring no specialist professional training. This is, is increasingly inadequate 
to meet the demands of the 21st century.520 
 
Although the advantages of using technology in the functions of diplomacy are obvious, this makes 
the tasks of diplomats more diverse, heavier and important. It should be noted that technological 
innovation relative to diplomacy is not synonymous with social media utilisation, which is but one 
aspect of the phenomenon; the emergence of the Internet and the seamless integration of digital 
information with real-world communications, transport, goods and services has immense 
implications for all aspects of life, including diplomatic functions. Better contact and 
communication reduces the risk of misunderstanding and misperception, also allowing direct 
communication between political elites. However, political leaders are very busy “and the time 
they allocate to diplomacy is quite limited. The daily work of the diplomats that constitutes the 
background to high-level summits is therefore very important. Any aspect of domestic policy can 
now be placed on the negotiating table”.521 
 
E-diplomacy can play an important role in encircling the challenges facing developing countries 
(such as Libya) concerning the protection of diplomats, especially when the state is lose control of 
most of its territory. Using e-diplomacy could on the most rudimentary level help save the lives of 
diplomats. 
 
3.3 How the Internet Affects Diplomacy 
 
The Internet and the IT systems it connects represents a quantum leap in people’s ability to 
communicate both one-to-one and one-to-many. It is one of the great leaps forward in 
communication analogous to the development of writing, the alphabet, printing and the telegraph; 
just as these primordial technologies completely transformed the world, the Internet is creating new 
sets of opportunities and risks at an accelerated pace.522 
 
During most of the 19th century embassies were sparse, giving limited opportunity to reach the 
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top level of the diplomatic corps. In the late 1860s Britain kept just seven embassies globally due 
to its practice of old diplomacy and the limitations of this practice in projecting national affairs in 
foreign roles and functions.523 While the development of the telegraph was ultimately more 
significant in revolutionizing communications in the long term, the advent of the Internet has 
profoundly transformed how diplomats communicate. Text and e-mail have replaced letters and 
faxes; websites are supplementing, and in some cases replacing, printed and broadcast media, 
although the relationship between them is evolving rapidly. Given the critical role of 
communication in the way, communities are organised and states are managed, this creates a 
fundamentally new dynamic.524 
 
International relations have traditionally comprised trade and conflict, leavened by the role of 
diplomacy.525 The Internet enables more and different actors to become involved in political and 
diplomatic processes.526 Diplomacy has become democratized, as technology allows more people 
to play a part, increases the size of the playing field by an almost exponential amount, and changes 
the rules every day.527 Internationally, the Internet is also being more widely used as a platform to 
address and influence world opinion. This became prolific shortly after the popularisation of social 
media during the 2000s. In 2006, the Iranian President Ahmadinejad published an open letter to 
US President Bush on the Iranian government website appealing for dialogue, providing 
maximum access to his arguments. In April 2007, within hours of Abdullah Gul’s withdrawal as a 
candidate for the Turkish Presidency, the military had posted a statement on its website invoking 
its role as the defender of the secular constitution in Turkey. When Nicholas Sarkozy won the 
French Presidential election in May 2007, Tony Blair posted his congratulatory message (in 
French) on his YouTube site. 
 
The development of social media tools has changed the way diplomats interact with people, 
communities, non-governmental organizations and even foreign governments. The technology 
revolution has played a significant role in diplomatic relations hips among states. The political 
objective is an important element in international relations, and the World Wide Web is the unique 
medium of international media exchange, circumventing traditional boundaries and barriers.528 
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As a system of communication between polities, diplomacy has been influenced by the 
development of available means of communication and transportation. Most importantly, the 
speed of diplomatic communication has varied greatly over time. In the ancient Near East, 
diplomatic missions could take years to complete. In the Amarna Letters, there is reference to a 
messenger being detained, and thus bilateral communication being interrupted, for six years.529 
 
In the areas of foreign policy and diplomacy, technology has brought about a tremendous amount 
of change. As Hillary Clinton once said during her tenure as Secretary of State, “Just as the Internet 
has changed virtually every aspect of how people worldwide live, learn, consume and 
communicate, connection technologies are changing the strategic context for diplomacy in the 21st 
century”.530 Even if medieval diplomacy could put a premium on speedy communication – in 
1496, for example, the Venetian Senate wrote to its orator keeping the death watch over the King 
of Naples that it wished for reports not daily, but hourly – communication over great distances 
travelled slowly well into the 19th century. At the end of the 18th century, the US President wrote 
a memorandum to his Secretary of State, lamenting the fact that the ambassador in Spain had 
not been heard from for two years, and suggesting that the US Government should write a letter 
to him if they did not hear from him within a further year. In 1838 US regulations instructed consuls 
“once in three months at least to write to the Department, if it be for no other reason than that of 
appraising the Department for being at their respective posts”.531 
 
Although many observers note how social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter change 
global connectivity, the reality is that new technologies do not necessarily create democratic 
evolution online.532 Breakthrough technologies enable instant contact and thus facilitate 
managing diplomacy and organizing political dialogue. Referring back to traditional 18th or 
19th century diplomacy, formal representatives had to wait for weeks or even months to receive 
relevant instruct ions on courses of action. As such, the points on agendas covered only the most 
important items needing to be addressed, and long-term strategic priorities. Consequently, 
governments left diplomacy to discreet gentlemen (and sometimes ladies) with social and academic 
competence to undertake sensitive relations with foreign notables, who mostly met behind closed 
doors. Now they are also using Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and local social media services, such 
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as China’s microblogging site, Sina Weibo.533 
 
Officials have continuous access to instantaneous and live networks empowering not only 
organizational dialogue, but providing international communications enhancing responsiveness, 
action and regulation.534 That being said, currently most ambassadors and politicians use Twitter 
to interact with officials, policymakers and citizens.535 “Twitplomacy” has been seen as a form of 
public diplomacy as it is used not only by officials but also millions of citizens across the globe. 
Twitter has two major positive effects on foreign policy: it fosters a beneficial exchange of ideas 
between policymakers and civil society; and it enhances diplomats’ ability to gather information 
and to anticipate, analyse, manage, and react to events. The former Italian Foreign Minister Giulio 
Terzi commented on this. “Tweets” of 140 characters have changed drastically the way officials 
communicate with each other, and the way politicians (most famously President Trump) 
communicate with the public.536 
After the attacks on the US Embassy in Libya and the murder of the US Ambassador, Christopher 
Stevens, many official condolences were sent via Twitter. Minutes after violent attacks on US 
missions in the Middle East, the country’s Embassies (particularly in Cairo) were active on Twitter 
to alert US citizens to emergency conditions as well as to issue policy observations, such as criticism 
of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood for supporting the protests on their Arabic feed, and thanking 
fellow tweeters for their condolences on the murder of the US Ambassador to Libya.537 
 
Twitter is used to facilitate the role of diplomats in building networks with others. One of the main 
priorities of modern embassies is to establish and maintain a diverse network of stakeholders. The 
sixth communication strategy for diplomatic actors on social media is, thus, to build an extensive 
network with relevant stakeholders. On social media, this can be realised by linking with a diverse 
range of different organizations and individuals and important online opinion leaders. The latter are 
perceived as major contributors on Twitter who are substantially engaged with political 
information, and whose function is to collect, read, edit and disseminate information with 
others. Another feature of online networks is that they are dispersed. This means that regular people 
are not only connected to other regular people but also connected with popular accounts on 
Twitter, such as opinion leaders. This dispersal enables government institutions to attract large 
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communities of the general public via the network of popular accounts.538 
 
While facilitating the exchange of diplomatic communications, these technological innovations 
have been seen as challenges to ingrained diplomatic procedures. As mentioned previously, 
modern communications make traditional diplomats superfluous in terms of basic 
communications functions, but the extensive and nuanced roles of modern diplomats – including 
outside of the realm public communication – mean that they are unlikely to become redundant, 
and expectations of the demise of diplomats due to developments in communications have 
historically proved false. For instance, when the first telegram arrived on the desk of British 
Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston in the 1840s, he reputedly exclaimed “My God! This is the end 
of diplomacy”.539 Similarly, the Royal Commission of 1861, which investigated the British 
Diplomatic Service, dwelt on the influence of the telegraph and wondered whether it would make 
ambassadors unnecessary. The dramatic development of today’s media and IT has elicited similar 
concerns.540 
 
During the Libyan civil conflict in 2011, India relies on digital diplomacy and more than 18,000 
Indian citizens were evacuated successfully from Libya, facilitated by using Twitter.541 
 
However, the lack of use of IT in 2012 in conducting diplomacy between the US and Libya during 
the armed conflict, when Libya had no ability to protect the diplomats, basically facilitated the 
attack on US diplomats: the physical presence of the diplomats in Libya, given the prevailing 
conditions of conflict, was inappropriate relative to the US military presence. 
 
3.4 The Effect of the Media on Diplomatic Relationships between States 
 
Media diplomacy emerged as a consequence of technological development: radio, broadcasting 
and the Internet provided new opportunities to reach worldwide audiences. Voice of America, 
launched in 1942, was one of the first worldwide broadcast services to project American values, 
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culture and lifestyle and advocate US policies. More recent US media diplomacy projects include 
Arabic Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra television. Examples of media diplomacy via state-sponsored 
broadcasters operating in foreign countries include Britain’s BBC, France’s France 24, 
Germany’s Deutsche Welle, Iran’s Press TV, Qatar’s Al-Jazeera, and Russia’s Russia Today, 
 Although the media provides new opportunities, it implies a certain level of complexity. First, with 
easy access to information on the Internet, governments have less control of information flow. 
Aside from egregious examples such as the exposure of top secret diplomatic cables in WikiLeaks 
revelations, general messages disseminated in and designed for particular countries and regions 
are universally viewable, which induces states to seek cohesion and consistency. Second, the 
interpretations of one message by the audiences inside and outside the country may differ 
significantly, which has been attributed to cultural differences.542 States need to understand the 
culture of the audience to pass effective messages to them. The idea of cultural resonance suggests 
that communication is more complex between countries that have drastically different cultures than 
those that have similar cultural assumptions and values. It stands to reason that governments must 
have a good understanding of target audiences.543 To consider the impact of current media 
technology in the public domain in MENA has given rise to some interesting reflections in recent 
times. The rise of modern media has been seen to play a major role in emerging ideas, identities, 
and discourses that “are fragmenting and contesting” the hegemony of authoritarian political 
and/or religious centres.544 
 The media has positively affected the role of diplomats and made their task easier. On the most 
elemental level, diplomats can concern themselves with specialist analysis and reporting as the 
ubiquitous 24/7 rolling news media assume the burden of informing their recipient states of general 
events and developments.545 
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3.5 E-Diplomacy: A New Way of Conducting International Diplomacy 
 
Social media are powerful channels for digital diplomacy and particularly suitable for making and 
maintaining contact with diverse stakeholders. Virtual diplomacy means public diplomacy, 
whereby governments communicate directly with the citizens of another country.546 Public 
diplomacy is defined as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an 
attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as 
well as its national goals and current policies”.547 
Although diplomats customarily have diplomatic immunity, this doctrine of international affairs 
and the rules of war emerged only during the early modern era, and it is increasingly less relevant 
in the context of modern armed conflicts between states and non-state actors, such as the 
insurgency in Libya and analogous situations elsewhere in Libya, where diplomats and diplomatic 
premises (particularly US Embassies) become preferred targets rather than sacred and inviolable 
sanctuaries.548 For example, in the years since 2011 Western governments have intermittently (or 
permanently) rolled back their diplomatic presence throughout MENA. For instance, the French 
government temporarily closed premises, including embassies and schools, in 20 countries, and 
Germany shut down its embassies in quite a few Middle Eastern countries in September 2012. 
Following years of diplomatic and other sanctions, Canada, Israel, US and most of the EU 
countries ended their operations and closed their embassies in Iran.549 
 While such efforts are generally precipitated by deteriorating security conditions or relations 
between states, these can provide a pretext for the underlying rationale of cost-cutting. For 
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example, Britain decided to share embassies with Canada in many states owing to the cutting of 
costs required under their austerity measures. Romania closed fourteen embassies at the same time 
in Africa and South America.550 The Philippines government recently terminated the operation of 
its embassies and consulates in Caracas, Koror, Dublin, Barcelona and Frankfurt. Greece ended 
the operations of six embassies and three consulates around the world as part of sweeping cuts.551 
Thus, when deciding to close down missions around the world, governments have to find other 
mechanisms to enable them to continue and further develop international cooperation. A virtual 
embassy has great potential and these types of online presence don’t only serve as a source of 
information for politics, economies, trade or cultural affairs between countries. A virtual embassy 
can be a platform providing e-services to citizens from both sending and receiving states. This 
new approach obviously does not have scope to perform all functions of a traditional embassy or 
consulate, but it can provide many services for its citizens and those of the host country.552 
Diplomats have learned very quickly to understand that Facebook, Twitter and other social media 
tools create opportunities to spread important information rapidly and save money at the same time. 
Social media had the speed to deliver this. The rise of social media basically opens a new area for 
competition on the world stage. Social media has many diplomatic clients globally. It should be 
borne in mind that it is not only the US State Department, UK Foreign Office, Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and other foreign services of developed 
countries which are active on YouTube, Twitter, Facebook or LinkedIn; the embassies of states 
like Nigeria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Moldova or Belarus also try to promote their diplomatic interest 
in the virtual space.553 
Those who believe that diplomacy can be conducted in the same old way will lose ground to those 
who understand the new dynamics and put in place policies to exploit them. This is digital 






diplomacy. It has implications for foreign policy-making in four areas: ideas, information, 
networks and service delivery.554 As mentioned previously, personal contacts remain a core role 
of diplomacy and diplomats, but this must be a complement to online activities. The greatest 
challenge to digital diplomacy in MENA is that the officials in embassies believe that personal 
relationships with decision makers and journalists as well as the establishment of trust are more 
important than online communication.555 
 
3.6 Examples of Recent Virtual Embassies 
 
In the absence of security in MENA (e.g. Libya), there is an increase in the proliferation of armed 
conflict and tension, accompanied by states often losing control, making it difficult or impossible 
for host states to protect diplomats. In this situation, MENA needs to find new mechanisms to 
protect diplomats. One expedient is to resort to virtual embassy technology to continue relations 
hips worldwide without the risks of traditional embassies. The 2014 Arab Social Media Report 
gives wide-ranging information surrounding internet usage the use of the Internet and social 
networks in the Arab world.556 
 The information indicates that using virtual embassies to aid and promote dialogue between 
Israel and the wider Arab countries holds much potential, as it simply discovers that this target 
audience is online and seeks information and news. Moreover, up to now, Israel has not been unable 
to promote dialogue with the Arab world using tools of traditional diplomacy,557 and Iran promptly 
blocked the US social media account which was trying to reach out to the ordinary people of Iran, 
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(discussed below). The figures question the use of Twitter as the medium to reach this grouping, 
given that the vast majority of Arab Internet users tend to use Facebook and it would be better 
to choose that as a medium.558 Furthermore, the predictable blocking of such social media 
outreach platforms makes it seem they are designed more for domestic political purposes than for 
realistic diplomacy initiatives. 
 While social media outreach to general populations is important to long- term diplomatic 
objectives, digital diplomacy between states is obviously of more immediate utility, particularly in 
cases where governments have no direct diplomatic relations (usually due to political sensitivities), 
as in the case of Israel’s relations with most Arab and Muslim states.559 The aim of these virtual 
embassies is to facilitate the promotion of dialogue with international audiences.560 
However, there are risks in using digital diplomacy, such as hacking, information leaks and 
potential anonymity for criminal activities.561 
Virtual embassies first emerged to reach remote Russian cities where the US did not have 
consulates. While their functions have largely been subsumed by the development of general 
Internet platforms, there are still some virtual embassies of this type.562 
 Face-to- face meetings are costly for hosting states in terms of economic resources, security 
implications and international prestige. In some MENA countries, armed groups specifically 
target diplomats with techniques displaying various forms of sophistication, with some armed 
groups having more effective power, weaponry and military experience than state governments. 
This was clearly evident in the case of Libya, whose government had no effective authority outside 
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its own compounds, with the majority of the country being controlled by various military 
factions.563 
The US State Department realized the potential of virtual embassies in MENA when it launched 
Virtual Embassy Teheran in December 2011.564 This followed a more long-term reorientation of 
US diplomatic policy following 9/11.565 
 
3.6.1 An Electronic Estonian Embassy in Luxembourg 
 
 Estonia was the first country to establish an electronic embassy in Luxembourg to keep important 
and sensitive information. According to the Estonian Prime Minister “Estonia is the world’s first 
country that uses this method to double-secure its digital consistency, in close cooperation with 
Luxembourg”.566 In 2017, the agreement was signed between the Prime Minister of Estonia Jüri 
Ratas and Prime Minister of Luxembourg Xavier Bettel on housing data and information systems 
between the two countries, thereby creating the world’s first data embassy. The data embassy was 




3.6.2 Israeli Virtual Embassy in the GCC Region 
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Notwithstanding the absence of diplomatic relations between Israel and the GCC, there have been 
increasing unofficial business ties between them over the past decade.569 
 
Although Israel has not opened embassies in the Gulf States, which do not officially recognize Israel, 
the Israeli Foreign Ministry used virtually embassies as a means of reaching out to the citizens of these 
countries via Twitter. 
 
The Virtual Embassy describes itself as “the official account of the embassy of Israel with the Gulf 
states” online. It started its official activities by congratulating the people of the Gulf countries on 
the occasion of Ramadan, with a tweet saying: “Ramadan is Kaream for all the Gulf countries, 
we hope that peace and humanity will prevail among all Muslims”.570 The Virtual Embassy also 
congratulated Oman on the occasion of the Omani Renaissance Day, which is celebrated in July 
2013.571 
In August 2013, the Israeli Foreign Ministry opened a Twitter account and defined it as “dedicated 
to promoting dialogue with the people of the GCC region” (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE).572 The Twitter account launched another account on social networking site 
called “Israel Virtual Embassy in the Gulf States”.573 Israel tried to open direct conversation 
with GCC citizens, including the opinion of Israel about the GCC. This conversation was managed 
and conducted in Arabic and English. Within a few days of its launch, the Virtual Embassy had 
1,043 followers, and had tweeted 57 times.572 
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3.6.3 US Virtual Embassy in Iran 
 
The diplomatic relations between the US and Iran were severed after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution and the siege of US Embassy staff in Tehran.573 The US tried to find new mechanisms 
to strengthen its relationships with Iran by means of a US Virtual Embassy website and a Twitter 
account and Facebook page to reach Iranians. The virtual embassy is a website developed by 
the US State Department and launched in December 2011. It was intended to build bridges 
between Tehran and Washington.574 The State Department lamented that in addition to losing an 
embassy in Iran, the US was deprived of a relationship with “Iranian people, access to Iranian 
society, and this has caused thousands of daily interactions between American and Iranian 
citizens”.575 The information related to the Iranian people through the virtual embassy would allow 
them to make up their own minds about the US. It will also relay US concerns about the Iranian 
government’s actions with a view to “achieving a resolution to those concerns”.576  
 The US confirmed that the virtual embassy would not be a substitute for an official US diplomatic 
mission in Iran.577 Obviously, the Iranian government was outraged, and predictably accused the 
US of subversion578 and blocked the site immediately.579 Other MENA countries welcomed the 
idea. For example, Egypt welcomed the opening of the US Virtua l Consulate in Ismailia.580 
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3.6.4 US Virtual Consulate in Egypt 
 
Unlike the broad public relations approach of the Israeli Virtual Embassy in the GCC, the US 
Virtual Consulate is targeted to specific US interests. Consequently, it has more practical, consular 
support services, with information in Arabic and English. The Consulate explains how Egyptians 
can apply to study in the US, how business people can find opportunities for commercial and 
industrial activities and how to participate. The site provides information on US economic 
assistance projects in the governorate electronic links to websites that trace the institutions located 
in the Ismailia governorate. Users are also able to provide feedback to the US Embassy. The main 
role of this virtual consulate is to promote educational ties between the US and the denizens of 
Ismailia, with links to US economic support and aid proffered to Egypt to strengthen the 
relationship between the two countries.581 
 
3.7 Challenges to Technology Utilization in Diplomacy 
 
New technology offers opportunities for countries in managing relations hips with key publics. 
For example, Facebook is used to reach younger people, such as students, who regularly visit the 
site to communicate with their peers. However, governments may face several obstacles in using 
social media to communicate with foreign audiences. First, governments’ organizational cultures 
and preferences public relations models may restrict them in trying other communication models 
that are more common and effective, such as the new media platforms. Second, new media sites 
loosen the control of the message. As discussed earlier, Arab governments closely monitor 
communication in the US and embassy engagement with US audiences, which may explain the 
limited use of new media by Arab embassies.582 
 
The greatest challenge to digital diplomacy in MENA is that embassy officials believe that personal 
relationships with decision makers and journalists, as well as the establishment of trust, are more 
important than online communication. 583Social media is not necessarily easy to use as a tool of 
public diplomacy. In fact, it might involve even more human resources and financial investment than 
traditional media-based tools as its objectives, methods and operations require a complex digital 
infrastructure and well-trained staff to carry out the missions.584 
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Although some Arab embassies use it to connect with audiences, the new media present them with 
another challenge.585Diplomats might also face the problem of their personal and diplomatic lives 
blurring and converging with their engagement in social media, with some diplomats (as well as 
politicians) being compelled to resign as a result of inappropriate personal tweets and Facebook 
posts from investigative journalists.586 Nevertheless, the new media “offer new possibilities for 
public diplomacy”,587 which in MENA includes specifically greater scope for genuinely 
independent diplomatic work, such as engagement with citizens in host countries, while 
traditionally heavily restrained by the dictates of sending states’ foreign ministries. Indeed, even 
ambassadors may not issue statements without the permission of their government. Modern e-
diplomacy enables embassies to activate a genuine role with greater autonomy, developing their 
own communication goals and strategies, and overcoming to some extent the problem of time 
difference, which ranges from 6 to 10 hours between Washington DC and Arab countries.588 
 
However, electronic communications pose serious new risks, including whistleblowing (as 
discussed previously with regard to WikiLeaks) and more serious malicious breaches of state 
security by foreign states or non-state actors (such as terrorist organisations). Malicious attackers 
may try to hack into government systems and extract information of use to themselves. That this 
happens should surprise no- one. While the Internet makes it possible for a lone wolf teenager to 
execute cyber-attacks against government systems, to break into seriously secure systems 
requires the full resources of a state apparatus to manage the scale of attack and sophistication of 
software necessary for success. Some states are ready and willing to commit such resources to 
this kind of activity.589 For instance, it was alleged that Chinese hackers gained unauthorized access 
to the computer networks of the German Prime Minister’s office and the private e-mail inbox of 
Chancellor Merkel. This serious incident also involved remote electronic infiltration of the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Pentagon, where parts of the unclassified network had 
to be shut down for a week for repairs.590 
 
Furthermore, the new communication technologies pose challenges. They appear to accelerate 
the pace at which diplomats are expected to react and deliver their analyses to their respective 
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governments.591 Another challenge of the 24/7 media saturated society is that the diplomat must 
navigate the ever-increasing volume of available information and select what is important.592 
Diplomats need to be faster and quicker to respond than before. Diplomacy is now more dynamic; 
it is a fast-paced and highly responsive role (if performed appropriately), whereas traditionally it 
was a slow and stately process. Information technology helps diplomats to be better informed 
and they have no choice but to be speedy and able to brief ministers of the executive on pertinent 





Technology clearly obviates some of the reasons diplomats were traditionally instituted, but it 
does not make diplomats themselves redundant in terms of their essential function in 
professionally mediating diplomatic relationships between states. The methods and mechanisms 
of conducting relationships between states as well as between politicians are given a fillip by 
modern communication methods and IT. In this respect, many of the traditional consular functions 
of state embassies can be immeasurably improved by the development of e-diplomacy (i.e. e-
government services such as issuing e-visas). They also enable rudimentary diplomatic contact 
between states during conflicts or when the presence of physical embassies and diplomatic 
personnel is inexpedient for political or security reasons. In the case of MENA, which has 
traditionally been strongly characterised by personal relationships in diplomacy as well as in 
general politics, technology must be used to enable diplomatic functions during times of armed 
conflict, tension and disturbance, due to the manifest difficulties of protecting diplomats under such 
conditions (among other reasons). 
 
Information globalization enabled by ICT and the popularization of the Internet since the 1990s 
has become an important and influential factor in contemporary international relations and one of 
the most effective mutual political influences in the world. The Internet is central to economic 
globalization, and the strongest guide in all political, economic, cultural and social interactions of 
globalization, including diplomacy. Indeed, diplomacy itself is increasingly shaped by the 
universal impacts of globalization, while it was traditionally determined by the interests of 
states in terms of ideological, social and economic systems. 
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Despite the obvious importance of technology, MENA is traditionally resistant to innovation and 
change, and the countries of the region require assistance and resources to overcome obstacles to 
the adoption and maintenance of technology and information preservation. Arab cultures have a 
very high level of uncertainty avoidance, and in the era of WikiLeaks the natural inertia of political 
elites is compounded by their paranoia about espionage and potential subversion; thus, social media 
may be viewed as a threat to sovereignty. 
 
The communications revolution has deepened the role of diplomacy and made it more 
sophisticated and complex. It has given the diplomatic mission special features, such as accelerating 
bureaucratic functions and reducing the formalities associated with diplomacy in the past. It has 
enabled more openness to diverse segments of society and its activities, with diplomats developing 
the mission as envoys between civilizations. 
 
E-diplomacy can be used to protect diplomats and prevent attacks against them, particularly in 
times of armed conflict where a nation loses control over its territory. The most critical role of 
diplomats is negotiation during armed conflicts, which can often be implemented online. Although 
face-to-face meeting and negotiation is important, online negotiation can be critical to save the 
lives of diplomats and conduct international relationships efficiently and economically. In the case 
of Ambassador Stevens, if the US had used e-diplomacy in its diplomatic relationships with Libya 
the diplomatic staff would not have been within the reach of militants, and both Libya and the US 
could have saved extensive resources by preventing the attack. As a developing country, Libya is 
less able to meet normal international obligations toward the protection of diplomats. 
 
Although it lacks resources, has poor management structures and security challenges, Libya has 
made minimal use of the advantages of information and communications technology in its 
diplomatic practice to protect diplomats in time of armed conflict
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TJ refers to the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to 
come to terms with a legacy of large scale past abuse in order to ensure accountability, serves 
justice and achieve reconciliation.594 It is not a way of mending all that is wrong in society, or a 
special kind of justice (e.g. restorative, distributive or criminal justice), but it applies human rights 
policy in certain circumstances. It is also an attempt to provide as much justice as possible under 
the political circumstances at this time. 
 
TJ is not a coherent idea or practice but its basis is the recognition of the principles of human rights. 
Certain mechanisms such as prosecution, fact-finding, investigations, reparation programmes and 
reform initiatives have been associated with this idea as the most effective means of rescuing the 
principles of human rights. The practice of TJ is therefore an attempt to facing up to impunity and to 
search for effective remedies and the prevention of repeat violations. It is not a routine application 
of standards but is done with careful and rigorous assessment. 
 
For example, in the case of the killing the US Ambassador to Libya in 2012, it was possible that 
the perpetrator who killed the ambassador would have escaped, which is why the US implemented 
an extraordinary intervention to capture the offender, due to the likelihood that the Libyan 
government was unable to prosecute the perpetrators. In this situation if the Libyan government 
implemented TJ or adopted hybrid courts (which the Libyan government resorted to recently), 
Libya may have been able to solve the Stevens case by identifying, arresting and prosecuting the 
offenders. Therefore, TJ is not a blueprint to be applied by governments under certain 
circumstances, rather it is a tool to address impunity and redress harm away from the routine 
application of normal judicial standards. 
 
As representatives of their home states in foreign countries, diplomats are placed in vulnerable 
positions in times of internal crisis or instability. Consequently, international law protects those 
exposing life and health for the greater good of the International office. Obligations to protect 
foreign envoys are among the longest - standing rules of diplomatic and consular law. Upon 
codification in the 1961 VCDR and the 1963 VCCR, personal inviolability was deemed so well 
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established in customary international law that negotiators barely discussed its scope or 
formulation. The Conventions comprise a special positive duty of protection and a negative duty 
to abstain from exercising any enforcement right, in particular an arrest or detention of foreign 
envoys (Articles 29 VCDR and 40-41 VCCR). The obligations apply to state representatives on 
duty (e.g. the 2012 killing of the US Ambassador in Benghazi).595 Inviolability is to be respected 
in the first place by the receiving state’s authorities. Any attack upon the person, freedom, or 
dignity of a diplomatic agent is prohibited, which implies that no arrest, abuse, or strip-search of a 
diplomat by armed forces or police officers can occur. As for consular officers, an arrest or 
detention pending trial is possible in case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by a 
competent judicial authority.596 
 
Protection of diplomats, as discussed in Chapter 1, is the responsibility of the receiving state 
under any circumstances, thus it is responsible to take appropriate steps to remedy criminal actions 
against diplomats subject to the VCDR (Article 29).597 As explained with regard to the Tehran 
hostage case, the ICJ stated that the receiving state has a duty to take steps to pursue offenders and 
to pay compensation for injury to diplomats. According to the ICJ, Iran is under an obligation to 
make reparation for the injury caused to the US: ‘The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
is under an obligation to make reparation to the United States of America for the injury caused to 
the latter by the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events’.598 The problem 
of attack on diplomats can only be remedied by placing an affirmative obligation on the state to 
investigate and prosecute human rights violators.599 
 
The case of violation of international obligation could be raised to the ICJ when only after the 
state has exhausted all internal means to find justice for the diplomat. In case of killing of 
ambassador Stevens, applying TJ mechanisms might help to find the truth and the circumstances 
that took place. 
 
Furthermore, in some cases the ICC can rely on the investigation made by the truth 
commission.600 The investigation through the commissions of inquiry does not remove the 
                                                          
595 Sanderin Duquet and Jan Wouters ‘The international protection of diplomatic and consular agents ‘(2017) 
OUPBLOG. Available at<https://blog.oup.com/2017/04/international-protection - ambassadors-Vienna-
convention/> Accessed 3 June 2017. 
596 Ibid. 
597 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, (entered into force 24 
April 1964). 
598 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
(Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3. 
599 Turgis (n608) 12. 
600 Christopher D. Totten ‘The International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions: A Framework for Cross-
131  
criminal aspect of the case, therefore, after making sure that the amnesty laws are not provided for 
the perpetrators of the violations against the safety of the diplomat and embassy security, it is 
possible to adopt these investigations whether in the internal courts, if the state is capable of 
conducting the trial, or if the state is not capable as the situation in Libya, the case must be referred 
to the ICC.601 Hence, it is possible to rely on the investigations conducted by the truth commission 
accompanied by the evidence and it is regarded as a supportive process and preparation for the 
task of the ICC. However, the state might establish a special court to charge those accused of 
crimes against diplomats. It should be noted that Libya is moving towards adopting a hybrid 
judiciary currently to develop and promote TJ in Libya. A truth commission is not focused on a 
specific event but attempts to paint the overall picture of certain human rights abuses, over a 
period of time. 
 
If applied successfully, such mechanisms would be more effective than other internal laws which 
might not have such guarantees. However, internal laws themselves should  be redesigned to apply 
to the citizens of the receiving state with regard to diplomats. 
 
The most important feature of TJ, which makes it the best way to remedy injured diplomats, is that 
it is not limited to judicial procedures, rather it encompasses non- judicial procedures. Also, there 
are international procedures when states fail to meet their obligations in accordance with the 
internal procedures of TJ, as this chapter examines. International procedure or recourse to the 
ICC to charge offenders when states fail to do so is a good guarantor of non-impunity. However, 
TJ must be comprehensively reviewed and endorsed by the international community to become 
international law. The researcher also believes in the importance of considering diplomats to be 
victims of human rights abuses to ensure their fundamental human rights, especially with the 
increase the numbers of conflicts accompanied by an increased propensity to attack diplomats 
and their premises in recent years. 
 
Justice is action in accord with the necessities of maintaining stability in society and the rule of law. 
It is universally acknowledged that fairness and equity in rendering justice improves the overall 
lives of members of a society, although there is great divergence in views on what constitutes fair 
justice. When justice loses transparency, society will suffer from different kinds of injustice and 
hatred, leading to conflicts. 
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Post-conflict circumstances often show signs of piecemeal and ad hoc legal frameworks that 
neglect international norms and which are distorted by political expediency, including 
discriminatory elements that do not meet fundamental requirements of international standards of 
human rights and criminal law. Conflict causes the suspension of political and legal norms, with an 
influx of emergency laws and executive orders that post-conflict regimes are often reluctant to give 
up. Furthermore, in case there is an appropriate law, the public may not know anything about it, 
and the new government does not have ability and essential means to implement these laws. Also, 
during such times, national systems such as judicial or police institutions and correctional systems 
lack human resources and material and financial support necessary for the complex 
institutionalisation of legal justice.602 Moreover, regimes and their associated institutions of 
law often lack popular legitimacy due to having risen to power by means of conflict, generally 
associated with abuse and repression.603 
 
Therefore, the international community has sought to find effective mechanisms to redress the past 
suffering of war-torn societies as well as to re-establish the rule of law under systems of TJ. TJ is 
an assertive approach to safeguarding the rights of victims, including diplomats, in order to know 
the truth and to hold criminals accountable, which generally involves institutional reform and 
satisfactory reparation for victims. In fact, TJ includes both judicial and non-judicial processes 
and mechanisms seeking redress for all kinds of injured diplomats’ rights, for example civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights. TJ also focuses on the causality underpinning 
abuses of human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).604 The international 
community needs to redress the problem of attacks on diplomats during conflict and in post-
conflict situations for a long-term solution; it must seek to address the root of the problem, which 
can help to avoid the repetition of such crimes and help legislators develop suitable mechanisms to 
redress such problems. However, this must be squared with the realpolitik of trying to preserve 
some kind of normalcy of life (among former and continuing enemies) in post-conflict areas. 
 
TJ might have international or internal mechanisms. Generally, the former are invoked when the 
latter prove inadequate, with governments resorting to treaty bodies, regional tribunals and 
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international courts.605 However, domestic justice systems should be the first resort in pursuit of 
accountability, although these are often unwilling or unable to prosecute violators due to the 
intensity of passions and power lobbies and competing interests in the immediate vicinity of the 
problem. The establishment and operation of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals over 
the last decade provide a forceful illustration of this point. These tribunals represent historic 
achievements in establishing accountability for serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law by civilian and military leaders. They have proved that it is possible to deliver 
justice and conduct fair trials effectively at the international level, in the wake of the breakdown 
of national judicial systems. More significantly still, they reflect a growing shift in the international 
community, away from a tolerance for impunity and amnesty and towards the creation of an 
international rule of law. Despite their limitations and imperfections, international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals have changed the character of international justice and enhanced the global 
character of the rule of law.606 
 
 
TJ processes are frequently designed and applied in fragile post-conflict and transitional 
surroundings. That means TJ processes do not operate in a political vacuum. However, the UN is 
keenly interested and aware of the political framework and the possible application of TJ process 
in complex situations worldwide. This knowledge is important to help post-conflict states to avoid 
unfair trials and dead-ends when regimes arbitrarily apply the processes and mechanisms of TJ, 
failing to observe the requirements of accountability, justice and reconciliation.607 
 
Laws are instituted to preserve justice; whether based on human consensus or societal rules, fair 
treatment is supposed to be ensured for all members of society, including diplomats. Several issues 
of justice arise and play a significant role in causing, perpetuating and ending conflicts. Just 
institutions are likely to instil justice among members of a society, along with a sense of stability, 
which would otherwise lead to dissatisfaction, rebellion and revolution. Each of the different 
spheres expresses the principles of justice and fairness in its own way, resulting in different types 
and concepts of justice: distributive, procedural, retributive and restorative. These kinds of justice 
are important both at the national and international levels of the effects of political, civil and criminal 
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The history of modern TJ can be traced back to the aftermath of the Second World War.609 Major 
states had degenerated into authoritarian regimes and dictatorships with massive violations of 
human rights, in the wake of this, the international community (particularly the US, UK and 
France, who wished to contain the spread of Communism) sought to promote democratic 
governance to address and prevent these serious violations to prevent obstacles to security and 
development goals. 
 
TJ mechanisms are not limited to judicial processes. According to a UN report, ‘justice and 
achieving reconciliation may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with different 
levels of international involvement (and none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-
seeking, institutional reform’.610 A large number of TJ experiments took the form of the formation 
of ‘truth and reconciliation’ under the democratic power and local and international human 
rights organizations in order to support injured diplomats and their families. Committees often came 
at the stage of political development either after weakness or the fall or collapse of the former 
regime (military regimes and dictatorships in the case of the Middle East); in a democratic or 
political transition (as a case of South Africa, Argentina and Chile); or in the context of the 
continuity of the old system that consciously addresses its legacy to filter the past, without a 
radical rethink in the course of the old rules (the case of Morocco). In other cases, the 
establishment of committees with financial support from the international community came within 
the framework of the peace-building process after the civil war (e.g. in Guatemala). 
 
Several countries use two methods of achieving justice in post conflict, namely TJ and 
reconciliation. The former often target three primary conceptual goals: protection of the historical 
facts and knowing the truth about violations; determining the limits of responsibility of the actors 
(politicians, security services, the army, the judiciary, the media and others); and ascertaining the 
fate of diplomatic victims. The responsibility of the actors, whether private individuals or state 
organs, is discussed in the following chapter, which examines the responsibility of states to 
protect diplomats in more depth. The current chapter explores what the concept of TJ means, why 
it is important and its main elements. It explains the experience of states that achieved TJ after long 
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period of crises and human rights abuses, and finally considers the experience of some countries 
in this regard, with particular consideration of the impacts of the Arab Spring. 
 
This chapter identifies some connections between the responsibility of states in armed conflict 
and times of political tension and disturbance under international law to protect diplomats and TJ. 
With particular reference as to how the latter excludes diplomats from appropriate consideration, 
this research reiterates that diplomats should be considered as victims of human rights abuses. This 
novel perspective may help identify mechanisms to grant justice and protection to diplomats. 
However, this chapter is going to rely on some examples, which is not related to. 
 
Until recently, few scholars have evaluated and analysed TJ as a consistent system of 
implementation in the context of a process of transition from mass violation of human rights to a 
more peaceful and democratic state. Scholars have tried to establish a link between TJ and human 
rights abuses by focusing on the importance of the TJ system to achieve justice for victims of past 
human rights violations. Examples include Paige,611 Megret and Vagliano,612 and Rubin.613 As 
explained early in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Diplomacy has a particularly strong link with TJ relative 
to other kinds of justice. For example, in 2006, diplomacy was key to legal redress for the conflict 
in Ugandan government; in August of that year, the parties signed a historic agreement on the 
cessation of hostilities, which led to a cease-fire.614 
 
This chapter discussed the background information on conflict situations in countries like post-
war Germany, Chile and South Africa, but diplomats were not primarily affected by conflict events 
in those cases; nevertheless, they are instructive for the mechanisms of TJ. 
 
4.2 The Concept of TJ 
 
The concept of TJ can be affected by the repression and tyranny that characterized the former 
regime, and human rights abuses are typically carried out by government officials, which of course 
affect the quality of the mechanisms and the nature of the actions that will be relied upon for the 
application of TJ. The higher the degree of oppression and tyranny, as characterized by the 
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apartheid regime in South Africa or the Nazis, the greater the need for mechanisms employing 
greater severity in sanctions, as represented in the cleansing mechanisms, or criminal 
accountability and retribution. If power has been transferred in a peaceful and smooth way, the 
new government can resort to less ‘hard’ mechanisms, such as the acknowledgment of the truth, 
or the obligation of compensation or apology.615 
 
The definition of TJ is still unclear, especially the first part of this term (‘transitional’); the question 
arises as to whether there is such a thing as TJ. 
 
There have been international and local attempts to define the TJ. Many scholars have recognized 
the importance of using universal conceptions of justice.616 For example, Teitel stated that TJ is 
associated with a universal rights discourse, and that the concept is broad enough to include 
international human rights and international humanitarian legal norms, but also encompassing 
more abstract rule of law standards.617 
In the international human rights (IHR) movement, TJ means the judicial process in the progress 
of democratic evolution in dealing with dictatorial regimes’ human rights abuses. It was used in 
the post-conflict processing of war crimes and human rights abuses committed in conflicts.618 The 
UN has played an important role in determining the framework of TJ through an approach based 
on respect for the rule of law in post- conflict periods. Former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi 
Annan, stated in his report of 2004 that the experience of the organization during the preceding 
decade clearly showed that the consolidation of peace in post-conflict in the short term and the 
maintenance of peace in the long-term cannot be achieved unless the population is confident of the 
possibility of detecting grievances through legitimate structures for the settlement of disputes by 
peaceful means, and of the fair administration of justice.619 
 
Although the ICC has in some cases depended on the internal investigation of the state (conducted 
by a truth commission),620 there is no existing definition of TJ, and a comprehensive understanding 
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of TJ and its aim of embedding peace and democracy is lacking. 
 
States have tried to define the TJ in their own TJ law. According to the Tunisian Transitional Justice 
Law (2013), TJ is a complete path of the mechanisms and the means adopted to understand and 
address past human rights violations, to reveal the truth and to hold accountable those responsible, 
and to award reparation to and rehabilitate victims in order to achieve national reconciliation and 
preserve the collective memory. TJ mechanisms document and establish guarantees of non- 
repetition and the transition from state tyranny to a democratic system contributes to a devoted 
human rights system.621 This definition is an all-encompassing one which outlines the ways to 
achieve TJ and its goals and its purpose. 
 
The original function of TJ is to hold offenders accountable for serious violations of human rights 
during conflict; due to political interference, accountability occasionally involves only leaders, who 
are often convenient scapegoats, although truth commissions that investigate the crimes of the past 
in order to understand the reason behind such crimes and record them, and guarantee they are not 
repeated, can play a conciliatory as well as cathartic role, as in the case of South Africa.622 It is 
clear from these considerations that the idea of TJ is not an academic issue; rather it is directly 
related to pragmatic concerns about the possibility of changes in social, economic and political 
structures through important negotiations taking place in a state.623 
 
Scholars tried to define the TJ as a ‘set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following 
a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing 
with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law’.624 According to this concept, TJ is the 
potential of the new government to deal with the war-torn society in order to re-establish the rule 
of law far away from reprisals approach. TJ is not a special kind of justice; rather it is an approach 
to achieve justice in transition periods of conflict and/or state repression. By trying to achieve 
accountability and compensation for victims including injured diplomats, TJ provides recognition 
of the rights of victims and encourages civil trust, and strengthens the rule of law and democracy. 
 
While some scholars tried to define TJ in accordance to its forms and procedure that TJ is ‘a 
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process of acknowledging, prosecuting, compensating for and forgiving past crimes during a 
period of rebuilding after conflict’.625 Also, TJ is ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large scale past abuses, in 
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’.626 
 
Teitel627 defined TJ as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes”. 
This thesis defines TJ as a range of judicial and non-judicial processes of achieving justice in 
transition time or after a revolution and disturbance. This justice aims to find justice for victims of 
human rights abuses through telling them the truth of the reasons for targeting them. States are 
accountable for responsible persons, delivery preparation, and guaranteeing non-repetition. This 
entails that they carry out reforms that include all political, legal and even social aspects, in a way 
that guarantees human rights and reassures citizens of the sovereignty of justice and human rights. 
 
It is clear from the above definition that TJ is a system of justice that focuses on the period of 
instability. However, there is not a great possibility of this justice applying to diplomats, since 
there is no legal text to prevent this application. 
 
Regardless of the exact definition of TJ, peace is an internal issue but it could not be achieved if 
foreign countries intervened in the internal affairs of another state, as happens in MENA nowadays. 
 
TJ measures that were adopted included prosecutions, usually of past regime leaders; truth-telling 
initiatives, such as opening up state archives and establishing official truth commissions; the 
creation of reparations programmes for victims; and the vetting of public employees, especially 
(but not exclusively) members of the security forces. TJ emerged as part of a recognition dealing 
with systematic or massive human rights abuses requires a distinctive approach that is both 
backward and forward-looking.628 
 
The concept of TJ stems from the international human rights movement. At first, it referred to the 
judicial process of addressing human rights violations committed by dictatorial or repressive 
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regimes in the course of democratic transition. Later on, the term also came to be used for 
processing war crimes and massive human rights abuses committed in violent conflicts.629 The 
concept has increasingly gained importance and gradually extended its meaning during the past two 
decades, and has been widely discussed by peace-building agencies engaged in human rights 
activities in war-torn societies. Today it covers the establishment of tribunals, truth commissions, 
settlement on reparations, and political and societal initiatives devoted to fact-finding, 
reconciliation and cultures of remembrance630 
 
According to Bell,631 the new law of TJ came as a result of the combination of peace agreement 
practice and legal developments. This “new law” draws on human rights law, humanitarian law, 
international criminal law and ordinary criminal law, but cannot be justified in terms of any one of 
these regimes on their own (and therefore remains controversial). The new law of TJ is a new 
developing practice rather than a new law. It finds some basis in soft law standards that are emerging 
with reference to TJ, and in the practice of states and international organisations.632 
 
The absence of an international convention covering the rule of TJ led to more complexities. 
Hence, there is a real need for a unified international concept of TJ that includes the main elements 
that should apply to guarantee successful TJ. These basic elements include the procedure of finding 
justice for victims and public disclosure. Furthermore, some states might adopt the amnesty 
mechanism. Although amnesty might be a good choice according to the situation of a given 
country, it should not apply to criminals who attack diplomats and embassies. The state sometimes 
might find it better to encourage citizens to forget about the past (i.e. prioritising ‘reconciliation’ 
over ‘retribution’). However, serious crimes, including crimes against diplomats, remain offenses 
in conventional criminal law as well as international human rights law, and victims are entitled to 
justice and reparation. 
 
During the occurrence of political transition after a period of violence and repression in a society, 
that society often finds itself faced with a difficult legacy of human rights violations, and therefore 
the state seeks to deal with the crimes of the past in order to promote justice, peace and 
reconciliation. Therefore, governments and NGOs activists pursue various judicial remedies and 
non-judicial methods to address human rights crimes; the latter are often more practically 
efficacious than the former, particularly in improving the material existence of victims. 
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There is also a close relationship between the concept of TJ and IHL, particularly as one of the 
most important goals of TJ is to address serious violations of human rights, which is the core of 
IHL. Indeed, TJ is the implementation of IHL arrangements to address those violations that emerge 
during armed conflict, holding accountable the perpetrators of such violations of the rules. 
However, the scope of the concept of TJ includes many more aspects; for example, it covers cases 
of human rights violations in times of peace as well, and includes many of the mechanisms that do 
not come under the remit of IHL, such as cleansing, institutional reform and reconciliation. 
 
Another aspect of the jurisprudence in which TJ overlaps with criminal law emerged during the 
Nuremberg Trials (held between November 20th 1945 and October 1st, 1946), and become 
definite and clear according to the principle of individual criminal responsibility, which is governed 
by criminal law.633 TJ addresses serious violations of human rights during war and peacetime; it 
could be regarded as a kind of international criminal law. The absence of a legal form of TJ means 
it can be applied to all cases (e.g. both political and criminal cases), although the reverse of this 
coin is that TJ can be considered highly subjective (and potentially political). 
 
According to a UN report on the rule of law and TJ for communities in the stages of conflict and 
post-conflict, the basic concepts in this area find primary sources in the Charter of the UN, along 
with modern international legal rules such as international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international refugee law.634 
 
Several scholars have different views of when exactly the concept of TJ emerged. Some argue that 
the concept emerged in 1995,635 while others stated that the first use of the term was in 1994, 
referring to the South Africa’s transition from apartheid to a democratic system of government.636 
This transition came after years of racial repression, and truth and justice were essential to realising 
a peaceful transition to democratic rule, which became a model for several societies undergoing 
post- conflict transition.637 
 
Other scholars stated that the concept of TJ emerged after the end of the First World War, when 
its main features became evident through the attention of the international community to dispute 
and conflict resolution, and the urging of countries to follow the criminal justice system to address 
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gross violations of human rights. However, the evolution of this concept and the crystallization of 
the basic components began with the formation of democracies that took place in some countries 
of the world during the late 19th century;638 the researcher agrees with this view. 
 
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is responsible for the policy area of TJ. The 
current incumbent, Navanethem Pillay, indicated that TJ efforts must be based on human rights and 
focused in a coherent manner on rights and needs of victims and their families, and the need for a 
national negotiation. Diplomats who have been affected as a result of acts of repression or conflict 
in the past need to express their views freely under TJ programmes, taking into account their 
experiences and determining their needs and entitlements.639 
 
However, the most frequent criticism of TJ pertains to remedies for victims of violations of human 
rights. Although human rights are considered universal, TJ has generally been applied to non-
Western, developing countries as part of Western cultural imperialism in international institutions, 
whereby its own mores and legal assumptions become universal requirements.640 Indeed, in 
foreign policy, the international community sometimes imposes on developing countries systems 
of justice that could not be countenanced in Western nations, such as the case of Iraq. 
 
The US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, established the Iraqi Special Tribunal arbitrarily.641 
It structurally ignored the mistakes of the US during their invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
accompanying human rights abuses, along with well-known, documented and acknowledged 
crimes of the US military such as the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.642 This is the repetition of a 
familiar pattern in post-conflict legal procedures whereby the victors are not subject to the justice 
they mete to others (for example, US military personnel were held to be exempt from 
prosecution during and after WWII).643 In practice, TJ frameworks are primarily concerned not 
with conflicts per se, but with atrocities committed by former regimes in the past, usually gross 
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violations of the civil and political rights of citizens under the jurisdiction of the offender.644 
However, TJ is not special kind of justice, it covers specific crimes including genocide, sexual 
violence, disappearance, massacre, torture and other war crimes, and it is also concerned with 
criminal acts.645 
 
TJ processes and mechanisms play a significant role in justice for the victims of conflict and 
human rights abuses.646 That is why the researcher believes it could play a significant role in 
finding justice for injured diplomats. The interests and inclusion of victims are the main aim of 
TJ. The contribution of the victims in the process of TJ and in the implementation of TJ 
processes could ensure its success as well as the success of the national reconciliation, 
establishing peace and accountability through appropriate TJ mechanisms.647 Furthermore, it 
could ensure the process of international and diplomatic reconciliation with the home countries of 
diplomats affected by the events. TJ is required to be sympathetic to the efforts of the 
international community to peacefully resolve conflict, resolve property disputes, promote 
human rights, keep personnel from fear and neediness, inspire economic progress and promote 
liable governance.648 Accountability for the abuse of human rights violations is important to 
support the rule of law in post-conflict. TJ, including trials, reparations, and truth commissions, 
helps strengthen the rule of law, particularly in post-conflict states. Brahm states that ‘For a 
peace process to succeed, it also must incorporate not just the combatants and victims, but the 
society generally’.649 
 
The impact of serious violations of human rights warrants the right of victims to see the punishment 
of the perpetrators, to find out the truth and to be awarded compensation. Because systematic 
violations of human rights affect society as a whole in addition to particular victims, it is the duty of 
states to ensure that, in addition to the fulfilment of these obligations, such violations are not 
repeated, and thus TJ assumes a special duty to reform the institutions that either had a hand in 
these violations or were unable to prevent them. 
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Societies that have suffered from human rights violations, genocide, or other forms of violations 
including crimes against humanity or the civil war resort to TJ in order to build a more 
democratic society. In order to achieve justice, several approaches are applied, for example: 
resorting to lawsuits for violations of individuals, as happened in Kosovo; the establishment of 
fact-finding initiatives to address past abuses, as happened in Sierra Leone; providing 
compensation to victims of human rights violations, as in Morocco; or previous operations 




Noted successes of the application of TJ approaches include achievements of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Darfur and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Lebanon, and new types of international and nationally established courts convened 
to try war crimes, and the extensive ness of the list of countries which exercise universal jurisdiction 
over crimes against humanity in other countries. Most importantly, the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court completes evidence of this new phase of the search for international 
justice, although the latter is often criticised for having a negligible practical impact thus far. 
 
International Human Rights law, International Humanitarian law, International Criminal law and 
International Refugee Law are the resources for achieving TJ aims. The principles of the IHRL 
have played a significant role in achieving justice in a transitional period in post-conflict as well as 
in reducing impunity. For example, Human Rights Law stated the responsibility of the state to 
achieve the goals of the TJ through investigating and prosecuting human rights abusers (i.e. 
criminals) and grave violations of International Humanitarian Law, as well as the state’s 
responsibility to take appropriate steps to avoid repetition of such violence in the future. Also, the 
right of injured diplomats to know the truth about past abuses has been emphasized, which is a 
relatively novel issue in law as a right. Furthermore, the right of these injured diplomats to get the 
reparations for abuses of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law has been well 
established. In order to fulfil these obligations, several measures have been taken, including 
international and national or mixed judicial mechanisms, reforming institutions, compensation and 
establishing truth commissions.650 
 
Despite the challenges that TJ faces and the limitations of its resources, it has played a significant 
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role in the international and internal community.651 There are potential benefits offered by truth 
and reconciliation commissions such as establishing the truth regarding the past, holding 
accountable the perpetrators of human rights violations, and providing a platform for victims 
including diplomats to narrate their experiences and to stimulate public debate. It can recommend 
compensation for victims who are diplomats, and propose legal and institutional reforms when 
necessary, as well as promoting societal reconciliation and helping to strengthen the democratic 
transformation.652 
 
TJ is an approach to systematic or massive violations of human rights that both provides redress 
to victims and creates or enhances opportunities for the transformation of the political systems, 
conflicts, and other conditions that may have been at the root of the abuses. 
 
A TJ approach thus recognizes that there are two goals in dealing with a legacy of systematic or 
massive abuse. The first is to gain some level of justice for victims. The second is to reinforce the 
possibilities for peace, democracy, and reconciliation. To achieve these two ends, TJ measures 
often combine elements of criminal, restorative, and social justice. 
 
TJ is justice adapted to the often-unique conditions of societies undergoing transformation away 
from a time when human rights abuse may have been a normal state of affairs. In some cases, 
these transformations will happen suddenly and have obvious and profound consequences. In 
others, they may take place over many decades.653 The concept of TJ is associated with periods 
of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoing of repressive 
predecessor regimes.654 TJ shares in the realization of truth, reparation and compensation for 
victims, in particular with regard to general political and civil issues. However, TJ is different from 
the traditional and frequent justice of being transitional. It may involve moving from an internal 
armed conflict or a civil war to a state of peace and democratic transition, or from the collapse of 
the legal system to its reconstruction. It is usually characterised by the reconstruction of the state 
from dictatorship to political and democratic transition, ideally toward openness and pluralism. TJ 
is essentially in contradiction to the path of criminal justice (both at the national and international 
level), although the choice of the first route does not mean excluding the second route, especially 
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for the victims and the impunity of the perpetrators.655 
 
TJ can be regarded as a set of measures that must be taken by a state that has emerged from 
conflict or revolution and has suffered serious violations of human rights. The main obstacle to its 
implementation is the government’s unwillingness or inability of the state to do so. The problems 
of the past are often more complex than the ability to solve them with one initiative or action without 
any truth or reparation efforts. 
 
4.3 The Purpose and Importance of TJ 
 
The primary objective of TJ is to end impunity and establish the rule of law in the context of 
democratic governance.656 TJ addresses challenges for societies emerging from violent pasts, i.e. 
bringing perpetrators to justice without endangering democratic progress; developing judicial or 
third party fora capable of resolving conflicts; and working out reparations.657 TJ creates or 
enhances opportunities for the transformation of the political systems, conflicts, and other 
conditions that may have been at the root of the abuses.658 
 
If applied in a manner consistent with international guidance (including diplomats as victims of 
human rights abuses), TJ measures have the potential to mitigate the risk of further violence against 
diplomats, promote internal and international security, strengthen the rule of law, encourage 
respect for immunity of diplomats and address the needs of injured diplomats.659 Applying TJ to 
diplomats will provide some form of justice. For example, through TJ mechanisms a serious 
investigation of violations against diplomats can be conducted. In addition, it imposes suitable 
sanctions on those responsible for the violations, and ensures reparation for the victims of the 
violations.660 Furthermore, applying TJ enables victims to know the truth about what happened 
and why the diplomats were targeted, acknowledges injured diplomats ’ suffering, holds 
perpetrators accountable, compensates for past wrongs, and prevents future abuses against 
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Based on these considerations, the researcher prefers applying TJ to find justice for diplomats rather 
than the normal justice because of the mechanisms of TJ, which in the criminal law context can 
punish offenders to ensure there is no impunity. The state responsibility aspect can be dealt with 
through diplomatic negotiations between the two states (e.g. the US and Libya), or at the ICJ if 
negotiations fail. 
 
The truth commission is an important mechanism of TJ, which investigates crimes against 
diplomats. Truth commissions are set up to discover facts about broad patterns of abuse in order 
to increase understanding and acknowledge the size of atrocities committed, and to address 
changes needed to prevent future abuse. They are different to criminal investigations in that they 
focus on both victims and perpetrators – to get to the bottom of abuses committed against whom 
and why. This differs from a prosecutor’s focus on individual perpetrators who committed specific 
crimes. Some of the main reasons to establish a truth commission include establishing facts about 
violations of the past, acknowledge past abuses, restore victims’ dignity and respond to some 
of their major needs, prevent future abuses by recommending reparations or institutional reforms, 
and to promote accountability and justice.662 
 
There are relationships between the truth commission and internal or international prosecution. A 
truth commission is complementary to national and international prosecutions, not a substitute for 
them.663 They are two sides of the same coin: transitional justice. 
 
The responsibility of the receiving state to protect diplomats should be met, as examined in Chapter 
5 in detail. States should make an effort to ensure their obligations have been met. The state 
sometimes after a revolution loses control over some territory (as happened in Libya), and it may 
be unable to punish offenders through the mechanisms of TJ. It should be recalled that when states 
fail to charge criminals then the hybrid courts can play an important role to avoid impunity. It is 
clear then that the main aim of TJ is to redress impunity. 
 
4.4 Forms of TJ 
4.4.1 Overview 
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The concept of TJ brings together two concepts: justice and transitional, but the meaning and 
semantic accuracy of the concept means to achieve justice during the transitional stage in the state, 
for example what happened in Chile (1990), Guatemala (1994), South Africa (1994), Poland 
(1997), Sierra Leone (1999), East Timor (2001) and Morocco (2004). The lack of definition led 
to every society applying TJ in a different way in accordance with what was suitable for its situation. 
 
TJ measures usually take place in situations where national and international efforts are targeted 
at enhancing the rule of law generally. The UN works to support post- conflict societies by 
strengthening national systems for the administration of justice and security, including official and 
informal societal resolution conflict, settlement processes, building capacity and providing 
technical advice and assistance. Due regard should be given to indigenous and informal traditions 
for administering justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their vital role and to do so in 
conformity with international legal standards. TJ measures, such as prosecution initiatives and 
institutional reform, are interdependent with these broader efforts. The UN must ensure that 
transitional justice programmes, by definition exceptional and of limited duration, are coordinated 
and positively reinforce the broader justice and security reform initiatives so as to strengthen the 
entire rule of law architecture of the country and, if applicable, the overarching peace-building 
framework.664 
 
The reconciliation aspect of TJ should not be confused with passivity regarding prosecution of 
alleged offenders; TJ firmly asserts that those who committed mass atrocities in times of conflict 
need to be punished, but it holds that this cannot be easily achieved or attain the wider desired 
results (societal impacts) without necessary prerequisite steps and processes. The core processes 
of TJ are truth commissions to investigate in the crimes of abuse of diplomats’ safety in order to 
inform society about the truth of what happened during the conflict. 
 
Under international law these processes of TJ are an obligation of the receiving State. These 
processes are important to do justice to the injured diplomats victims. TJ investigates cases, 
prosecutes alleged offenders, punishes criminals, determines and allots adequate reparation, and 
invokes accountability for past crimes as an obligation of the receiving state according to 
international law.665 
 
In accordance with international law, TJ mechanisms need to seek to ensure that receiving states 
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undertake investigations and prosecutions of gross violations of human rights and serious violations 
of international humanitarian law, including attack against diplomats. Furthermore, they should 
guarantee the right of diplomat victims to compensations, the right of diplomat victims and sending 
state to know the truth about abuses, and guarantees of non-repetition of such abuses.666 
 
According to the UN Secretary General’s report TJ includes domestic, hybrid and international 
prosecutions; truth telling initiatives to determine and document violations that have occurred and 
promoting reconciliation within divided communities; reparations to diplomat victims, including 
collective and symbolic reparations; constructing a legacy and monuments for education of future 
generations, and institutional reform.667 As seen above, there are several forms of the TJ process. 
The most important ones are truth commission, prosecution initiatives, delivering reparations, 
and reforming institutions as explored below.668 
4.4.2 Truth Commissions 
 
Truth commissions are ‘bodies set up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights in 
a particular country which can include violations by the military or other government forces or 
armed opposition forces’.669 According to this definition, truth commissions are temporary 
appointees looking for a pattern of diplomats’ inviolability abuses in the past (particularly during 
conflict). This means that truth and reconciliation commissions must decide on appropriate 
specialists to investigate cases within a certain period. 
 
The truth commission is often established by local government with missions such as investigating 
past violations of diplomat’s inviolability and recording such crimes, and then reporting them.670 
 
Reparation of victim of diplomats or their states involves listening to their grievances, recognition 
of their suffering, and apologizing to them and compensating them and their families and 
rehabilitation, all in order to facilitate reconciliation and pardon. Commissions must also advise or 
carry out political and institutional reforms to ensure non-recurrence of violations and the 
establishment of democracy through constitutional reform, and through legal reform and the 
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reform of the security, judicial and media systems in the state. 
 
International law acknowledges the rights of injured diplomats and underscores the particular 
gravity of the violation of diplomats’ inviolability. In this aspect, and in terms of the concept of 
society’s right to know the truth, international law remains in development, because dictatorial 
regimes involved in gross violations of human rights have always sought to blur the facts through 
rewriting history and denying the facts of abuses. Therefore, the search for truth contributes to the 
historical record in order to avoid this kind of manipulation, helping victims to achieve closure such 
as by learning of the fate of missing individuals, or why some individuals were exposed to abuse. 
That can only come through access to information, the declassification of archives, and the 
investigation of the fate of missing diplomats. 
 
Many countries that experienced serious violations of human rights in the past adopted non-judicial 
fact-finding, which often takes the form of truth commissions. The subject of the truth has 
constituted one of the most important experiences of the major challenges in the democratic 
transition and for the following reasons: 
 
 
 The desire of the diplomats who are victims and their state to know who is responsible 
for violations and abuses, the fate of the disappeared and their places of burial. 
 The desire not to forget the past and to preserve collective memory. 
 The right of diplomats to know the truth about violations of diplomat’s 
inviolability. 
 
 More than 30 such truth commissions have already been established, including those of  
Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Peru, Ghana, Morocco, El Salvador, Guatemala, Timor-Leste and 
Sierra Leone.671 Not all truth commissions’ experiences and reconciliations have been successful; 
some have decisively failed to reach the truth, to accord reparations to victims or to secure 
democratic transformations, as in the cases of Haiti, Sri Lanka and Nigeria, as well as 
investigation committees on disappearances in Algeria.672 These failures were despite the use of 
diplomatic channels, as in the case of Haiti.673 However, in case of East Timor, diplomatic channels 
were used to find a solution to the conflict, and diplomatic pressure on Indonesia played an 
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important role to bring stability.674 Some have achieved mixed results between failure and success, 
as in the case of Morocco. 
 
However, other truth commissions succeeded and helped to secure and strengthen democratic 
transition, as in South Africa, Chile, Argentina and Tunisia. 
 
After the January 2011 revolution, Tunisia witnessed a number of activities in the context of TJ. 
Two truth committees were formed after the defeat of the former regime in order to disclose the 
truth of the violations committed during the revolution and in the time of the former regime: the 
National Truth Commission on Corruption and Bribery, and the National Commission to 
Investigate the Violations Committed. The commissions, composed of national figures, jurists and 
representatives of civil society, played a key role in disclosing the truth about the abuses of the 
former regime and its corruption675. However, neither of these specifically addressed the cases of 
diplomats who were victims of violence. 
 
Truth commissions often focus on political and civil rights. However, despite the relatively limited 
mandates of TJ, it often has a significant impact on consideration of the main reasons of conflict 
or repression.676 Truth commissions play a major role in the resources of IHR, especially in the 
face of impunity, not only relating to criminal accountability but also in to the right to know the 
truth.677 
 
Truth commissions are often temporary, operating for a year or two, officially recognized and 
mandated by the state, deriving their powers from it. They may be prescribed in a peace agreement, 
as non-judicial bodies enjoying a degree of legal autonomy, usually arising in the midst of a 
process of transformation and transmission, from war either to peace or from authoritarian rule 
to democracy. They focus their attention on the past, investigating the patterns of certain violations 
committed over a period of time, not about one particular event, concluding their work to provide 
a final report with conclusions and recommendations, focused on human rights violations and as 
determined by the commonly understood international norms and standards.678 
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Clearly, truth commissions in war-torn societies, often helping those societies to develop from 
dictatorship to democracy, have played an important role. Its rule is not only related to the 
accountability of the criminal, but also to the comfort and cathartic closure it can offer to victims 
(including diplomats), in addition to honouring their right to know the truth, and the allocation of 
appropriate compensation. However, reality indicates that there are frequently delays in the 
proceedings whereby victims need to wait entire generations, and there is a large degree of 
official or unofficial impunity still accorded to alleged offenders. 
 
The truth commission’s role is not only a disclosure of the fact of violations and an investigation 
of them, but also an analysis of the violations from the perspective of human rights standards, 
considering the direct and indirect effects on diplomats victims and society, in order document this 
in the framework of the historical record of the country’s past in order to preserve the memory of 
individuals and groups so that lessons can be learnt from past events to avoid their repetition. 
 
4.4.3 Prosecutions Initiatives 
 
New governments instituted after conflict and massive human rights violations find themselves 
responsible for establishing security and balancing power between the old and new orders during 
a time of transition. Furthermore, the matter of violation and the victims who waiting for their rights 
needs to be redressed. Several states were able to charge criminals, while other countries could 
not. For example, the Nuremberg Trials were possible in post-war Germany only because the 
Allies had militarily defeated the Nazi regime and apprehended most of its leaders, therefore they 
possessed sufficient power to guarantee the trial of the leaders of the Third Reich. Conversely, 
when the transition to democracy occurred in Chile, the new government was unable to prosecute 
those who had committed abuses of human rights during military rule because of on-going military 
protection accorded to the former dictator Pinochet as the head of the armed forces.679 
 
A third approach is the amnesty one, as adopted by South Africa, which offers perhaps the best 
example of a genuine transition from a dictatorship to a democratic society without violence;680 
however, the researcher does not agree with this view as the black citizens of South Africa had no 
choice but to deal with the former government because of the latter’s monopoly of experience in 
operating the machinery of government as well as the powerful interests involved in the South 
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African economy. One notable feature of South Africa was that there was at least some form of 
organised opposition, albeit viewed as criminal under apartheid, whereas in other cases the lack 
of organised opposition can result in civil war (as in Libya after the defeat of the dictatorial 
Gaddafi regime in 2012) or a transient and unsustainable democracy (as in Egypt, where after the 
2011 revolution the Egyptians ultimately elected President Morsi, who was subsequently 
overthrown by a military coup in 2013 in a wave of military jingoism). This internal armed conflict 
affected the safety of the diplomats and their premises in both Egypt and Libya. Tunisia after the 
January 2011 revolution witnessed a number of activities in the context of TJ, including the trial 
of a number of former regime leaders and the passage of the amnesty law for the interest of former 
political prisoners.681 Similar to South Africa, in 1991, Lebanon adopted an amnesty approach, 
however the amnesty applied to political crimes excluded crimes against diplomats. 682 
 
In action, TJ can be either internal, international, or a combination of the two (hybrid).683 Some 
measure of international prosecution is generally considered necessary for those bearing the 
greatest responsibility for international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide.684 The credibility and legitimacy of prosecution initiatives mandates that they are 
conducted without discrimination and in an objective way, irrespective of who the supposed 
criminals may be. States have the main obligation to apply jurisdiction over these offenses. Thus, 
in relation to the supposed wrongdoings committed in the context of the conflict or repressive rule, 
TJ processes will aim to strengthen or progress national investigative and prosecutorial capacities, 
with independent and operative judges, adequate legal defence, witness and victims’ protection 
and support, and humane correctional facilities.685 
 
The state in post-conflict situations might not able to mount a prosecution; in this situation, it can 
contribute to the International Criminal Court. For example, the Darfur Court failed to prosecute 
alleged criminals in human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations committed 
during the conflict. Regardless of the form the prosecution takes, it must be based on a clear 
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obligation to fight against impunity, focus on the needs of victims, and take into account 
international standards of fair courts.686 
 
Impunity has been fought not only by internal jurisdictions, but also by the international 
community. That is why the accountable perpetrators of crimes against war, humanity and 
genocide are not limited within their own jurisdictions. The international community can also take 
action under the principle of universal jurisdiction to ensure that justice is done. International law 
has played a significant role in fighting the impunity. For example, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were 
established to deal with atrocities including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as 
well as making international individuals accountable for such crimes. 
 
The investigation and prosecution of international crimes (including genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes) is an essential component of TJ. This fact is rooted in the international 
legal obligations arising from the Nuremberg Tribunal and developed with the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Investigating and prosecuting 
influential leaders (both political and military) helps strengthen the rule of law and sends a strong 
message that crimes of this kind will never be tolerated in a society that respects rights. Trials 
continue to be a major demand for victims. When done in ways that reflect the needs and 
expectations of victims, they can play a vital role in restoring their dignity and achieving justice.687 
 
Hybrid tribunals were established in the cases of the War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, and the Crime Panels of the District Court of Dili in East Timor.688 
Accountability for human rights violations is important to support the rule of law in post-conflict 
scenarios. TJ, including trials, reparations and truth commissions, helps strengthen the rule of 
law.689 Libya turned recently to apply the hybrid tribunals, as explained later in this chapter. 
 
Others established a special court to charge the offenders of human rights abuses, such as in the 
case of Iraq. However, the court’s purpose was limited to charge the offenders of the previous 
regime (of Saddam Hussein), and measures to implement TJ since 2003 have been largely 
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unsuccessful because TJ in Iraq was selective justice (i.e. it did not acknowledge the culpability of 
other Iraqi and international offenders during the period of the former regime or the aftermath of 
the invasion). That is why it cannot be described as a project to transition from dictatorship to a 
fair democratic system. The focus was on trial and punishment, while other basic forms were left 
out. While the Ba’athist regime is conventionally considered Sunni, it in fact included members 
and collaborators from all of Iraq’s ethnic groups and minorities. While the Ba’athist regime 
committed numerous violations of the human rights of all Iraqi citizens, but the TJ applied in Iraq 
was limited to the crimes committed against the Kurds. While these were the most egregious, 
including ethnic cleansing and the Anfal Genocide, the uncomfortable fact that the regime was 
supported by the US and most of the international community at the time was not widely 
acknowledged, and the grievances of Arab Shias and Arab Sunnis against the Ba’athist regime 
were not addressed.690 The grievances of the Shia community, catalysed by Iranian influence and 
the de- Ba’athification of politics, ensuring strong Shia sectarianism in the government 
(particularly after 2005), thus subsequent efforts by the Iraqi government to promote 
reconciliation failed.691 
 
In regard to truth-seeking, many criminal files are still open and no investigations have been 
undertaken to determine who exactly was responsible. Who was in charge of the mass graves in 
the time of Saddam Hussein? Which group targeted Iraqi pilots after 2003? Who is responsible 
for the killing of more than 300 journalists? Who bombed the Shia holy shrine in Samarra in 2006, 
which was the cause of the outbreak of strife between Sunnis and Shiites?692 The Sunnis were 
accused of doing this, while America claimed that Iran was behind it as a false flag attack, in order 
to provoke sectarian conflict.693 
 
In terms of reparation, the question might arise of whether the easiest solution available to TJ – 
the award of financial compensation – can compensate for the violation of diplomats’ inviolability 
(though often appropriate in itself for material loss associated with violation of inviolability of 
diplomats). 
 
4.4.4 Delivering Reparation 
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Reparation programmes seek to address the systematic violations of diplomats’ inviolability 
violation by offering a set of material and symbolic benefits to injured diplomats. The UN General 
Assembly confirmed the right of victims to reparation in Resolution 147/60, entitled: Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law Violations and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law. 
 
The processing of reparation can take a variety of forms, including restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. Experience have proven that the most 
successful programmes of reparation are those designed in consultation with affected communities, 
especially the victims (injured diplomats). The UNHCR provides technical assistance in the design 
and implementation of reparations programmes, supports the participation of NGOs in 
discussions on reparation, and calls for full implementation of reparation. For example, in 
Cambodia, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia established a process for the 
participation of victims, which allows victims who have become a party to the claimed reparation 
to ask for both moral and collective reparation; this was under the observation of the UN. 
 
Another good example is the state of the Nepal. The Government of Nepal embarked on an 
‘interim relief to the victims of conflict program’, which expected reparation to develop a more 
comprehensive policy in conjunction with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, 
there were not any cases involving diplomats. 
 
Furthermore, the truth commission in Timor-Leste recommended the development of a programme 
for reparation. In 2005, Timor-Leste and Indonesia jointly embarked on a new TJ relationship 
with bilateral truth commissions, with a diplomatic mandate. The Commission of Truth and 
Friendship of East Timor and Indonesia conducted truth-seeking activities for promoting 
reconciliation between East Timor and West Timor, and between Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The 
Commission’s ostensible goal was to promote sustainable peace between the two countries.694 
 
Colombia has a more active programme for reparation whereby victims could under the Justice and 
Peace Law; submit to claims of redress against a former fighter whose trial has ended. However, 
the law is applied in a limited scope and the court decisions in this regard were limited to two 
resolutions. In addition, the victims of human rights abuse committed by illegal armed groups can 
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file for reparation under the Colombia Development Program, which started in 2008 and finished 
its mission in 2010. This programmes granted several victims reparations, however it failed to apply 
to crimes of the officers of the State. Efforts made by the UN to develop the Colombian Program 
of Reparation, including the legislation whereby expropriated lands are restored to their owners 
(victims), adopted by Parliament in May 2011.695 However, injured diplomats were not involved 
in this programme. 
 
As explained previously, the TJ process in Tunisia also defined the focus of reparation and 
compensation programmes, especially for the benefit of the ‘martyrs’ and victims of the revolution, 
which was established by Decree No. 1 of 19 February 2011 on amnesty and Decree No. 97 of 
24 October 2011, January 2011 and its victims, which was later expanded to include victims of 
the mining basin. These decrees provide for victims’ compensation, treatment, and education for 
their families and free transportation.696 In Iraq, also the reparation was delivered to the victims. 
However, compensation of victims has been given indiscriminately and unfairly.697 Victims have 
been reported to be facing difficulties to get their right of compensation, and thousands of families 
must wait to have their files considered by the Political Prisoners Foundation.698 TJ in Iraq was 
retaliatory, which included not only those who attacked human rights, but also those who belonged 
to the Ba’ath Party and all those who worked in the important sectors of the state, even if they are 
not accused of any conventional crime. For the Sunni community in particular the political isolation 
of de-Ba’athification in Iraq was a disaster, which resulted in the rise of non-state and non-political 
militias – including ISIS – rising to fill the void of the lack of political leadership.699 Justice must 
be restorative and not retaliatory. Consequently, Iraqi TJ cannot be described as a real case of 
TJ, and the Iraqi government could not achieve peace and stability in the region. 
 
Reparations programmes aim fundamentally to partially redress diplomats’ inviolability 
abuses.700 Under TJ, states were held responsible for atrocities and wrongful acts against their 
own citizens, which were regarded as an internal affair. Moreover, under the international law 
principle of state responsibility for injury to aliens when such states committed wrongful acts 
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against nationals of other states, the offending state may allow for claims by way of emphasizing 
its own rights. 
 
After WWII, international human rights were no longer an internal matter. The international law 
framework progressively transformed from a law of involvement to one of cooperation, 
consequent to the establishment and development of the UN and the ratification of its Charter as 
the principal instrument of international law. This transformed human rights toward 
internationalization, reiterated by the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948.701 
IHRL and ICL are the essential resources of redress and reparation for the victims of attack on 
diplomats. IHRL confirms the right of injured diplomats as a victim of human rights abuse to pursue 
their claims before national and international justice mechanisms, with the right to remedy and 
reparation.702 
 
It is a fact that the traditional concept of responsibility of State has been altered because of the 
embodiment of human rights in international law. The international law Commission, in its current 
form of the law of state responsibility, focused on the wrongful acts of the state against other 
states. Under international human rights and humanitarian law, obligations of a state require legal 
consequences, not only concerning other states, but also regarding individuals and groups of 
persons who are under the jurisdiction of the state. The incorporation of human rights into state 
responsibility has brought about the basic principles that, in cases of breaches of international 
duties, redress and reparation are due not only to states but also to the harm suffered diplomats. 
 
Under international law, the responsibility for reparation is twofold: firstly, the receiving state 
needs to apply appropriate internal remedy for crimes under its own legislation and obligations; 
secondly, the receiving state should provide redress for harm suffered by injured diplomats in the 
form of compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and assurances of non-repetition.703 In this 
regard international law confirms the importance of the reparation as one of the effective remedies 
and as a right of the injured diplomats rather than a duty of states. For example, the Human Rights 
Committee stated that ‘without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, 
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the obligation to provide effective remedy… is not discharged’.704 According to international law, 
states are responsible for wrongful acts and subsequent reparations.705 This principle has been 
confirmed by international courts and tribunals through judgments, for example in the Chorzow 
Factory case, the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that ‘It is a 
principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make 
reparation in an adequate form’.706 According to international law, violations of human rights and 
International Humanitarian Law give injured diplomats a right to reparation, which is generally 
incumbent on the offending state. However, applying this right and corresponding obligation is 
subject to the internal law and policy of such states.707 This means that IHL obligations are first 
subject to internal legal systems for implementation; however, when the internal legal system 
breaks down during times of conflict, it becomes necessary to rely on TJ for the implementation 
of IHL principles. 
 
Restorative justice practices are intended to rebuild not only the individual level but also at the social. 
A procedure brings together the parties affected by an event of wrongful act to cooperatively 
decide how to deal with the outcome of the happening and its consequences for the forthcoming. 
The issue of reparations after human rights violations are a delicate subject. Double efforts need to 
be taken in order to redress the problems of the past, which is why in order to avoid re-
victimization when pursuing redress, extreme caution must be taken.708 The victims of serious 
rights abuses have massive suffering during and after conflicts, which is why multifaceted 
resolutions need to be formed. Injured diplomats must involve themselves in finding solutions, 
because it would help find the most effective remediation. Although, financial reparations might 
significantly improve access to the necessities of life, an apology is the supreme requirement of 
many victims, above all else; this entails emotional or symbolic reparations for civil plaintiffs such 
as dignity, emotional relief, participation in the social policy, or institutional reordering, all of 
which are of greater long-term significance for societies than immediate monetary compensation. 
 
On most occasions, civil plaintiffs express their satisfaction with the procedures of reparation, 
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including financial reparation, accountability of criminals, apology for injured diplomats, and other 
effective reparation needs when appropriate and relative to the seriousness of the abuse and the 
situations of each occasion.709 Such reparations have several forms, such as rehabilitation, 
restitution, compensation, gratification and assurances of non-repetition. Furthermore, the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 states the rights of physical, 
cognitive and psychological recovery, rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons with 
disabilities in the event of exploitation and abuse.710 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
confirmed that the recognition, restoration and accountability are the demands of the victims as well 
as some degree of financial reparation. Furthermore, protection of the injured diplomats as the 
victims of human rights and providing for the reparation of damages are the core aims of IHRL.711 
 
Reparation is one of the mechanisms of the TJ to compensate injured diplomats, regardless of the 
criminal responsibility of the perpetrator. Both the responsibility of state and the responsibility 
of the individual might be invoked under the assumptions of TJ when considering attacks on 
diplomats. Receiving States are responsible for their human rights abuses or any a breach of 
international obligations.712 
 
Some victims might find the reparation is a good mechanism of justice. However, others find it is 
inadequate, because they are afraid that financial compensation somehow expiates the criminal 
offence perpetrated against them. For example, several mothers of the sons who disappeared 
during Argentine military Plaza de Mayo refused to accept financial compensation because they 
thought it would lessen the importance of their claims for justice (i.e. the criminal prosecution of 
alleged perpetrators).713 Such doubts are based on the victims’ feeling that their government does 
not really represent their interests, thus it resorts to blood money to avoid the embarrassment of 
victims’ campaigns. However, other scholars believe that the true value of reparations is not their 
monetary worth, but their social and religious significance.714 
In state redress for victims of violations, the main demands of the latter are generally for their 
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suffering to be recognized and their dignity to be restored, with government admissions and 
apologies, and public acknowledgment. Furthermore, after the abuses that the victim faced, the 
victim might suffer from other kinds of abuse such as social ostracism. The victims for this reason 
want to re-join the society that rejected them. Moreover, victims may have other demands, such 
as commemorations and memorials.715 If victims are diplomats, who represent the sovereignty of 
their states, the sending state often demands reparation, which may consist of disowning the act, 
expressing regret, apologising to the injured state, punish the individuals responsible, and/or paying 
compensation for any material damage.716 TJ could be particularly instrumental in assisting injured 
diplomats to achieve truth and guarantees of non- repetition etc. 
 
Reparations programmes aim to guarantee the receipt of benefits by injured diplomats, regardless 
the level of the violation and the kind of the violation. There are several challenges that might face 
reparations programmes, frequently characterized by weak institutional capacity, fractured social 
relations, low levels of trust and a dearth of monetary resources.717 
 
However, the researcher finds that such programmes could be considered to be successful if they 
ensure that every victim actually receives the benefits, although not necessarily at the same level or 
of the same kind. If this is achieved, the programme is complete. Completeness refers to the ability 
of programmes to reach every victim, such as turning every victim into a beneficiary of some kind. 
Whether this happens depends, to some extent, on the way in which the categories of violations 
that give rise to benefits are determined. Hence, completeness can be approached only if the goal 
is articulated early on and steps meant to guarantee it are put in place from the very outset of the 
process and via the duration of reparations programmes. 
 
The most basic elements of TJ are based on IHL and HRL with the aim of supporting 
accountability for abuses, and to build on the principles of peace, democracy and considering the 
victims’ rights for redress, equity and design strategies based on the evolution of social, cultural, 
local political and historical elements. The competent authority charged with the implementation 
of these principles and foundations are local courts, where jurisdiction includes criminal cases 
(local and international) based on local laws and international laws, especially if the judiciary and 
internal law are unable to secure justice themselves. Nevertheless, if the judiciary and other legal 
apparatus are unwilling to prosecute those accused of a crime of violation of IHRL and IHL, then 
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a resort to international courts is warranted. 
 
4.4.5 Reforming Institutions 
 
Institutional reform is very important in guaranteeing the rights of injured diplomats. Post-conflict 
states often navigate a democratic transition in which justice and legislation are essential, which 
could include establish truth commissions and enacting laws which confirm the rights of victim and 
how to find justice for them. Justice is not limited to redress for crimes, but also as a way of coming 
to terms with the past and building a new future. 
 
Institutional reforms have to include both justice and security, preventing the recurrence of serious 
abuses of diplomats’ inviolability and the impunity of offenders, entailing vetting, identification 
and removal from public office of individuals responsible for abuse. Institutional reforms might 
contribute to non-repetition of abuse and longer-term reform. Reform might also include increasing 
the representation of different religious, ethnic, regional groups and women within institutions. 
Institutional reform is one of the most important forms of the TJ process. That TJ might be unable 
to prevent heinous crimes and human rights violations from occurring again without resorting to the 
reform of institutions. In other words, there is a positive relations hip between non-repetition of 
abuses and the reform of institutions applying the law through the TJ process.718 
 
For Libya, some institutional changes have been instituted to improve political and human rights 
conditions. The Libyan authorities enacted a number of important laws, the most important of 
which was the Libyan Anti-Terrorism Law (2014), as explained in the previous chapter, which 
specifically criminalizes attacks against diplomats, but which did not apply retroactively to the 
notorious attack on the US Ambassador in 2012, although the Law specifically referenced this 
incident. This was preceded by the Libyan Transitional Justice Act (2013), which affirms justice 
for victims of human rights abuses, but this did not specify diplomats. 
 
There are several factors that influence the approach of TJ that countries apply. Authorities must 
consider the circumstances surrounding the customs and traditions of the society in which TJ is 
applied, and the scope for democratisation and human rights progress that can be achieved in such 
contexts. Determining the most suitable TJ mechanism or combination of them for a given context 
is dependent on many factors as well as the unique circumstances of the abuse. Such questions as  
 ‘’Are crimes widespread, or focused on one region or ethnic group?  
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 Are many perpetrators responsible, or only a few?  
 Were the crimes acts of the state, of insurgents, or both?  
 Are the perpetrators still more or less in power, or has there been a clean transition to a 
new government?  
 Does the state have sufficient resources to implement a justice mechanism?  
 Are the courts credible?  
 Can the state afford individual reparations?”719 
 
Depending on the answers, certain options are more viable than others. The most important point 
is for a careful assessment to be carried out on the circumstances of the event(s) and the positions 
and interests of the victims, leaders, and the public. These are all required prior to a TJ mechanism 
being applied. Often the easiest way to determine different group needs is via consultations and, 
ideally, public debate on the different TJ options available.720 
 
It is important to acknowledge that each post-conflict situation is unique. As such, it needs different 
combinations of measures to address wrongs. Comparative information about how other countries 
approached similar post-conflict justice problems can help design and implement the most 
appropriate TJ strategy. No matter what violence and forms of abuse have taken place, similar 
questions crop up in the wake of past atrocities:721 a country’s decisions about how to deal with 
its past should depend on many things: the type of dictatorship or war endured, the type of crimes 
committed, the level of societal complicity, the nation’s political culture and history, the conditions 
necessary for dictatorship to reoccur, the abruptness of the transition, and the new democratic 
governments. 
 
States are therefore different in the way they apply TJ. No one model is appropriate for every 
case; there are few, if any, universal guidelines.722 Each country must carefully work out the 
substance or content, timing, and nature of national policies required to face difficult and often 
painful events in its past.723 While there is no universal blueprint, it has been suggested that one TJ 
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document can be designed for Arabic countries, due to the similar conditions and factors of 
countries throughout the MENA region.724 The judicial and non-judicial mechanisms of TJ differs 
from one territory to another, but they should share a common thread rendering them 
“comprehensive, complementary and coherent”. It is on that basis that TJ is able to perform a 
substantial part in consolidating peace and building a new and respectful society that honours the 
life and dignity of all members.725 
 
Most experiences of TJ indicate that knowing the truth was the greatest requirement of societies 
and victims. The families of victims were very interested to know the truth about why such abuses 
of human rights occurred, who committed them, and where the places of burial were. In addition, 
there was a desire to not blur the facts and to know the whole truth. However, there was no evidence 
that any of the states, which experienced TJ, found out the whole truth about past human rights 
abuses. This could be a theoretical rather than practical aim of TJ.726 Knowing the truth should be 
important for injured diplomats as well as their state and their families. Attacks on diplomats are 
attacks on the sovereignty of the sending state itself, as this thesis explained in Chapter 1. That is 
why knowing the truth is in the interests of the sending state and the receiving state, because it 
provides closure for all parties involved. In the case of attack on Ambassador Stevens, the truth is 
still unknown.727 There is an urgent need to address the case of Libya if TJ is to be achieved for 
Stevens, his family, the US and Libya itself. 
 
Several post-conflict countries attempted to apply the reconciliation and TJ system in order to 
achieve a convergence of views between the new government and supporters of the former regime. 
The international and domestic community are of importance in this transition, which is highly 
sensitive politically. TJ in post-conflict situations is new to Arab countries; however, it was 
welcomed as a culturally congruent and politically expedient solution to the dilemmas created by 
the Arab Spring from 2011, including its consistency with the principles of Sharia and ethics as 
well as international norms.728 The Arab Spring exposed, exacerbated and in some cases created 
continuing political tensions and internal conflicts throughout MENA, including Yemen, Libya, 
Syria, the Gaza Strip, Iraq and Egypt. However, other Arab countries achieved some post-conflict 
justice, such as Morocco and Bahrain. Actually, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
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(BICI) is the only a commission of inquiry in the Arab countries which can be described as a 
comprehensive commission.729 
 
Each Arab country follows a different approach and system of TJ, according to its culture and 
understanding of the concept. For example, Morocco established a ‘truth commission’, while 
Algeria adopted an ‘amnesty, peace and reconciliation’ programme. 
 
A notable stumbling block of TJ in the Arab world was identified by Bassiouni, who observed 
that in Arabic the term ‘transitional justice’ implies a temporary (and revocable) condition of 
justice rather than a permanent solution. However, the true meaning of TJ has now come to be 
understood in Arab societies and public discourse.730 The researcher disagrees with this 
assumption that the Arab nations are now neatly unpacking TJ and the notions of IHRL and citizens’ 
rights; traditionally, it was inconceivable for tyrannical and murderous despots in the Arab world 
to be held accountable for their crimes. Only successful prosecutions could demonstrate this 
notion, with accountability taking place and some victims getting reparation. 
 
Drawing on the universal Arab-Islamic heritage of MENA, the religious and legal precedent of 
the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (6 H/ 628 CE (is germane to the explant ion of the concept of 
reconciliation in Arab discourse. Briefly, the nascent Muslim community, having been expelled 
from Mecca and living as refugees in the open desert and in Abyssinia prior to establishing a city-
state in Madinah, went to perform the ancient Ishmaelite custom of Hajj. Although non-violent, 
this was perceived as provocative by the custodians of Mecca (the Quraish tribe and their allies). 
There was deep distrust between the sides, following closely after an attempt by the Quraish to 
terminate the Muslims in Madinah, and at one point the Muslims believed their envoy Uthman ibn 
Affan (later the third caliph) had been murdered by the Meccans. Despite the profound mistrust 
between the two sides, they managed to agree that: people would be free to follow Islam, but any 
member of Quraish who converted without the permission of his or her guardian must be returned 
to Mecca, while apostates would be free to leave the Muslims in Madinah; and that there would 
be no war for ten years.731 Although this later proved to be strategically beneficial for the Muslims 
(who did not themselves break the Treaty), it was perceived at the time to be a major concession 
by the Prophet who also consented to the demand of Quraish that he not be referred to by his 
epithet ‘Messenger of God’ in the document. This reconciliation, is similar to the modern concept 
                                                          
729 Bassiouni (n 630) 325. 
730 Ibid 325. 
731 Abd-Al-Hakhem Sadaq, Reconciliation of Khudaibiya - Political studies in the Biography of the Prophet 




Many of the Arab countries today need to enter into a new phase of TJ, especially those countries 
that have seen significant violations of the human rights standards, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya 
and Yemen. The fundamental challenge facing these countries is TJ, and how they deal with serious 
violations in the past to help a peaceful transition to the stage of a pluralist democracy rather than 
being plagued by political instability, and sliding into civil war. 
 
The Arab Spring countries need to decide whether the TJ will lead to conciliatory or punishment 
justice. The punishment of the perpetrators of violations is of particular help victims overcome the 
violations they suffered during the former regime, but dictators typically depend on a particular 
group identity and affiliation, thus punitive measures can stoke the flames of conflict. However, 
this research focuses on Libyan TJ and how it is struggling to achieve justice in a post-conflict 
scenario. 
 
It is clear from the discussion of the forms of TJ above that the states applied different forms of 
TJ. Tunisia witnessed a successful transition to democracy alongside its application of different 
forms of TJ, including the truth commission, reparation, institution reform and prosecution. 
Tunisia’s experience was different from other experiences in MENA where different forms of TJ 
were applied, including prosecution, amnesty for the interest of former political prisoners, truth and 
compensation, and reparation and compensation programmes. For example, the experience of Iraq 
was the worst experience in MENA.732 It emerged from the decision of another state (US) to 
transfer Iraq from a dictatorship to a democracy. In 1998 the US Administration issued the Iraq 
Liberation Act.733 This is the only law in the world that has been issued by a state to change the 
regime of another state. Article 3 of this law stated that ‘Policy of the United States is to support 
efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussain from power in Iraq and to replace that 
regime’. Also, paragraph b of this Article stated that ‘The US president is to provide military and 
financial support to that aim, additionally to provide radio and television facilities ’.734 
The US drew the plan for the future of Iraq and appointed Iraqis to implement its plan, including a 
process of TJ beginning with prosecutions, de-Ba’athification (including purging officials who 
were not accused of any conventional crimes) and the dissolution of the Iraqi Army. This was 
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particularly significant in Iraq, which like Egypt and Turkey conventionally has a large standing 
army that plays an important role in the state. The prosecution approach was selective, as discussed 
previously, ignoring the crimes and human rights abuses committed by the US and its allies 
(including Iraqi opposition militias) during the invasion of Iraq. Also, Iraq adopted the reparation 
approach, however, this approach was based on discrimination that excluded many families.735 
The TJ experience in Iraq was vengeful.736 
 
On the other hand, sectarian tensions in the country caused some state institutions to act in bad 
faith with regard to TJ, which led to further violence in the past years. The partisan way the 
government dealt with Sunni and Shia militias is further evidence of this situation.737 For instance, 
Sunni armed groups are targeted as terrorist groups, while equivalent Shia paramilitary 
organisations, such as the Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, were received material and political support from the 
former Prime Minister Nouri Al- Maliki’s government.738 The successive cycles of violence in Iraq 
have led to additional complications in the TJ project, as the executioner and victim have traded 
roles. This rearrangement of power has deepened the gap between Iraq’s communities and made 
it harder for parties to find ways to achieve justice.739 It seems Libya has adopted a similar 
approach of Iraqi TJ. The Libya government did not take lessons from the wrong steps taken by 
Iraq, which led to disaster and an on-going civil war. 
 
4.5 The Practice of TJ in Western European Countries 
 
The war for the unification of Ireland has been going on for centuries, but this study is concerned 
with the protracted violence seen in the Northern Ireland conflict during the late 20th century.740 
The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement was signed in 1998, and was born from peace negotiations 
chaired by US Senator George Mitchell.741 It was highly successful in stopping the cycle of 
violence, although it did not contain a formal mechanism t o  deal with former abuses and 
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violations.742 It is a multi-party agreement which was done with a majority of Northern Ireland’s 
political parties, and a constitutional settlement where the governments of the UK and Ireland 
agreed to introduce and support changes in British legislation as well as the Constitution of Ireland 
as was required for changes in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. 
 
The Agreement sought to resolve many issues relating to the conflict. It made provision for 
“devolved political institutions, reform of policing, security and justice, decommissioning, and 
enhanced protection of human rights.743” Support for the Agreement by the British and Irish 
governments and most of Northern Ireland’s political parties was seen as a marked and significant 
turning point in the conflict.744 TJ in Northern Ireland affected practically all aspects of societal 
function and identity. Transition in the province has been a long, ongoing and organic process, 
with elements of reform and change which ran throughout the course of the conflict.745 However, 
as being largely “forward-looking”, it does not set out a strategy for dealing with the province’s 
past, nor does it propose a structured mechanism for truth recovery or reconciliation. While it 
recognises victims’ rights and acknowledges the necessity to provide financial and other support, 
it does not state specifically what the government is required to do beyond providing ‘sufficient 
resources to meet needs of victims’. There are commitments to supporting reintegration of 
prisoners and community-based initiatives to help young people facing difficulties as a result of 
the Troubles. Similarly, the Agreement pledged support to organisations that aim to improve 
reconciliation and mutual understanding.746 
 
The Weston Park Agreement (2001), negotiated between governments of the UK and Ireland 
was an agreement to fill certain holes identified in the Good Friday Agreement. Under the Weston 
Park Agreement the two governments were committed to measures including a review of the 
Parades Commission, a commitment to look at issues surrounding police reform and policing 
arrangements, an intention to consider the status of ‘on the runs’, and a formal investigation by a 
selected judge into some unexplained deaths. The St Andrews Agreement (2006) between the 
UK and Ireland governments cleared the path for a return of devolution in Northern Ireland in 
2007. In addition, it established a Victims’ Commissioner, announced an initiative to aid 
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employment and reintegration of ex-prisoners, and addressed a number of specific issues with 
relevance to the transition. These included “support for Irish and Ulster-Scots languages, passing, 
equality legislation, the powers of the NIHRC, deprivation and poverty”. 
 
The Hillsborough Agreement (2010) negotiated between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
and Sinn Fein allowed the devolving of policing and justice powers to the Northern Ireland 
Executive. In doing so, it touched on several of the issues relevant to the transition, including 
interests of victims, and introduction of a Victims’ Code of Practice would be. While these 
agreements did not address in detail past human rights abuses, they did not exclude a possibility 
of the development of such policies. A review of peace agreements in other national areas shows 
that the text of one agreement can serve as a starting point, and that future consultation, debate 
and policy work must follow. Indeed, there can sometimes be advantages in leaving issues to be 
worked through during the consultation process, rather than having policies limited by constrained, 
and often pressured, political negotiations.747 
 
The North Ireland experience involve providing justice to the victims of past abuses of human 
rights, which was part of addressing physical and psychological injuries under the Victims and 
Survivors Northern Ireland Order 2006.748 In 2012 the Victims and Survivors Service was 
established in replacement of the Northern Ireland Memorial Fund and the Community Relations 
Council Victims and Survivors Programme. This service came into being in April 2012 and is the 
awarding body for funding for survivors. Regarding the issue of gravesites alluded to previously, 
in 1999 the TJ procedure included establishing the Independent Commission for the Location of 
Victims’ Remains. The task of this Commission is to obtain information on the whereabouts of 
remains of victims, and disclosing such to aid finding of victim’s remains. At least 17 individuals 
are believed to have been murdered and secretly buried; nine bodies have thus far been located. 
Several memorial projects have tried to acknowledge those murdered and give comfort to their 
families. 
 
Other remembrance initiatives include a £300m redevelopment proposal for the notorious Maze 
prison which will include a conflict resolution centre. The centre is expected to undertake 
education and research, provide a venue for conferences on conflicts, and include exhibition hall 
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and archive. Under the aim of non-repetition of the action of abuse of human rights, the 21st of 
June has been set as the “annual Day of Reflect ion”, promoted by the NGO Healing through 
Remembering. This is one of a number of initiatives by the group that aims to create opportunities 
for personal reflection, to acknowledge grief caused by the conflict and to reflect on personal 
attitudes.749 Several non-governmental storytelling projects have been established. Also, 
information, research and analysis of the conflict and politics in Northern Ireland was provided by 
universities and websites and archive.750 
 
The UK government made a public apology for ‘unjustified and justifiable’ killings in 
Derry/Londonderry in January 1972; Prime Minister David Cameron also issued an official 
apology to the Finucane family in 2011 and again in 2012 for the state collusion in the murder of 
Pat Finucane. More than 450 qualifying former prisoners have been released on licence.751 There 
is also further action required for victims and survivors in the area of reparations. Whilst most 
injured or bereaved received compensation just after the event, many live in poverty now as a result 
of these initial events. Some have had no compensation, for differing reasons. One of the obstacles 
to progression in this area is defining what constitutes a victim, which is controversial. For example, 
the reaction to the recommendation by the Consultative Group in the Past regarding reparations 
overshadowed the many other recommendations made in that report. There would be merit in 
carrying out at least some process of reflection and consultation surrounding reparation.752 
 
The experiences of Poland and Hungary witnessed peaceful democratic transitions based on the 
negotiation between the previous government and the new government. In this regard several 
political and constitutional exchanges were made, especially after the debates and conversations 
between the previous regime and opposition in 1988 and 1989.753 For example, in Hungary the 
most important development to achieving TJ was that the Socialist Labour Party accepted 
recognition of political multiplicity and abandoning authoritarianism or monopoly of power.754 
In 1989, Hungary’s Parliament passed a special law granting citizens the right to demonstrate and 
to gatherings which led to establishing several political parties and NGO’s. Finally, the power 
peacefully transferred to the opposition.755 Similarly, in Poland the negotiations conducted 
between the government and the opposition was represented by the Solidarity movement. The 
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requirements of the opposition were simple and were all about fundamental human rights. This is 
similar to the requirements of the protestors of the Arab Spring revolution. Between 1980 and 
1981, the Solidarity Syndicate raised the issue of abolishing censorship, demanding freedom of 
the press, allowing the opposition to work in the media, abolishing the monopoly of power and 
regulation, establishing freedom of assembly, independent local administration and economic 
reform.756 The government recognized this movement and started negotiations with them. In June 
1989 Solidarity came to power and defeated the previous government at the elections which 
Solidarity won.757 
 
4.6 Theoretical and Practical Development of Transitional Justice 
 
 
While modern TJ is inevitably traced to the Nuremberg Trials, its current form began to be 
delineated during the 1970s in Greece, then in follow- ups to military rule in Argentina and Chile 
through the committees of fact-finding in Argentina and Chile in 1983 and 1990 (respectively), 
and then in many countries in South America.758 The most famous example is the experience of 
South Africa, which pioneered the Truth and Reconciliation concept of TJ in the mid-1990s to 
redress the structural oppression of black people in South Africa. 
 
The objective of giving examples of the application of TJ is to highlight key issues and lessons 
learned from previous empirical experiences the promotion of justice and the rule of law in conflict 
and post-conflict societies. This section explores the examples of successful practice of TJ in 
Morocco, South Africa and Argentina due to their generally successful experiences, which other 
states (especially in MENA) should take into account when applying TJ according to their own 
circumstances, possibly involving choosing multiple elements from different experiences, which 
can be derived with regard to TJ mechanisms to find justice for injured diplomats, although 
diplomats were not specifically considered in these cases (which underpins the rationale for this 




Morocco was notable among the former French colonies (or regions of interest) in North Africa 
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for its ability to maintain control over situations of political tension and internal disturbance in a 
troubled region.759 Citizens considered a threat to governance were subjected to persecution, 
including torture, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance. However, in November 2003 
significant steps were taken to redress this legacy. As a result of such efforts the Truth Commission 
for Moroccan Reconciliation was established by King Mohammed VI.760 In January 2004 this 
commission began to undertake its duty of investigating the crimes of the violation of human rights 
and international humanitarian laws committed under the previous regime and to allocate 
compensation to the victims and their families. The experience of Morocco is unique because the 
new king is the son of the previous king, and the son is essentially investigating the wrongdoing of 
his father and his government. Furthermore, several members of the Commission were themselves 
victims. Moreover, this commission enjoys the authority to offer the compensation directly to 
victims. For these reasons, the Commission enjoys the ability to exercise a significant impact at the 
international and regional levels over the short and long term. In the period in which the Commission 
carried its work it assembled an archive including 22,000 personal testimonies of victims and their 
families. The Commission also held various conferences, meetings and seminars on a large number 
of issues, which opened the way to understand the past of Morocco, and allowed victims to speak 
about their suffering to others through public hearings. It also documented the roots of the crisis 
and this analysis helped Morocco to come to terms with its past. 
 
After gaining independence from France in 1956, the various factions in the revolutionary 
movement began to vie for power and influence. To maintain its supremacy, the monarch inflicted 
large-scale repression, called the ‘Years of Lead’. King Mohammed V was punitive in his 
suppression of all opposition to his rule, with a significant number of arrests and the persecution of 
entire regions deemed to be subversive. For example, Jabala Al-Raff Al-Shamiliya areas were key 
in the anti- French struggle, but their attempts to oppose the persecution of the regime resulted in 
them being crushed by the Royal Armed Forces. This had a long-term, debilitating impact on the 
region, which remains plagued by unemployment, lack of investment and isolation from the rest of 
the Morocco.761 When King Hassan II succeeded to the throne in 1961 he adopted a less severe 
style of repression comprising sanctions and lavish rewards. It was a successful approach that 
led many opponents into compliance. However, by the 1970s the regime had resorted to massive 
human rights abuses, particularly after failed attempts to overthrow the regime in 1970 and 1971. 
                                                          
759Veerle Opgenhaffen and Mark Freeman, Transitional Justice in Morocco: A Progress Report, (2005) 
International Centre for Transitional Justice 3.  
760 Ibid 3. 
761 Opgenhaffen and Freeman (n 767)15. 
172  
Show trials of alleged revolutionaries resulted in mass executions.762 
 
However, this situation eased during the 1980s and 1990s, and in 1991 the government released 
330 of ‘the disappeared’,763 most of whom had spent 18 years in prison. This prompted 
Moroccan demands for official and public investigations into the existence of secret prisons. For 
this reason, in 1990 King Hassan II established the Advisory Council for Human Rights. The 
Council’s duty was to offer advice to the King in regard to human rights. This was an important 
step to end the violation of human rights in Morocco. 
 
The Council initially focused on political and legal reforms, and it could not address the violations 
of the Years of Lead. In 1998 the King asked the Council to look at the cases of the forced 
disappearances, to redress such problems. However, the result of the investigation indicated that 
there were only 112 cases, of whom 56 were deceased and 12 were living either inside or outside 
Morocco; there was no information about the remaining 44.764 These unsatisfactory results led to 
the contempt of the people and criticism by local and international organizations. In response 
the Council declared these results to be preliminary, and they asked the King for the resources for 
a deeper investigation and the allocation of death certificates for families and reparation. 
Demands for human rights continued to increase, and two organizations were established for human 
rights, namely the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (1979) and the Moroccan 
Organization for Human Rights (1989). A dedicated Ministry of Human Rights was established 
in 1993.765 
 
Furthermore, during the 1990s attempts were made to include opposition groups in the national 
administration, for example the appointment as prime minister of one of the main defenders of 
human rights who spent a long time in exile. In April 1999, the Council of Human Rights 
recommended that the King establish a commission to pay compensation to the victims of past 
abuses, which was authorised by him two weeks before he died, becoming incumbent upon his son 
and heir Mohammed V to complete the process. In his maiden speech, Mohammed VI stated the 
State’s responsibility for disappearances, and declared his condemnation of past human rights 
abuses. Furthermore, he formed an independent commission to investigate enforced 
disappearances and other human rights violations for period1956 to 1999. The members of this 
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commission asked the King for amnesty for past crimes for the public good.766 However, the 
Commission started its mission in September 1999, and gave only one month for the victims to 
register their complaints. This unjust situation led to a more chaos in Morocco. 
 
Nevertheless, establishing such a commission was regarded as positive progress in the human 
rights field, particularly because it based its work on an implicit acknowledgment of the 
responsibility of the State for past wrongdoing. As a result, a large number of victims gained 
massive reparation. However, this reparation was limited to monetary compensation, despite the 
demands of victims, their families and advocates for treatments, certificates of death, return of the 
bodies of deceased victims and other requirements. Furthermore, the amount of compensation 
was not equal to all victims. However, the Commission was important in investigating human rights 
abuses by the State itself, and was the first step toward the establishment of the later Commission 
of Truth and Conciliation.767 
 
In 2001, the King responded to the demands of human rights defenders by extending the authority 
of the Advisory Council for Human Rights. Then, in November 2001 after the seminar organized 
by several human rights organizations, which recommended the formation of a truth commission 
by the King, he established the Truth and Conciliation Commission to end the suffering of the past. 
In January 2004 the Commission started its mission and aimed to finish its work within one year.768 
 
Morocco’s experience is one of the most important Arab and international experiences 
demonstrating the possibility of a democratic and peaceful transition by incorporating dissenting 
and opposing voices in mainstream political discourse, such as the appointment of Yousfi (The 
popular Moroccan political activist and opponent of the government of Hassan II) as Prime 
Minister, investigating forced disappearances and torture, and ultimately compensating victims 
and reforming official institutions. 
 
The Advisory Council on Human Rights (Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme, or 
CCDH) was established by King Hassan II in 1990, because of domestic and international 
criticism of Morocco’s human rights abuses since independence in 1956. Later on, in 1998, the 
Independent Arbitration Commission was formed in accordance to the CCDH recommendations. 
Its mission was to compensate victims of arbitrary detention and forced disappearance.769 
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Morocco had a unique experience in dealing with TJ, which has not been implemented after civil 
wars or revolutions. Morocco focusing on a truth commission and reforming national institutions. 
The successful experience of Morocco can be attributed to resorting to most requests of the 
victims, which is knowing the truth. It was a very special experience in Morocco when King Hassan 
II enacted the transformation and delivery of government to the opposition in 1995, which led to 
the establishment of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the facts; it 
concluded by advocating the payment of compensation to victims and working to repair and 
rehabilitate some national institutions in 2005, which included promoting the right to education, 
constitutional reform and establishing a ministry of human rights.770 
 
4.6.2 South Africa 
 
The Republic of the Union of South Africa was one of the foremost examples of structural, 
institutionalised racial discrimination whereby a population of four million white inhabitants ruled 
over 29 million non-whites in a system that proclaimed and entrenched the racial superiority of the 
former. During the 1980s, the tensions between two black African organisations, the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), on an increasingly violent form. 
Especially after the beginning of the peace negotiations in1989, these conflicts escalated into open 
conflict and the arming of Self-Defence Units and Self-Protection Units. These units were armed 
and received basic combat training, but were subject to very little formal control. While the conflict 
was apparently between the ANC and the IFP, the state security forces were directly implicated 
in supplying arms and other support to the latter.771 
 
Between 1990 and 1994 South Africa was experiencing the difficult transition from minority rule 
to democratic government. The transition from minority rule to majority rule was an extensive and 
painful procedure of bilateral and multiparty negotiations. Several bilateral talks were held 
between the National Party, which had established apartheid in 1948, and the ANC, which was 
the largest liberation group providing the base for the establishing of multiparty negotiations on 
the future of the country, including matters of ending political viciousness, temporary power 
mechanisms and the amnesty of political prisoners.772 
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission played a significant role in recording the abuses of 
human rights committed by all parties. Victim statements were the main documentary resources of 
the Commission, including records of 33,713 gross human rights violations from the 21,296 
statements of victims.773 The Commission stated that the KwaZulu-Natal region witnessed the 
extensive abuse of human rights, and that the period 1990 to 1994 was the most violent. This abuse, 
especially sexual violence, affected men and women alike. Most of the perpetrators were aged 
between 30-36 years old. The State was also implicated in such abuses, particularly due to its 
disproportionate and deadly reaction to the risk in the region. Furthermore, the State itself 
committed gross abuses of human rights, including, torture, kidnapping, inhumane treatment, 
sexual assault, extra-judicial executions, incitement to violent clashes, and arming, training, and 
funding violent rebel units or hit squads for deployment internally against opponents of the 
government.774 On the other hand, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recorded that the 
one-third of all the violations from the late 1980s to 1994 were committed by the IFP.775 
 
With the progress and severity of the conflict, it became difficult to differentiate between political 
and criminal violence. The state employed criminal networks in its actions against the liberation 
groups, and state security forces themselves became involved in wrong deeds. Similarly, the 
liberation forces engaged with criminal networks in pursuit of their goals. The lack of 
accountability to political leaders or the local community created the space for criminal acts by 
those professing to be political combatants. 
 
After the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, and the legalization of several political 
parties, initial talks led to an agreement on, among other things, an indemnity process that would 
release certain political prisoners from South African jails and ensure that political exiles were not 
arrested when they returned to South Africa to participate in the peace process. This agreement, 
called the Groote Schuur Minute, led to the enactment of the Indemnity Act of 1990, which 
provided a temporary amnesty for individuals, mainly the ANC members accused of political 
violence.776 The Further Indemnity Act of 1992 followed this, allowing members of the National 
Party security forces to receive amnesty through a wholly secretive procedure. The Further 
Indemnity Act of 1992 was passed despite opposition from the ANC and international scorn. 
With the passage of these two acts, those who wanted to benefit from indemnity y had to provide 
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information about the acts they had committed.777 
 
These negotiations also led to the establishment of a National Peace Accord in 1991, which 
outlined a framework for dealing with political protests and community conflict. It also established 
various local peace accord structures, such as local dispute resolution measures, to address the 
high level of on-going political violence. These local measures were needed, as this four-year 
transition process was marked by escalating violence, particularly among political factions in the 
black townships where militarized youth played a key role in the conflict.778 
 
The South African experience is one of the best known experiments in achieving TJ, seeking to 
eliminate an old and entrenched system of racial discrimination in the wake of what amounted to 
a political civil war under the slogan “amnesty in exchange for the truth”. While the amnesty system 
of the South African experience was praised for its associations of forgiveness (being championed 
internationally by Christian leaders such as the Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu), the lack of 
compensation for victims was a serious shortcoming, along with the absence of trials for most 
perpetrators of crimes.779 
 
Africa has served as a challenging ground for new systems to resolve the problem of impunity in 
1990s, pursue truth and justice, and enable reconciliation in broken societies. However, the 
consequences of these accountability efforts have been mixed and dissimilar. African experiences 
contributed to the emergence of a plethora of internal and international TJ initiatives. 
As in South America, other African countries’ experiences of the circumstances around the 
adoption of TJ and its mechanisms was challenged by false starts and political manipulation 
before the construction of advanced and active accountability systems. The TJ approach included 
the both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. For example, the international tribunals, hybrid 
courts, and domestic trials as a judicial mechanisms, and truth commissions, reparations, and 
traditional based processes as a non-judicial mechanisms. 
The TJ in South Africa is a relatively successful example of the transformation of repressive to 
democratic rule. It provides not only a rich sample of the public role that a truth commission can 
play in reconciliation, but also suggests an admonitory tale about the efficacy of amnesty 
authorities. In 1995 the South African transition from apartheid to democracy was crystallised in 
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the adoption by the government of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. To 
achieve the peace and democracy amnesty was wanted. The amnesty system contributed to 
balance between the political truths and the desire to discover crimes committed and hold to 
account those who ordered these crimes. 
 
Through amnesty in exchange for full disclosure, the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission wanted to provide a motivation for offenders to come forward of their own volition. 
The Commission released its final report in 1998, which found that both previous government, the 
ANC and other liberation movements had committed human rights violations as well as being guilty 
of terrible human rights abuses. However, this Commission was criticised for failing to address 
the socioeconomic properties of discrimination, such as the oligarchy who profited from apartheid, 
and it did not hold individual and established beneficiaries of racism liable.780 
 
The provision of amnesty made by the new government had important impacts in successful 
negotiations between the parties of conflict. The amnesty was temporary and accompanied a wider 
truth and reconciliation procedure. This amnesty was from civil claims and criminal charges. It 
could be offered to only individuals, not groups or organizations. Furthermore, it had provisos, 
such as the requirement that individuals provide complete disclosure about the events, as well as 
they need to show that they the acts for which they requested amnesty were politically motivated. 
 
According to the legislation establishing the TRC, a large number of members of the Amnesty 
Committee had to be judges and legal specialists. Although part of the TRC, the Amnesty 
Committee had a large measure of independence in making decisions to grant amnesty or not, based 
on an administrative review, investigations and public trials. Due to the requirement that applicants 
prove political motivation for their crimes, more than 7000 requests were rejected during a 
preliminary administrative review because they were criminal cases deemed lacking in political 
motivation.781 
 
The Truth Commission, however, continued its investigation on crimes against human rights that 
occurred under apartheid. Such investigations and prosecutions mostly considered the actions of 
the Liberty Movements, however prosecutions of their members were frequently tainted by the 
political bias of adjudicators, by the admissibility in court of forced confessions and the 
                                                          
780 African Union Panel of the Wise, ‘Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities and 
Challenges in the Fight against Impunity’, (2011) International Peace Institute, 31. 
781 Merwe and Lamb (n 779) 17-18. 
178  




Argentina has had a rich experience of democratic transformation and the application of the 
concept of TJ, so that the emergence of the term itself was born from within Argentina, which 
offers a pioneering experience in this field, especially for the countries of the Third World in 
general, and for Latin America in particular. Thus, the study of the Argentine model is really 
important for any country undergoing similar conditions of the transition to democracy after a 
period of repressive authoritarian system, which is the case of most Arab countries, such as in 
Libya, Egypt and Iraq. The Argentine model has three stages in applying TJ systems. 
 
The first stage began with the military coup led by General Jorge Videla against the Government 
of the Head of Argentina, Izabella Peron, in 1976. Martial law was imposed by Videla, under a 
military council of nine generals.783 Several suspensions of human rights were imposed, and the 
constitution was suspended. Demonstrat ions and gatherings were prohibited, and the press and 
media were censored. Military dominance was established in unions and civil society 
organizations, and finally the ‘dirty war’ began, lasting until 1983.792 
 
The main reason for the enactment of this coup by the Argentine army was to protect Argentina 
from the dangers of socialism, under the slogan ‘protect the security of Argentina’.784 Left-wing 
politicians, activists, journalist, students and trade unionists were all victims of the political violence 
of the regime. 
 
This stage was noted for 10,000 to 30,000 disappearances, mainly of young people.785 All 
information concerning status or the right to burial was withheld; bodies were thrown in in the sea 
or burned so as not to leave behind any evidence.786 
 
In addition, arrest and torture were the norm. Given the state of severe repression, it was not 
possible to establish any party or protest movement in Argentina during this phase, with the 
exception of one unique movement: Mothers of the May Square Association (Association 
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Madres de Plaza Mayo). This movement began in 1977 as a gathering of 14 in the yard called 
May Square in front of the Presidential Palace to demand to know the fate of their disappeared 
children. They were just a group of mothers, which is why the military forces ignored or were 
reluctant to deal with them using brute force. The movement became a locus for the taciturn 
opposition to the military junta.787 
 
Largely in order to divert the attention of the Argentine population from the increasingly dire 
internal situation of Argentina, the junta launched a jingoistic campaign to seize the Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas) from the UK in April 1982. When the British unexpectedly mounted a full-scale 
expedition to retake the Islands, the Argentine forces were routed and the military rule could not 
justify its stranglehold on Argentina, thus the first democratic elections were held in the country, 
resulting in the election of Raul Alfonsin, who began a democratic transition in the country, but it 
was imperative to address the thorny issue of the disappeared persons.788 
For this reason the National Committee for the Study of the Problem of Missing Persons was 
established to investigate the truth. This Committee was able to develop a report on the 
disappearance of 9,000 people in spite of the lack of adequate documentation, due to pursue the 
military regime’s policy to hide evidence and documents constantly.789 When the completed report 
was published in the official magazine, Argentines were shocked at the horror of what had been 
perpetrated, and then the trials began against members of the military accused of humanitarian 
abuses against the Argentine opposition.790 
 
Although Morocco, South Africa and Argentina had very successful TJ and were able to 
successfully transfer from the conflict to peace, those states did not witness significant injury of 
diplomats and cases relating to them in their TJ system. However, they do offer useful insights for 




Libya witnessed a bad experience of TJ. Since Muammar Gaddafi’s removal, successive interim 
governments have paid little attention to building accountable institutions, while militias with 
regional, tribal, religious and financial objectives have gained more control and operated with an 
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impunity that defines the new fragmented and volatile country.791 Libyans can neither reconcile 
with their past nor with each other while they fear for their lives. Libyan TJ law involves mechanisms 
that are supposed to address all issues concerning the redress of victims and the establishment of 
national reconciliation, and that measures have been taken to rehabilitate the judiciary and the 
security services, which are the most important elements for the application of any law.792 
 
The Middle East has witnessed in recent times a state of confusion with regard to the question of 
the trial of former regime figures who commit ted human rights abuses, and often the citizens 
demand the need to complete these trials as a preliminary to national reconciliation, turning a new 
page and presenting these ideas as the only way to build a new life. 
 
Libya, which has negligible minorities, was the most homogenous society in MENA, but the 2011 
civil war led to the division of society into numerous groups, initially supporters of the regime and 
rebels, and later a plethora of competing militias vying for control of resources and political 
influence. All of these groups commit ted numerous human rights violations, including rape, extra-
judicial killings, torture and disappearances. These crimes might be accounted international war 
crimes. 
 
The Libyan authorities have to deal with the militias, who are seasoned and experienced fighters 
and former revolutionaries, to help enforce the system, instead of giving priority to domestic law 
enforcement and implementing the process of TJ. These militias, including the Libya Shield 
Brigades and the Supreme Security Committee, have been working under the command of Chief 
of Staff of the Army and the Interior Ministry, respectively, and are operating in parallel with the 
state security forces. Increased attacks from unknown groups against foreign diplomatic missions 
in Tripoli and Benghazi, including the attacks on the embassies of France and the United Arab 
Emirates in Tripoli, and the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi, expose the utter chaos of the security 
situation.793 In the midst of this confusion the judicial system and TJ continue to face significant 
challenges, including the slow pace of screening detainees held by militias in their jails and 
transferring them to the custody of the state; such detainees may be common criminals, political 
prisoners, terrorists or perpetrators of attacks on diplomats and diplomatic premises in Libya, but 
in the absence of due legal processes they cannot be processed without TJ procedures to address 
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The Libyan Transitional Justice Law No. 29 of 2013 
795
sought to establish a truth commission 
(the Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission), a reparations scheme for victims and survivors 
of violence and rights abuses.796 Article 1 of this law explains what TJ means and its aim of dealing 
with the past human rights abuses committed by the Gaddafi regime.797 This could be through 
legislation, judicial, social, and administrative procedures. This law clearly defines the serious 
violations, which are any abuses of human rights by murder, abduction, physical torture or 
confiscation of funds.798 This law set out that the Truth Commission should be established.799 The 
Commission has to provide the government with detailed information about the cases with evidence 
and recommendations, and it should inform the government about its efforts and attempts to seek 
conciliation between the parties.800 
 
There are many rights for the victims of human rights abuse according to this law. The victim has 
the right to know the truth and document their suffering,801 reparation,802 treatment, rehabilitation 
and provision of social services, and others.803 This law of 2013 dealt with problems faced when 
applying TJ by qualifying the statute of limitation, whereby crimes committed before the 
enforcement of Law 11 of 1997, and those committed for political, security or military reasons, 
would not lapse or be halted by the statute of limitation.804 
 
Libya has seen many international and domestic prosecutions for human rights abuses and 
international crimes, and it cannot be claimed that Libya has ignored TJ. However, almost six years 
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since the Libyan uprising, very few TJ goals have been achieved. In the wake of the civil war in 
Libya, the new Libyan government was floundering in its application of TJ and in its steps to 
achieve peace and stability in the region. The transitional authorities passed Amnesty Law No. 38 
protecting participants in the revolution from prosecution as well as Libya’s Political Isolation Law 
in an effort to cleanse Libya of all who supported the former regime.805 UN and Human Rights 
Watch criticized these laws. In addition, Libya has witnessed some traditional and informal justice 
and reconciliation processes.806 However, as in Iraq, Libyan TJ is selective justice based on 
retributive criminal justice, replicating the injustices of the Gaddafi era.807 It resorts to vengeance 
against those associated with the regime into the transitional phase. For example, as explained 
previously, the Libyan courts have passed tough sentences, including the death sentence, for 
crimes committed by members of the Gaddafi regime and his loyalists during the 2011 conflict,808 
while TJ law clearly excluded revolutionaries from punishment for the same crimes commit ted 
during the 2011 revolution. Law 38/2012 on Some Procedures for the Transitional Period, 
enacted on 12 May 2012 by the National Transitional Council, protects from prosecution 
perpetrators of serious crimes if their actions aimed at “promoting or protecting the [2011] 
revolution” against Gaddafi.809 
 
This is reflected in a selective use of the TJ mechanisms implemented in Libya. The victor’s justice 
of Libya led to a divided country with two governments, the first being in Tobruk and the second 
in Tripoli, each claiming to be the legitimate authority and each conducting military operations 
against the other.810 
 
The division of Libyan society, latently the most homogenous population in the world, resulted 
from the sudden defeat of Gaddafi after decades of totalitarian despotism. The sharp division 
between the pro- and anti-Gaddafi factions prevented a peaceful democratic transfer after the 
revolution, which led to the practice of repression, exclusion and subjugation of those who 
associated with the previous government. For example, the Libyan Authority enacted the Political 
Isolation Law (PIL) (No. 13 / 2013) against those who served in the former regime between 
September 1, 1969 and 20 October, 2011. According to this law, these people were excluded 
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from public service for ten years.811 As well as removing the entire civil service and all skilled 
bureaucrats and public servants from their roles, this law entrenched the bitter divisions among 
the public. Sharqiesh suggested an alternative to this Law, which might be more conducive to a 
successful TJ: a comprehensive national reconciliation process that helps in securing a successful 
transition to sustainable peace and stability.812 
 
The current scenario of granting amnesty for crimes committed against the Gaddafi regime 
perpetuates a culture of impunity that encourages further violations.813 This covers abuses 
committed under cover of the state, its agencies or individuals acting on its behalf.814 
 
This law clearly enshrines double standards and distinguishes between citizens, whether victims or 
perpetrators of criminal acts, which makes it contrary to international standards and constitutional 
principles and establishes a state that does not respect its citizens equally.815 
TJ Prosecution in Libya only investigates the crimes of the previous regime, and does not include 
the crimes committed after the defeat of Gaddafi. For example, the crimes committed during the 
revolution were justified by TJ Law because it was necessary activities to protect the revolution. 
However, it is not possible to regard such crimes as not subject to TJ law and disregard them.816 
This distinction between the offenders in time of Gaddafi and offenders of new government was 
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of rights and law’ Human Rights Watch ‘Libya: Libya’s new special procedures law must be amended’ (2012) 
available at 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0114ForUpload_0.pdf> accessed 30 May 2017 
815 This Article means impunity for offenders and carte blanche for more violations of human rights; it is an 
obstacle to obstructs peace building and TJ in Libya. Libyan TJ distinguishes between crimes at the time of 
their commission and offenders according to their political affiliations. The perpetrators of violations after the 
collapse of the former regime are treated differently in law to those committed under the latter. Hedi 
Bouhramra ‘Notes on the amended Transitional Justice Bill’ (2013) Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace. 
816 The current TJ Law emphasized this distinction when it provided for the establishment of TJ 
Prosecution and defined its jurisdiction only with the gross and systematic violations committed by the former 
regime from the date of 1 September 1960 until the declaration of liberation. This means that it has no 
jurisdiction over the serious violations committed after the defeat of the old regime. This clearly violates the 
Constitutional Declaration and the principles of the international law of human rights and the principles of 
Sharia. The latter is the source of TJ, as the TJ Law itself states. Ibid. 
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impeded by the reconciliation process among the groups within Libyan society and thus hindered 
the peaceful transition.817 
 
The former Libyan justice minister Salah Al-Marghani stated that Libya has not had a successful 
experience of TJ,818 which he attributed to the existential power and political influence of the 
militias and the breakdown of the Libyan state. Indeed, the latter is the backdrop for all of the 
association damage to property, assassinations, kidnappings, and threats against army officers, 
police, activists, judges and journalists. The establishment of different forces, each according to 
the interests of particular factions and militias, has brought the national judiciary into political 
battles. All of this has cast a shadow over the TJ process, especially in light of some examples that 
have been brought to justice in cases that were supposed to be an important part of justice and 
truth. The security conditions that accompanied the fighting and the political conflict preventing 
the successful application of TJ.819 
 
Another reason for the instability in Libya that prevents TJ is the collective punishment and 
displacement of those allied with Gaddafi, including those who did not commit crimes, which led 
to an increased number of displaced people and refugees. Another collective punishment was the 
enacting of the Political Isolation Law No. 13 of 2013. 
 
Libyan authorities instead of reforming its local laws in a way that confirmed the human rights and 
cessation of an unfair life for all citizens resorted to revenge from all those loyal to the former regime 
of Gaddafi. The law, which prevents those who served in the former regime between 1 September, 
1969, 20 October, 2011, from holding public office for ten years, is a barrier to Libya’s post-war 
reconstruction. The law prevents social cohesion within Libya and destroys the state’s institutional 
memory, greatly undermining the ability of the Libyan state to function. The Political Isolation 
Law must be significantly mitigated, adjusted, or simply cancelled. 
 
The revolutionary militias generally refuse to participate in government and public affairs, 
preferring to lambast the government from the side-lines while effectively controlling their own 
areas. This exacerbates the culture of division inside society and government. However, there is a 
                                                          
817 Ibid. 
818 Morocco News ‘Salah Al-Marghani, the former Libyan justice minister to "Morocco": The Size of the 
Western Intervention and Its Objectives the Truth in Libya is Unclear’ Morocco News (Morocco 2016). 
Available at <‘http://ar.lemaghreb.tn> accessed 7 July 2018. 
819Sharqieh (n821)1; Marach Noah ‘Transitional Justice in the Libyan Constitution Draft’ Libya Future (Libya 
February 2017). 
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legitimate grievance and lack of understanding of the Libyan population in general concerning 
awareness of the full extent of the crimes committed by the Gaddafi dictatorship over his “42-year 
reign”. When reforming state institutions, particular attention should be given to the security 
services in light of their responsibility for preventing torture and violating human rights; the 
administrative apparatus and bureaucracy, especially considering the endemic corruption within 
it; the media, which spent the forty plus years of being responsible for the glorification of Gaddafi; 
and the judiciary, which has been handed the trust to faithfully and honestly implement transitional 
justice.820 Furthermore, the absence of national dialogue between the two sides has widened gaps 
between Libya’s different parties as well as reinforced mistrust, and exacerbated an already 
disastrous security situation.821 
 
The weakness of the Libyan government and lack of means of implementation of TJ required 
international assistance. Libya requires technical assistance from outside on “how best to run a 
reconciliation process, investigate past crimes, hold transparent and fair trials, repair injury done 
to victims and their families, and engage in deep institutional reform to prevent human rights 
violations from being repeated”.  
 
Furthermore, Libya needs international assistance in building a strong police force and army – a 
necessary step for restoring state authority. Security collaboration with neighbouring countries – 
particularly Egypt and Tunisia, who can help control their borders with Libya – can aid Libya in 
its quest for a more secure environment for reconstruction and reconciliation. 
 
In 2017, Libyan authorities tried to promote TJ by introducing three articles in the Libyan 
Constitutional Draft of Transitional Justice. This would make TJ more compelling and enforce the 
Libyan government to implement it.822 The Draft provides a set of transitional measures in Chapter 
11. Article (197) contains six paragraphs detailing the principles of transitional justice and 
mechanisms for triggering them. This Article also states the Libyan government’s obligations 
towards the victims, and that the Libyan government should maintain national memory by exposing 
and documenting human rights violations.823 
                                                          
820 Ibid. 
821 Ibid. 
822 Noah (n 829). 
823 The Constitution Drafting Assembly, Draft Libyan Constitution Art 197 (1) stated that ‘Preserve national 
memory through uncovering and documenting human rights violations including linguistic and cultural 
violations, crimes of corruption, the fate of missing persons, victims, and persons harmed by violations, 
military operations and armed conflicts on the individual and regional level’. 
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The Draft explains that the Libyan government should undertake to compensate victims of 
systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Compensation shall be awarded 
under material and symbolic compensation, individual and collective compensation, psychological 
and social treatment, and rehabilitation of victims, taking into account administrative procedures, 
without prejudice to the right of the state to prosecute persons who committed these violations. 
This means that compensation is one of the forms of reparation based on recognition of the harm 
suffered by victims of violations and the adoption of policies to give compensation, in kind, or 
symbolic, for loss and suffering victims, and their families, helping to overcome the consequences 
of violations, or focus on the future, by working to rehabilitate the victims and to ensure a better 
life for them.824 
 
Other paragraphs concern the right of compensation for victims, a return of the remains of war 
victims and criminal prosecution of all contributors to violations of human rights and corruption 
crimes, all in accordance with international standards and the requirements of national 
reconciliation within the framework of Sharia.825 It is understood that criminal prosecution is an 
accounting mechanism. During the periods following the radical political changes from tyranny to 
democracy, the process of purging state institutions and excluding officials who are suspected of 
having committed human rights crimes can accompany accounting. 
 
It is also important for the state to prepare national staff specialized in various fields, who are 
capable of implementing TJ mechanisms according to the highest international standards, whilst 
taking into account national privacy and research in the components of national justice, especially 
                                                          
824 Paragraph 2 of Art 197 stated that ‘The State shall commit to compensate victims and persons harmed by 
systematic violations to human rights and fundamental freedoms a compensation proportionate to the harm. 
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psychological and social effects and rehabilitation of victims, while taking into consideration the 
administrative and judicial measures that have already been taken, without prejudice to the right of the State to 
prosecute persons who committed these violations’. 
825 Paragraph 3 stated that ‘Ensure the rights of persons whose property and movable assets were violated or 
seized provided that the State shall ensure the rights of the original owner by restitution or compensation, 
taking into consideration the financial status of the occupant of the property and the construction added to it, 
the previous administrative and judicial measures in accordance with the law. Paragraph 4 stated that ‘Return 
the remains of war victims from abroad’; Paragraph 5 stated that ‘ 
Prosecute criminally all those who had a role in human rights violations and corruption crimes provided that 
all of this is in accordance with international standards and national reconciliation requirements within the 
framework of the Islamic Sharia. Legal provisions that are in conflict with the mechanisms of transitional 
justice shall not be applied’, and paragraph 6 stated that ‘A body for transitional justice and reconciliation shall 
be established for the implementation of the programs of transitional justice. The law shall regulate its 
structure and the duration of its work. Programs on truth, justice and reconciliation shall be designed in 
accordance with the rules of effectiveness and comprehensiveness and to represent the components of the 
Libyan people in a way that guarantees impartiality, independence and efficiency’. 
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in the field of accounting. The study confirms its consistency with the principles of Islamic Sharia, 
and that in-depth study of the provisions of the Islamic Sharia in light of international provisions 
can contribute to the development of the jurisprudence of TJ in an Arab-Islamic format.826 
 
Accountability in TJ safeguards the rights and freedoms of citizens. One of the most important 
considerations to be taken into account when choosing such mechanisms is to achieve the main 
objectives of TJ, namely to reduce gross violations of human rights and to prevent their 
recurrence.827 Reforming security institutions is one of the most important benefits of TJ because 
it involves restructuring institutions associated with the monopoly of the law enforcement in 
society, so that they become fairer and transparent, follow the rule of law and the culture of good 
human rights, and are held accountable for past violations. The Draft contains texts that support this 
trend, including Article 198, which is marked by guarantees of non-repetition, as well as the section 
of the judiciary and its contents, which entrench the independence of the judiciary, which is 
considered a major guarantee. The most pertinent requirements state that the armed forces and 
police must be subject to the national government, and that it is prohibited for any individual, party, 
or group to maintain armed or semi- armed paramilitary forces.828 This is the most immediately 
prerequisite for effective TJ in Libya, and the most difficult to achieve due to the mistrust and caprice 
of armed militias, who are reluctant to lay down their arms and submit to the national government. 
 
Aside from this, the Draft is idealistic in its proclamations focused on the necessity of eradicating 
tyranny and oppression by consolidating and spreading the values of justice, equality of 
opportunity and equality, and spreading the culture of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as 
enshrined in Article 60, entitled “The right to education, citizenship, social harmony, peaceful 
coexistence and human rights education”. However, based on the analysis presented in this thesis, 
the Libyan authorities are unable to practice these articles or even to agree on them. The Draft 
Constitution was to be approved in December 2017, having been issued for approval in 2012 
after the upraising. This massive delay in even agreeing to the fundamentals of a political process 
and post-conflict dialogue reflects the intractable divisions in Libyan society and politics. 
 
There is only one reason why the situation in Libya has been more difficult to stabilise after the 
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Arab Spring - the oil factor. Regional militias consequently sought to control oil reserves in 
anticipation that they could ultimately benefit from this economically. This mirrors the resort to 
sectarian and tribal affiliations in Iraq following 2003. Similarly, in Syria and Yemen the conflicts 
arose due to long-standing oppression and a lack of economic development, but in their military 
and political form they have also assumed a sectarian character. Egypt and Tunisia have no 
significant oil deposits and no pronounced sectarian differences in their societies, so it has been 
easier in these countries to make relative progress in peace and reconciliation during the post-
conflict era. As of 2018, Libya still lacks an inclusive national reconciliation process to secure a 
successful transition to sustainable peace and stability.829 
                                                          




TJ comprises a set of steps or procedures undertaken by states emerging from a period of war, 
conflict or revolution, during which they suffered from the abuse of human rights. The most 
common challenge that TJ might face is the impotence of new governments or a lack of serious 
inducement to achieve justice in post-conflict situations. 
 
On several occasions it can be difficult to solve the problems of the past by choosing one 
approach without knowing the truth or delivering reparation. Sometimes the accountability of the 
offender seems to be no more than a form of exacting political revenge. Also, the delivery of 
reparation without real accountability for offenders means the government buys the satisfaction 
of victims. Thus the fundamental elements of TJ are indivisible (institutional reform, delivering 
reparation, prosecutions initiatives, and truth commissions). Institutional reform can be 
disingenuous and/or ineffective, particularly in judicial trials without compensation, while 
compensatory “blood money” can be interpreted as an attempt to buy the silence of the victims 
(or their satisfaction) without legal justice. 
 
In many practices of states in post-conflict periods, mechanisms of TJ are commonly used to 
resolve disputes. However, TJ is not a wholly new form of justice; rather it is a novel combination 
of very well established judicial and non-judicial means of resolving conflict and post-conflict 
scenarios. It is fundamentally a pragmatic approach, and there is no uniform theoretical model for 
TJ; it must be devised and implemented according to the particular context in which it is applied. 
Nevertheless, similar societies can learn good lessons from previous experiences of successful and 
unsuccessful TJ. 
 
While in principle TJ is mainly derived from International Law, International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law, in practice it is concerned with the redress of aggrieved parties, uncovering 
the truth and allotting reparation and compensation for victims. However, TJ is different from the 
traditional justice in being concerned with periods of the transition, such as the transition from an 
internal armed conflict or civil war to peace and democracy, or the case of the collapse of the legal 
system and rebuilding it in conjunction with the reconstruction of the state, or the transition from 
a dictatorship to a democratic system. 
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One of the most important challenges that might face the victim to achieve justice in a post-conflict 
environment is that TJ processes take time. TJ is instituted to promote security and avoid revenge 
by promoting peaceful coexistence within states, and often between factions who were formerly 
enemies. TJ has several elements, the most important of which are truth commissions, delivering 
reparation and prosecution initiatives. Truth commissions play a significant role in investigation 
in the crimes of the past human rights abuse, the reasons behind such abuses, and their 
consequences. They give special attention to the accounts of victims, as well as giving them 
special protection, and they also play a significant role in prosecution initiatives and delivering 
reparation after submission of reports, resulting in obligations and recommendations for 
governments. The program of reparation means returning rights to their owners. 
 
Several states have been unsuccessful in their experience of TJ, while others have been largely 
successful, such as South Africa, Argentina and Morocco. The experience of South Africa is the 
most famous successful experience in achieving the aims of TJ. It led to end of structural 
discrimination, with acknowledgement and investigation of past abuses of human rights in the 
context of an amnesty for politically motivated crimes (i.e. those attributable to the structure of 
apartheid rule rather than to individual criminality). The amnesty was implemented in exchange for 
truth, to highlight the abuses which occurred during apartheid. Such decisions initially upset many 
victims because they did not receive reparation and they did not see the criminal as being 
subjected to justice, but the long-term stability and relative peace of South Africa is substantial 
evidence of the efficacy of the reconciliation approach. 
 
According to international law, the hosting state (Libya) is obliged to protect diplomats and find 
justice for them. The state has to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomats from any attack 
that may occur. According to the ICJ, the state-receiving diplomats has responsibility when 
attacks occur to cease such attacks and find justice for diplomats (as in the US v Iran case). 
During armed conflict, especially when a state loses control over the territory, the duty of protecting 
diplomats and of providing justice for injuries committed against them becomes more difficult. A 
developing country such as Libya lacks resources and the ability to charge the criminals of an 
attack on diplomats, even where political realities and goodwill enable a commitment to this in 
principle. The receiving state is obligated to arrest and try suspected offenders and to pay 
compensation to injured diplomats and their state. TJ aims to find justice for the victim of human 
rights abuse by using different instruments such as prosecution, reparation and truth finding. 
Through applying TJ to find justice for diplomats, the receiving state should be able to find the truth. 
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States, including Libya, did not include the injured diplomats as victims of human rights abuses in 
their TJ laws, because diplomats were not considered to be directly pertinent to issues of TJ, due 
to their traditional protection under conventional international laws. However, the reality that 
diplomats are now targeted and not protected persons in MENA conflicts – particularly when 
targeted by non-state actors such as paramilitary forces and terrorist organisation – it is incumbent 
upon governments to be creative and active in seeking justice for diplomats. 
 
TJ can be applied if the sending and receiving state agree to that, in which case an injured diplomat 
or family members of a murdered diplomat are compensated by their own country (i.e. the sending 
country). The sending country then claims compensation or reimbursement from the receiving 
country through a process of diplomatic negotiations. If diplomatic negotiations fail, the sending 
country takes a case to ICJ (as in the US v Iran case) under the principle of state responsibility. 
The sending country also asks for the perpetrators to be brought to justice by the receiving state. 
If, as in the case of Libya, the receiving country is unable to do so because of political 
instability, then TJ process could be inclusive, with injured diplomats or family of killed diplomats 
taking part (but only if they and the sending country choose to do so). 
 
In effect, TJ processes to provide remedy in cases of injured diplomats are more geared toward 
truth finding and reconciliation rather than criminal punishment of offenders or compensation of 
victims (as compensation would already have been paid by the sending state as part of the 
diplomats’ contract of service). In the event that attacks on diplomats take the form of war crimes 
or crimes against humanity, a prosecution of suspects at the ICC can also be considered if the 
receiving state is unable or unwilling to prosecute them. At the same time, the protection of 
diplomats and finding justice for them by applying appropriate law could help in diffusing law 
and order in conflict and post-conflict situations, and facilitate the stability of the international 
community. TJ can only work with regard to diplomats if it is discretionary (i.e. sending states and 
the victims involved have a choice whether or not they wish to take part) and limited to truth 
finding (i.e. does not include punishment and reparations, which are covered by international law 
(under the ICJ) regarding state responsibility for reparations, and criminal law in the case of 
punishment. 
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The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (VCDR) plays a role in determining the 
responsibility of particular states for attacks on diplomats, whether committed by state officials or 
by individuals. The VCDR in general refers to the duties of the host state regarding protection of 
foreign diplomats. The law on the protection of diplomats can be traced to various other sources. 
These include the treaties between particular diplomats’ the sending and receiving states of 
particular diplomats. This research also refers to other international conventions, such as the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973. As with the VCDR, this convention does not 
determine the responsibility of particular states, but focuses on criminalizing selected actions 
which it regards as crimes. It then asks the relevant state to set out in its internal law the appropriate 
punishment. Art 2(2) states that ‘each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature’.830 Similarly, Art 2 of the 
International Convention against Taking of Hostages 1979 provides that the state should set out 
suitable penalties for such crimes.831 Although Art 6 of this particular Convention states that a ‘state 
party… shall in accordance with its laws take him into custody or take other measures …’832 it 
does not confirm state whether the state, in addition to the criminal, still incurs responsibility for 
that individual’s crimes. Furthermore, Denza stated that as the VCDR does not specify or regulate 
how to deal with situations in which diplomats are victims of crimes, it is accepted that the receiving 
state authorities should take all necessary precautions to protect diplomatic officers.833These 
ambiguous situations are considered in this chapter by examine the responsibility of the state through 
other sources of international law than the conventions already discussed. 
                                                          
830 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, (adopted by the General Assembly of the UN on 14 December 1973, entered into 
force on 20 February 1977) UNTS, vol. 1035, and p. 167. 
831 (Adopted by the General Assembly of the UN on 17 December 1979, entered in force on 3 June 
1983) UN, Treaty Series, vol. 1316, No. 21931. 
832 Ibid. 
833 Denza (n154) 183. 
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5.2 The Definition of State Responsibility 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, the VCDR does not define state responsibility in the context of 
protection of diplomats, simply enumerating the duties of receiving states in protecting them. Nor 
do other international conventions determine this responsibility. 
The responsibility of a state is one of the principles of international law. Shaw explains that 
several essential criteria must be met before state responsibility can adequately exist.834 These 
include the existence of an international legal obligation in force between two particular states. 
There must also have been an act or omission, which violates that obligation. In the Case 
concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran835 the responsibility of 
Iran was raised because of the breach of the VCDR. The Court, in its Judgment of 24 May 1980, 
found that Iran had violated and was still violating obligations it owed to the US under conventions 
in force between the two countries as well as rules of general international law, and that the 
violation of these obligations engaged its responsibility.836 
 
As for the International Law Commission, discussion about the responsibility of states for 
wrongful acts carried out intentionally led to a report to the UN General Assembly in 2001 which 
provided a definition of international responsibility. Art 1 stated that ‘Every internationally 
wrongful act by a State entails international responsibility’.837 This definition of state 
responsibility, which includes both action and omission being breaches, contrasts with TJ, which 
sets out punishment only for past crimes, and does not refer to omissions. This was confirmed by 
the ICJ in its decision in the case of the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
1980,838 as explained later in this chapter. 
Shaw added an act or omission imputable to the state responsible.839 Art 2 of Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001840 says that states actually commit an intentionally 
wrongful act if ‘the goal of that act or omission attributable to the state under international law 
                                                          
834 Shaw (n 27) 781. 
835 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
(Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3. 
836 Ibid. 
837 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. Of ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted on 10 August 2001 (2001 ILC Articles). 
838 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
(Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3. 
839 In Eureko BV v Republic of Poland, the judge stated that such wrongful acts may include actions or 
omissions or may be a combination of both of them. Hence, the word ‘act’ is estimated to include omissions.  
See Partial Award) (2005) Ad Hoc Arbitration. ; Shaw (n 27) 781; 
840 UN General Assembly, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts : resolution / 
adopted by the General Assembly, 8 January 2008, A/RES/62/61, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/478f60c 52.html [accessed 7 January 2018] 
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constitutes a breach of the obligation of the state’.841 Similarly, the ICJ in the United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case842 stated that one of the foundations of the law 
of state responsibility is that conduct of any state organ must be thought an act of the state under 
public international law giving rise to the responsibility of the state if it establishes a breach of an 
international duty. According to the ICJ, Iranian authorities did not try to prevent the offender 
from the seizure of the Embassy right up to the point of completion. During the events of 
November 1979, Iran did not ask offenders to stop or avert their action or withdraw from the US 
Embassy.843 Article 8 of the UN General Assembly Resolution on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) states the wrongful act committed by a person(s) is 
attributable to the state, when such acts were under the direction or control of the state or in 
accordance with its instructions.844 
 
Furthermore, loss or damage arising from that unlawful act/omission is considered the 
responsibility of the state. The state is responsible for its wrongful acts committed against other 
states. In case of proof that the act or omission has been committed and caused harm to others, 
the consequence of an unlawful harmful act is to provide compensation.845 Several contemporary 
authors consider that responsibility can be seen in contemporary society as a general principle of 
law. Both the Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor, the ICJ, confirmed very 
early on that the consequence of an unlawful harmful act was the duty to provide compensation.846 
Furthermore, the ICJ in Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran847 stated that one of the principles of international law is that appropriate compensation is 
required for breaches of international obligations. The ICJ decided that as a consequence of the 
Iran causing injury to the US, Iran was obliged to make reparation for this injury caused.848 It is 
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clear there is a significant relationship between state responsibility and reparations. Consequently, 
a state is responsible for the wrongful acts committed by its organs. This responsibility exists even 
if there is no fault on the part of the state itself. After the event, Iran was bound to release the 
hostages and to make reparation to the injured diplomats or their states,849 as the violations were 
considered Iran’s responsibility.850 
 
To summarise, the general responsibility of the host state for attacks on diplomats and their 
premises is subject to several conditions. First, breach of international obligation should have 
occurred, whether by act or omission. Second, this act or omission should be attributable to the 
state. Third, this act or omission should cause harm to the other state (i.e. its representatives). If 
these three elements of state responsibility can be proven then the host state is obliged to provide 
compensation to the injured diplomats or their states. 
 
5.3 International Responsibility and the Protection of Diplomats 
 
To determine the responsibility of states regarding the protection of diplomats, in circumstances 
where the attack on diplomats was caused by individuals or armed groups, a critical analysis of 
international laws and cases is required.  
Receiving states have an international obligation to prevent any abuses against diplomatic 
personnel. A state then incurs international responsibility for any harm caused to diplomatic 
personnel.851 According to the ICJ, the purpose of such protections from a long historical view is 
reflective of the international state system itself. Diplomats are the means for conducting and 
strengthening relationships between states. Diplomacy has an important role in shoring up the 
core stability goals of the international system852 
 
International responsibility for protecting diplomatic missions and their personnel is attributable to 
the receiving state and when an attack occurs against this target the state is guilty. A state is 
responsible for the wrongful acts committed by its nationals if they occurred under its order and 
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851Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign 
Domestic Courts’ (2011) 21(4) The European Journal of International Law 815.     
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direction.853 An example is the case of United States v. Iran (1980).854 
 
In brief, this case found that on 4 November 1979 the militants forcibly entered the US diplomatic 
mission and the ground floor of the Chancery building during an internal armed conflict. Iranian 
militants forcibly stormed the United States Embassy and overtook it. During this action six persons 
were killed and the US Ambassador to Tehran along with 70 diplomats and citizens was held as a 
hostage.855 The militants attempted to set the building on fire and cut through the upstairs steel 
doors with a torch, eventually gaining control of the main vault. In addition to the Chancery 
building, the surrounding mission premises were seized. All the diplomatic staff and other persons 
present were taken hostage. US nationals from other places in Tehran were brought to the Embassy 
and added to the number of hostages. The militants justified the taking of hostages as retaliation 
against the US for years of supporting the Shah of Iran and his totalitarian rule, and for giving him 
entrance to the US (in order to receive medical treatment). During October 1979 the Americans 
repeatedly sought assurances from the Iranian authorities that their diplomatic premises would be 
properly protected and the Iranian authorities repeatedly gave those assurances.856 Although the 
Iranian authorities (host state) under international law had responsibility to protect diplomats, and 
undertook to honour this responsibility; it then subsequently showed blatant disregard for the safety 
of foreign diplomats and thus for the Vienna Convention’s guarantee of their protection. According 
to the VCDR (1961) Article 29, ‘the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable’. Article 22 
(2) also states that the receiving state has a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the 
diplomats and their premises. However, the Iranian Government seems to have failed in every 
aspect by not taking any of the ‘appropriate steps’. At the time of the attack, the Iranian security 
personnel simply disappeared.857 
 
The invaders or militants after the attack on the US Embassy in Tehran and Consulates at Tabriz 
and Shiraz detained diplomatic and consular staff of the USA in Tehran as hostages. A dispute then 
arose as a consequence of the militants’ attack. The US initiated a suit against Iran.858 It claimed 
that the Government of Iran, in permitting, encouraging, tolerating, adopting, and making no effort 
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to prevent the action, along with failing to restrain and punish the conduct described in the 
Statement of the Facts, violated its international legal responsibilities to the United States.859 The 
ICJ held Iran responsible for the acts of its citizens.860 Although there was no proof that the 
militants were acting on behalf of the Government of Iran, it was held that Iran was responsible for 
the wrongful acts of its nationals as it did not take any action to prevent the revolutionaries or to 
release the hostages, and by its delay, it supported the revolutionaries861. For not taking the 
appropriate steps to prevent the attack on the US diplomats or their premises by these militants 
and for not stopping the attack, the Iranian Government was held responsible.862 
 
This violation of the international obligation to protect diplomats on the part of the Iranian 
government was confirmed by the ICJ, which stated that ‘the Iranian security personnel is reported 
to have simply disappeared from the scene; at all events it is established that they made no apparent 
effort to deter or prevent the demonstrators from seizing the embassy’s premises’863 
 
The attack on diplomats in Iran were not limited to the US Embassy; the British Embassy in Tehran 
was occupied on 5 November of the same year and the following day an Iraqi Consulate was also 
invaded.864 
 
Under international law the host state (Iran) had a responsibility to take proper steps to protect 
the diplomats. Iran therefore incurred the responsibility for not making any effort, whether positive 
or by omission. The US arranged to meet the Iranian authorities to discuss the release of the 
hostages; however, these efforts were unsuccessful. The US later ceased relations with Iran, 
stopped US exports and oil imports, and Iranian assets were frozen. Although the militants were 
not acting on behalf of the state, neither did the state uphold their duty to protect US nationals. The 
revolutionaries said they would hold the hostages until the Shah (the previous ruler of Iran), who 
was receiving medical treatment in the US, was returned to Iran.865 
 
The embassy personnel and other persons captured during the attack were held hostage for over 14 
months until 20 January 1981, with the exception of 13 persons released on 18 and 20 November 1979, 
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and the vice-consul who was released in July 1980.866 
 
The ICJ in its decision considered the acts incompatible with the obligations of Iran under treaties 
and rules of international law, as explained earlier. Also, the ICJ determined to what extent the acts 
of the armed groups could be regarded as imputable to Iran. The action of the armed groups was 
not attributed to Iranian authorities until 17 November, when Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree 
declaring that the hostages would (with some exceptions) remain ‘under arrest’ until the US had 
returned the former Shah and his property to Iran, and forbade all negotiation with the US on the 
subject.867 Ayatollah Khomeini described the Embassy as a ‘centre of espionage’.868 This decision 
makes it clear that the action of the armed group was considered a de facto action of the state of 
Iran due to the tacit compliance given by the official government position; thus the actions of the 
non-state armed group were attributed to the Iranian authorities. 
 
According to the ICJ, the Iranian authorities during the attack on 4 November were fully aware of 
their obligation under international law to take all appropriate steps to protect the US Embassy and 
its diplomatic staff and other persons inside premises from any attack during the armed conflict.869 
The Iranian authorities also understood the urgent need for action to be taken by them to protect 
the US Embassy. However, they were completely unsuccessful in complying with their obligations 
of protection despite having the means at their disposal to complete their duties.870 Iran could not 
claim that it had no knowledge of how to meet its international obligations towards the US to 
protect their diplomats and premises. This can be contrasted with the lack of means in Libya to 
protect diplomats and the inability of the state to protect them; Iran had the ability to protect 
diplomats and the means to do so, but it failed to provide the necessary protection. Iran 
intentionally neglected to cooperate with the sending state to protect diplomats, while in Libya 
the lack of means of protection prevented the government from fulfilling this same obligation. 
However, it is still the standard of due diligence which determines whether or not a host state 
meets its international obligations. 
 
The ICJ decision was to hold Iran responsible for failing to protect the embassy against the assault, 
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for not taking steps to protect the diplomatic and consular staff, for not stopping the attack before 
it reached its conclusion and for not initiating any action against the militants. Iran was asked to 
make reparation, the form and amount of which were to be settled by the court failing agreement 
between the parties.871 
 
Furthermore, as explained in Chapters 1 and 2 as an Islamic state Iran is responsible not only under 
international law but also in accordance with Sharia. Sharia has an early and powerful tradition of 
respect for diplomatic envoys and relations in the concept of aman, safe conduct, which legally 
compels the state to protect such personnel until their departure from its territory. Technically Iran 
is an Islamic Republic governed by the Sharia principles of Shia Islam, for whom the decree of an 
Ayatollah constitutes a Sharia ruling in itself, overriding the general principle of aman. In reality, 
this was clearly a politically motivated decision that reveals the deep influence of the thought of 
Sayyid Qutb in the Iranian Revolution.872 
 
5.4 Responsibility of State and Individuals under Public International Law 
 
 International law provides several articles on the protection of diplomats. Art 1 (b) of the 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979, grants diplomats special 
protection from any attack on their person or their families, their freedom or dignity.873 According 
to Article 2 of this Convention, the state has to take every possible measure to ensure that offenders 
are brought to justice and subject to punishment.874 Also, the state is required not just to free the 
diplomat who has been taken hostage, but also to ensure his or her safe departure from the 
receiving country.875 
 
Furthermore, Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973, outlines the crimes 
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against the diplomats. These include murder, kidnapping or any other form of attack against a 
person or the freedom of a person; the use of violence on the official diplomatic or consular 
premises, private accommodation or means of transportation of an internationally protected 
person or member of his family, which exposes a person or freedom of the person to the 
threatened.876 Several states responded to these terms and made efforts to free diplomats by 
meeting the demands of the abductors, even though in some cases this might affect the national 
interest of the receiving state, while the others were unsuccessful in meeting the kidnappers’ 
demands. For example, Charles Burke Elbrick, the American ambassador to Brazil was 
kidnapped in September 1969 by members of the October 8th Revolutionary Movement, as 
described in Chapter 1. Brazil responded to pressure from the US to meet the demands of the 
kidnappers in order to ensure the release of Ambassador Elbrick.877 
 
International law requires states to cooperate with each other in the prevention of crimes against 
international persons, including diplomats. Art 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 
1973, rules that states party to this convention need either to extradite the offenders or subject him 
or her to prosecution without delay in accordance with its competent authorities.878 An example is 
the events of 1973 in Sudan, when the gunmen (the Palestinian terrorist group Black September) 
stormed the Saudi Arabian Embassy and took several diplomats hostage. After a few hours, a 
number of important diplomatic personnel including the US Ambassador to the Sudan, his deputy 
and the Belgian chargé d’affaires were killed. Although the Sudan judiciary punished the 
offenders,879the sentences were later commuted from life to a lenient seven years.880 Also, the 
Convention of 1973 requested that states set out in their local legislation suitable punishment(s) 
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for crimes against diplomats.881 
In this regard, Art 203 of the Iraqi Civil Code stated that in the case of the killing of a person by 
an organ of state, the offender is not only subject to punishment but also has to pay 
compensation.882 Although the Iraqi Civil Code did not refer specifically to diplomats, this article 
could be applied to them. Nevertheless, under Art 219 of the Iraqi Civil Law, the victim could 
charge the state itself according to the state responsibility for wrongful acts committed by its 
organs or officials.883 However, when crimes against diplomats are committed by private 
individuals, the individuals are responsible for their crimes.884 The question then arises as to 
whether the state has any responsibility in this situation. 
 
The State incurs civil responsibility when there is a breach of a previous obligation or it fails to meet 
its obligation under international law, for instance, failure to meet its obligation to protect 
diplomats. This failure includes preventing the occurrence of the crimes mentioned above against 
diplomats, failure to punish the offenders, and failure to remedy the violation of international law 
by private persons which might have caused injury to a diplomat.885 Hence, the protection of 
diplomats is not limited to due diligence by the receiving state to prevent injuries but extends to the 
prosecution, punishment, apology and redress for injuries which it was unable to prevent.886 If this 
special protection stated by the VCDR has not been granted by the receiving state, and there is no 
local remedy, then the injured diplomat or his or her state has the right to claim reparation. Article 
44 of the VCDR does not limit the duties of the receiving state for special protection in time of 
peace, but also when the state is faced with a civil war, mob action, or an insurrection. These 
circumstances do not affect the duty of the host state in the prevention the crimes and the 
punishment of offenders as the state still has the responsibility to protect diplomats.887 
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State are also responsible for the wrongful act of its agent. Acts of State could be represented by 
the acts of agents and/or representatives.888 State responsibility then arises from the actions taken 
by its officials or organs of state. For example, in the case for violation of the immunity and 
privileges of diplomats by its officials, the state is responsible for violation of international law. 
Hence, the arrest or detention of diplomats is an abuse of diplomatic immunity, and the state is 
responsible.889 
 
The state is not only responsible for commission but also for omission when its officials, organs of 
state or any other person representing the state commit violations.890 These could be carried out 
by individuals or by a group of individuals (whether officials or private individuals), whose 
characteristics will determine the responsibility of the state or otherwise. The action under question 
must be a clear violation of international law before the state can be held liable. This means that the 
state is responsible whether the action is allowed under its local law or not. These acts of 
commission or omission must have caused injury to the diplomats (whether this injury is moral 
suffering or material loss) in order for the state to be held responsible. Compassion, however, for 
moral suffering has not been consistently awarded.891 
 
However, it is not easy to say whether the State is responsible for its commission or omission 
without first determining whether is practised due diligence.892 For example, in the case of the 
killing of American diplomats to Libya in 2011, Libya had exercised reasonably due diligence to 
try and prevent their injury, with ‘Libyans fighting alongside US personnel during the assault’.893 
The Libyan authority also apologized to the US over the murder.894 Furthermore, Libya has taken 
serious steps after the murder to make sure such crimes would not be repeated in future. For 
example, Libya enacted the Libyan Anti-Terrorism Law 2013 which includes punishment for 
attacks on diplomats and their premises, as explained early in Chapter 1. This law is unique in the 
MENA region as Libya is the first and currently the only receiving state in that region to take steps 
to guarantee the protection of diplomats and seek redress for them. The Libyan authorities took 
these important steps to avoid breaching international obligations to protect diplomats, even 
though the actions against the US diplomats were committed by Libyan non-state actors without 
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the knowledge or approval of the Libyan authorities. However, the degree of such protection and 
the amount of the reparation is still not clear.895 
 
Whether discussing responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, or liability for acts prohibited 
by international law, damage remains the central trigger of both responsibility and liability; the 
object of both mechanisms being to ensure reparation for damage, whether that damage results 
from a violation of an obligation, or from an activity involving risk to diplomats.896 
 
If an element of responsibility exists, then the state is responsible for repairing the damage caused 
by its wrongful act. The state is also responsible for making full and appropriate reparation for 
any loss or damage it has caused, whether material or moral,897and for restoring the situation to 
what it was.898 
 
In practice, several states have paid reparation to injured states. For example, in 1962 the British 
Embassy in Jakarta was attacked; the Ambassador was hit by stones and 23 staff were immolated, 
while the Indonesian authorities did nothing to try to protect the diplomatic personnel or even to 
extinguish the fire. Consequently the Indonesian government paid £600,000 to the British 
government. Similarly, Pakistan paid compensation for the 1979 looting of the US Embassy in 
Islamabad.899 
 
Furthermore, in the Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 
the ICJ stated that ‘Iran is under an obligation to make reparation for the injury caused to the 
United States, and that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the 
parties, shall be settled by the Court’.900 The consequence of the Iranian violation of international 
law was not limited to reparation, as the ICJ also decided that the government of Iran should 
prosecute those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the 
United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates.901 
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As explained above, responsibility falls on the state when an act or omission is committed by an 
organ of the state or its officials. The state does not incur direct responsibility for the acts of 
private individuals. For example, in cases where crimes are committed by individuals and the state 
fails to either prevent this act or to punish the criminals, or in the case where the state encourages 
such acts, indirect responsibility will be incurred by the state. If by negligence or by omission, 
the state’s police fail to prevent such an act and this leads to the injury of diplomats, then this 
omission by the state’s police may be attributable to the state. This implies that to determine the 
state’s responsibility, a distinction needs to be made between the direct responsibility incurred by 
state agents, those authorized, or controlled by it or acting on its behalf, and / or the indirect 
responsibility of the private individual.902 
 
However, states are still obligated under international law to employ due diligence to prevent the 
commission on their territory of certain acts by persons injurious to diplomats. Hence, state 
responsibility could arise fror failure either to punish the offender or to provide a proper legal 
remedy for the diplomats. Reparations and punishment are also required in this case. The reparation 
could include several acts, such as apologies to the injured state, disowning the act, or expressing 
regret. It is the responsibility of the state to repair any material or moral damage caused by the 
violation of international law. Although individuals could be subject to punishment and pay 
compensation for any material damage, the state is still liable.903 
 
Proper diligence needs to be undertaken by the state to prevent the injury of diplomats. The 
question then arises as to the level or degree to which local protection should be provided by the 
state to determine that it has exercised due diligence. As Baumann has pointed out, ‘in normally 
well-ordered states governmental liability is dependent upon its ability to protect the injured person 
in any given case’.904 Also, the circumstances around the case might determine the degree of 
protection to be provided by the state. For example, in some cases a state might need to double its 
effort to protect diplomats, such as the instance Baumann gave where ‘the moving cause of the 
injury is notorious, e.g. bandits in a certain locality, a greater degree of protection is incumbent 
upon the government than in cases of sudden violence which the best- organized government could 
not foresee’.905 To determine the level of the culpability of state in not providing the proper 
amount of protection, diplomats need to present the receiving state with details of their movements, 
to determine the degree of danger and the degree of protection that might be needed. For example, 
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two Serbian Embassy employees, the communications officer, Sladjana Stankovic, and driver 
Jovica Stepic, were kidnapped by gunmen in the north-west Libyan coastal town of Sabratha.906 
Ambassador Oliver Potezica, who escaped unharmed and was travelling in the three-vehicle 
convoy with his wife and two sons aged 8 and 14, later reported the attack, which occurred when 
one of the embassy cars was hit from behind and the convoy was ambushed by an armed group. 
When the driver came out to check what had happened, he was dragged into one of the attackers’ 
cars. Although the Libyan authorities made efforts to secure the hostages’ release, they argued that 
it was not safe to travel through the area unguarded, and that the embassy had not notified the local 
authorities in advance about the trip.907 This would lead to the conclusion that the receiving state 
(Libya) was not responsible for the incident, because the diplomatic mission had not informed the 
authorities that suitable and ample protection was required. Otherwise, a prior request for sufficient 
police protection may afford a legal basis for reparations if such protection is not provided and 
injuries incur.908 Liability is predicated on the failure to prevent the injury, regardless of ability to 
prevent it.909 As at the time of writing, the case is still progressing and no feasible outcome has 
been reached. 
 
Injurious acts such as attacks or insults against diplomats are regarded as injuries against the 
sending state itself and any claim for redress is brought by that state on its own behalf. This was 
clear in the case of Respublica v. ‘de Long-champs in which the judge stated that ‘The person of 
a public minister is sacred and inviolable. Whoever offers any violence to him, not only affronts the 
Sovereign he represents, but also hurts the common safety and well-being of nations: he is guilty 
of a crime against the whole world’.910 
 
The special protection provided to diplomats by the receiving state consists of the government’s 
obligation to prevent violations of their personal dignity, their personal safety, and their intercourse 
with their government at home. If this protection cannot to be met by the receiving state, then that 
state should punish the offenders harshly. 
 
It is recognized that this protection is provided for in both the general principles of international 
law and the local laws of some receiving states. Several States have enacted laws outlining the 
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sentence for offences committed by individuals against diplomats. For example, in the United 
States, the law provides that ‘...assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers violence to… 
ambassador… shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than three years, or 
both… uses a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned 
not more than ten years, or both’.911 
 
The question then arises as to whether, in the absence of any laws directly providing for the 
punishment of attacks on diplomats, the domestic criminal laws can be applied. Applying these 
laws would provide appropriate trial procedures and sentences. The state is obligated to punish 
offenders according to their local laws for violation of the international obligation of providing 
special protection for diplomats. This holds whether the crimes are committed by an organ of state 
or by a private individual. Such violations must be remedied by the offending state through any 
rational means which will bring the offenders to justice; otherwise, the right of reparation might 
arise.912 
 
However, the sending state cannot demand this right of reparation unless all local remedies have 
been exhausted. This means that sending state needs to give the receiving state which failed to 
prevent the assault or attack on a diplomat, the opportunity to punish the individuals who committed 
the crime.913 
 
In cases where local remedies are absent, insufficient, or are applied indifferently, direct 
diplomatic action could be taken. Such cases include: the receiving state after reasonable 
opportunity fails to bring the offenders to justice; insufficient sentence for responsible persons; 
escaping of offenders due to neglect on the part of the state or an unjustifiable delay in inspecting 
the facts. Also included is an amnesty to criminals or avoiding the punishment of offenders. Direct 
action might be taken by the state of an injured diplomat by demanding redress or reparations. 
This usually occurs only if local remedies are not afforded or are insufficient, or if they have been 
exhausted without provision of satisfactory justice.914 In cases where there is a lack of special 
protection either as a failure of prevention or inadequate punishment, the injured diplomat’s state 
may claim reparations for injury to itself through its official representative, and it becomes an 
international issue. From this point, states may resolve the issue either amicably or otherwise, using 
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methods ranging from diplomatic negotiations down to the use of force. The amicable methods 
that might be used include the as use of good offices, diplomatic interposition, mediation and 
arbitration. Unfriendly methods that might be used by the injured state include withdrawal of 
diplomatic representatives, a show of force, and the use of armed force.915 
 
Under the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the core 
legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act set out in part two are the obligations of the 
responsible state to cease the wrongful conduct,916 and to make full reparation for the injury caused 
by the internationally wrongful act.917 
 
Where the internationally wrongful act constitutes a serious breach by the state, it is held 
responsible under international law and the breach may entail further consequences both for the 
responsible state and for other states. In particular, all states in such cases have obligations to 
cooperate to bring the breach to an end, not to recognize as lawful the situation created by the 
breach and not to render aid or assistance to the responsible state in maintaining the situation so 
created.918 
 
International law requires that the wrongful act committed by the state should cease and that 
further action should be taken by the responsible state (for example, non-repetition of this 
wrongful act needs to be guaranteed).919 The injured state is to invoke the cessation by another 
state if the wrongful act of this state is continued until the time of claim. 920 
 
For example, in the case concerning United State v. Iran the ICJ 921 stated that Iran needed to 
secure the immediate release of all United States nationals detained within the premises of the its 
Embassy in Tehran, and to guarantee that those persons and all other United States nationals in 
Tehran be safely allowed to leave Iran. 
 
Expressions of condolence and solidarity following violations of the safety of diplomats are 
common, as in the case of the murder of a US Vice-Consul by terrorists in Cyprus, or the murder 
of an employee in the US Embassy in Damascus by a terrorist bomb, after which the nations 
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involved offered full cooperation and support for criminal investigations and prosecutions.922 The 
Cuban who murdered a Spanish diplomat in Mexico in 1950 was sentenced to 16 years in 
prison.923 Remuneration was paid in the case of the murder of a British Military Attaché in 
Baghdad.924 
 
That state have responsibility to take serious steps to protect diplomats was confirmed by the 
General Assembly No 136/38. In accordance with this decision of the General Assembly, several 
states took important steps, including France, which in 1982 set up a centralized system for the 
registration of terrorism, and established a central office to counter the transfer of weapons, 
explosives and sensitive materials. 
 
Lebanon took important steps to protect diplomats and their premises on 24 March 1982, when 
legislation No (5018) covered the establishment of special troops called troops for the security 
of embassies. The duties of these troops were protection of diplomatic premises in Lebanon, 
protection of the head of the diplomatic mission and the diplomatic staff when it is necessary, and 
accompanying the mission’s special documents during transfer when necessary. According to 
Article 3 of this law, these troops were made up of commandos, soldiers, detectives’ forces, guard 
forces, general reserves and emergency services. Similarly, the Metropolitan Police in London 
has a special branch known as the Diplomatic Squad. This comprises police officers who are 
specially trained and specifically assigned to protect diplomats and diplomatic premises.925 
 
5.5 Responsibility of States in Time of Civil War and Civil Commotion  
 
Although receiving states are under an international obligation to grant adequate protection to 
diplomats, including measures taken by the State such as the posting of police guards at the 
embassy or the provision of an armed escort for envoys, the definition of adequate protection is 
still an ambiguous and confusing term in cases of political turmoil, mob action, insurrection and 
civil war.926 
 
Baumann stated that in times of insurrection and civil war, and especially when a government is 
                                                          
922 Baumann (n 131) 71. 
923 Ibid 71. 
924 Ibid 71. 
925 The Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command (PaDP) was formed in April 2015, with the merger 
of the Diplomatic Protection Group (SO6) and the Palaces of Westminster (SO17). Available at 
<http://content.met.police.uk/Site/diplomaticprotectiongroup> Accessed 2 June 2016. 
926 Baumann (n 131) 51. 
209  
unable to prevent injurious acts by individuals in conditions of civil commotion, the receiving state 
is not directly responsible for injuries which may be received by aliens in the course of such 
struggles.927 This means that proof of the level of effort taken by the receiving state is needed in 
order to decide whether it is culpable. Similarly, Hollis stated that to accuse Libya of being 
responsible for the killing of an American diplomat to Libya, or Egypt of being responsible for the 
attack on the US Embassy in Cairo, it was necessary first to determine whether they had taken all 
the necessary measures to protect the diplomats and their premises.928 
 
Again under international law, when the state fails to meet its obligation of preventing, punishing 
or remedying any abuse by individuals which caused injury to a diplomat, the receiving state is 
indirectly responsible for protection of the diplomats. 
 
As explained above, the injured diplomat’s state may demand reparations from the receiving state 
when receiving state fails to afford special protection and/or if adequate local remedies are absent. 
The state is also obligated under the VCDR to provide diplomats with special protection. 
 
The receiving state in time of civil war is responsible for providing special protection for diplomats, 
and when a wrongful act is committed by a private individual, and the state had failed to provide 
this protection, then the state is responsible for prosecution, punishment, apology, and redress for 
injuries, as stated earlier. With reference to the case study, in the time of insurrection and civil 
war, the responsibility of the Libyan authority could be determined in accordance with whether 
it had met its duty before and after the crimes were committed. Before the crimes against US 
diplomats were committed, Libya should have provided special protection for diplomats (due 
diligence), while its duty after the crimes against was to find justice for the injured diplomats. 939 
The Libyan authority was thus indirectly responsible for murder of the American ambassador by 
the Libyan rebels. Again, the Libyan authorities had exercised reasonably due diligence to try and 
prevent the killing, and also took satisfactory steps to ensure that there was no repeat of the crime. 
The US Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee Report of 30 July 2014 confirmed 
the inability of the Libyan government to adequately provide security for the Mission in 
Benghazi.929 Furthermore, the new Libyan government apologized to the US and promised that it 
would take appropriate measures to protect diplomats.930 It is generally accepted that the state 
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928 Duncan Hollis ‘The Duty to Protect Diplomatic and Consular Premises’ (2012) NYU Journal Law and 
Political. Available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/12/the-duty-to-protect-diplomatic-and- consular-
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929 Baumann (n 131) 44. 
930 Alex Tiersky and Susan B. Epstein ‘Securing US Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background 
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performed its due diligence,931 and therefore, could not be held responsible for the wrongful acts 
committed by the rioters or rebels if it was proved that they acted in good faith and without 
negligence. 
 
The question might arise as to whether the state is responsible in cases where they could not prevent 
injurious acts by individuals against diplomats in times of civil commotion. While the state is 
generally responsible for injuries incurred by foreigners resulting from its failure to protect them 
during disturbances, clearly it cannot be held directly responsible for such acts in themselves, and 
common standards of due diligence come into play.932 Due diligence can take different forms and 
require serious action by the state as diplomats are faced with various forms of attack or assault. 
Due diligence will vary according to the situation and the special set of circumstances that come 
with it. Take for instance one common form of attack, kidnapping. The question arises as to whether 
the payment of ransom to the kidnapper for the return of diplomats is part of the duty of special 
protection falling on the receiving state? 
 
On several occasions, kidnappers have demanded for a ransom as a condition of releasing the 
diplomats, and states have responded to these demands in different ways. Some give in to the 
demands in order to release the diplomats, while others refuse to do so because they believe it is 
not in the national interest. However, prioritizing the national interest in most cases leads to 
breaking off diplomatic relationships between the receiving and sending states. For instance, in 
1970 West German diplomats to Guatemala were abducted and subsequently killed by the Rebel 
Armed Forces (RAF). This killing happened after the Guatemalan government refused to comply 
with the RAF’s demands of releasing 25 prisoners and paying $700,000 in ransom. 933Thereafter 
West Germany withdrew its diplomatic mission from Guatemala and asked the Guatemalan 
mission staff to leave Bonn. This was because the West German government claimed that 
Guatemala had breached international law by not making an effort to save the life of West 
Germany’s diplomats, and that its refusal to deal with the rebels in order to release the diplomat was 
a breach of Article 22(2) of the VCDR, which obligates receiving states to take all necessary 
measures to protect diplomats. As a humanitarian gesture, sending states have in some cases 
advanced the price of the ransom for payment to the kidnappers.934 
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931 Baumann (n 131) 47. 
932 Ibid 51. 
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Where the sending state protests, no special protection of diplomats is required from the receiving 
state. However, receiving states are under an obligation to afford diplomats the same security from 
any assault or attack which it grants to others residents.935 Although the state might have difficult y 
in controlling angry protesters, this researcher argues that the state is still responsible for protecting 
the diplomats. Article 44 of the VCDR states that even in the case of war between the sending and 
receiving states, the receiving state is responsible for the safe departure of the diplomats from its 
territory. Therefore, although mob actions, insurrection and civil war often complicate the legal 
picture, the rules of due diligence in the prevention and punishment through local remedies generally 
continue to apply. However, the situation in MENA areas is different, as there is generally a lack of 
relevant legislation, and in cases where it does exist, there is a lack of mechanisms to implement 
these laws. There are regions where the government has lost control of the territory, with armed 
groups taking over several areas and controlling the prisons, judiciary and other government 
systems. This leads to impunity and makes it difficult to charge the offenders. That is, in cases 
where the state has lost control over its territory, due diligence will not be possible. 
 
As explained earlier, another problem that might arise in the case of civil war or internal disturbance 
and political tension, is the absence of international observation, which increases the chances of 
the violation of human rights. For these reasons, this researcher suggests that the TJ system be 
applied as explained in Chapter 4, to ensure the punishment of offenders, and to avoid impunity 
when the armed groups take control of most of the territory of the receiving state. 
 
5.6 International Responsibility of State during Armed Conflicts 
 
During periods of armed conflict, diplomats enjoy the same protection that ordinary persons or 
citizens of the receiving state enjoy. This is in addition to any protection provided specifically to 
diplomats under international law, such as diplomatic protection. This means that diplomats enjoy 
the protection provided for by the international humanitarian law (IHL) which implies that the 
receiving state incurs responsibility for any violation of the IHL. The protection of diplomats is 
based on the IHL along with international law represented by the VCDR. This double basis of 
protection elevates the status of diplomats above that of ordinary persons or the citizens of the 
receiving state. 
 
However, those enjoying the protection of IHL, whether ordinary persons or diplomats, should be 
civilians. A civilian is one who does not bear arms and does not engage in armed combat, or who 
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might have done in the past but has laid down his arms.936 The judiciary has a similar definition of 
civilians to that of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which defines 
civilians as ‘persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces’.937 
 
The Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 provides for the protection of civilians, during armed 
conflict. This is based on the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians during 
military operations and the classification of diplomats as civilians, confirming that the rights 
provided by this convention are also applicable to diplomats. 
 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 1949, which gave civilians protection from any attack, defined 
civil persons as those who does not involve themselves in conflict.938 
 
One of the most important aims of the IHL is protecting civilians during different kinds of conflict. 
Hence, distinguishing between civilians and combatants is one of the important obligations that the 
parties in conflicts have to respect. The IHL mentions the protection of the civil person in several 
laws. For example, Article 48 of Additional Protocol l states that the importance of this distinction 
between civilian and combatant is in the interest of civilians, to allow them to enjoy protection and 
requiring the parties in the conflict to bear in mind this distinction: ‘In order to …protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, Parties to the conflict shall … distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives ...’939 
 
Furthermore, the Declaration on the Rules of International Humanitarian Law 1990 governing the 
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humiliating and degrading treatment; d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
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939 Council of the International Institute of the Humanitarian Law, Declaration on the Rules of international 
humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities in non -international armed conflicts, (San Remo, 7 
April 1990). A6 
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conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts paid special attention to the distinction 
between combatants and civilians and to the immunity of the civilian population during non-
international armed conflicts.940 
 
These rules ban launching any attacks on the civilian population as such or against individual 
civilians, as is the general rule applicable in non-international armed conflict.941 
 
Also, Article 51(2) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
prohibits ‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the 
civilian population’.942 Moreover, Article 8(e) (i) of the Rome Statute prohibits that ‘Intentionally 
directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians, not taking 
direct part in hostilities’943 
 
The difference between civilians and the military was made when international law provided 
civilians protection from the objectives of military operations. For instance, Para 3 of Article 51 of 
Additional Protocol l of Geneva Convention grants protection to civil persons on condition that 
they do not engage in the war. Similarly, Para 3 of Article 50 of the Additional protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions stated that ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’.944 
 
Article 52 (1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 states that 
‘Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects 
which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2’.945 Also, Article 52 (2) prohibits 
attacks on civilian locations; for this purpose, military places are described as places used for 
military activities or for military purposes. The article states that attacks should be ‘limited strictly 
to military objectives …, military objectives are limited to those objects which … contribution to 
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military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’.946 
 
The Committee of Human Rights states that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 can be applied in armed conflict. Furthermore, the ICJ and the UN Commission on Human 
Rights confirm that the human rights laws remain applicable in times of armed conflict, and are 
complementary to the IHL. An exception is through the provisions on derogation of the kind 
contained in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.947 
 
Furthermore; international law states that when there is doubt about a person’s real status, the 
person will be taken to be a civilian. This is set in Art 50 (1) of the  Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions, and relates to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977 which confirms the protection of individuals whose status is not clear. 
That is, in case of doubt about their status, they should be regarded as civil persons. Similarly, 
Protocol II (draft) Article 25(4) states that ‘In case of doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, 
he or she shall be considered to be a civilian’.948 
Under IHL, diplomats are prohibited from bearing arms or participating in hostilities, and they 
have no military attributes and not violate the laws of the state of occupation in order to benefit 
from the civil person protection.949 
 
The protection provided to diplomats is provided only on condition that they take no action that 
will adversely affect their status as civilians, and this protection is lost in cases of their direct action 
in the on-going hostilities between the parties to the conflict. This was confirmed in part 3 of Article 
51 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,950 and Rule 6 of 
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the Customary International Humanitarian Law applicable to international and non- international 
armed conflicts that ‘Civilians are protected against attack unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities’951 
 
The protection of civil persons under international law was set out in Art (4) (I) of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, as the persons who are not nationals and find themselves during the conflict 
under the authority of the conflict or occupying parties.952 This Article also states that nationals of 
states that are not bound by the Convention cannot be protected by it.953 Both Libya and America 
are parties of the Geneva Convention.954 
It has often been observed that armed conflicts are usually accompanied by a massive number of 
IHL violations. This gives the international community a clear signal that there is a need for 
deterrent measures in order to deter the perpetrators of these violations. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949 and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
describe what acts are considered as violations, including assaults on the lives of people who are 
not involved in hostilities. Article 85 of the Protocol states that serious violations of the Geneva 
Conventions and this Protocol will be considered war crimes while Article 147 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949 and Article 85 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (1998) 
provide lists of serious irregularities that constitute war crimes. These include; murder, torture and 
inhuman treatment, including tests for knowledge of life such as biological experiments, wilfully 
causing great suffering and serious damage to physical or mental integrity, the kidnapping and 
hostage-taking of diplomats, intentionally directing attacks against diplomats in their capacity as 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, illegal detention of diplomats, and 
intentionally launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the premises of the diplomats with the 
knowledge that such an attack will cause excessive loss of life of diplomats, or injure the diplomats, 
or cause damage to their premises and their facilities. 
 
                                                          
December 1979]. 
951 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law , 2005, 
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952 ‘Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, 
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Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 points out the criminal aspects of 
international responsibility: where contracting states are committed to taking the necessary 
legislative measures to impose sanctions on persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any 
of the grave breaches mentioned above and to bring them to trial regardless of their nationality.955 
On the other hand, the terms of article 146 state that each contracting party if it prefers, and in 
accordance with the provisions of its legislation can deliver these defendants to the other 
contracting party concerned for trial as long as they provide such party with sufficient 
incriminating evidence against these persons. Article 157 of Customary IHL stipulates that states 
have the right to empower national courts with universal jurisdiction to look into war crimes.956 
 
Receiving states can be subject to tort liability for the targeting of diplomats during armed 
conflicts while individuals also incur responsibilities for their actions which are deemed as war 
crimes. The tort liability of the state could be a result of the actions of its officials or organs, as 
explained earlier.957 
 
In accordance with a breach of the obligations of IL (VCDR), the civil or tort responsibility of the 
receiving state can exist as a result of attacks against diplomats in the event of a proven breach 
of any of the following obligations: 
 
1 The obligation to facilitate the departure of diplomats and their family members from 
the territory of the receiving state as soon as possible (as soon as the outbreak of 
military operations).958 
 
2 The obligation to take all preventive security measures to ensure the protection of 
                                                          
955 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
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diplomatic envoys and their premises from any of the dangers of the current military 
operations in the receiving state.959 
 
3 Again, the responsibility of the state to protect the diplomat is not limited to preventing 
crimes from occurring but extends to the arrest, prosecution and punishment of 
offenders of crimes against diplomats. 
It is known that the state incurs responsibility if it does not carry out its duty in preventing crime 
or fails to prosecute offenders, or is deliberately negligee net in their search of offenders, or refuses 
to try or punish, or failed to monitor him/her enabling them escape, or is quick to pardon him/her 
after sentencing.960 
 
Under international law, the responsibility of the receiving state to protect diplomats is required 
both in times of peace and in times of armed conflict. The receiving state in a time of conflict 
needs to make efforts to let the diplomatic staff and their families leave in good time. This has to be 
done even in cases where the relationship between the receiving and sending state might be broken 
off.961 Article 44 requires the receiving State, even in the case of armed conflict, to provide the 
necessary means of transport for diplomats to enable them to leave at the earliest possible moment. 
This was confirmed by judgments such as in the case of Congo v. Uganda.962 Uganda claimed 
that a force from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) invaded and seized the 
Ugandan embassy and that Ugandan diplomats to the DRC were mistreated by the receiving state 
in direct violation of the Vienna Convention of 1961. The court held the DCR responsible for this 
violation of Articles 22 and 29 of the convention, stating that ‘With respect to the question of 
admissibility, the Court finds that its Order of 29 November 2001 did not preclude Uganda from 
invoking the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations since the formulation of the Order was 
sufficiently broad to encompass claims based on the Convention. It further observes that the 
substance of the part of the counterclaim relating to acts of maltreatment against other persons 
on the premises of the Embassy falls within the ambit of Article 22 of the Convention and is 
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admissible… ‘The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to prove … acts of maltreatment 
against Ugandan diplomats on Embassy premises… It finds that, by committing those acts, the 
DRC breached its obligations under Articles 22 and 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.’ 
 
Also, as the ICJ confirmed in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran,963 the inviolability of diplomatic personnel is essential for the conduct of relations 
between states even in the situation of armed conflict. 
 
The dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia was similar. In this Diplomatic Claim and in its defence 
in Eritrea’s Diplomatic Claim, Ethiopia took the position that a state of war must modify the 
application of the international diplomatic law. In turn, Eritrea argued for strict application of the 
standards in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations despite a state of war.964 
 
A caveat to these considerations is that diplomatic relations are generally severed between 
combatant nations in conflicts; while a period of grace is generally allowed to decommission 
properties etc. and for diplomatic personnel to vacate the country, this cannot always be 
expediently achieved (and may be abused in bad faith by receiving states). However, the VCDR 
obliges states to protect diplomatic premises for the duration of hostilities, viewing conflict as an 
extraordinary situation.965 
 
Such obligations cannot be waived on the grounds of the exigencies of war. Furthermore, the 
reciprocal nature of diplomacy, as the VCDR (Article 2) notes, entails that relations between states 
depend on mutual consent, which also pertains to the protection of diplomatic personnel and 
properties.966 
 
To determine the responsibility of the state or individuals for violation of IHL in times of armed 
conflict, the attribution of an act by the state or individuals is required. Under Rule 149 of the 
Customary International Humanitarian Law 2005,967 the state is responsible for any violation 
of IHL attributed to it. This article also determines other cases where violation is attributed to the 
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state: when an official of the state commits the violation; when this act is committed by these 
officials in the course of carrying out their official duties; when the state adopts these actions; or 
when this action or violation is committed under its orders or instructions.968 If this attribution is 
confirmed, then the burden of responsibility falls on the state, which must make reparation for any 
loss or injury sustained.969 
 
 
Individuals are also responsible for any violation of IHL; however, this responsibility is criminal 
and is considered as a war crime.970 The criminal responsibility lies with the commanders under 
whose order the violation was committed.971Commanders are thus criminally responsible for 
violations committed by their subordinates, if they did not take suitable action to prevent the 
violation. This requires commanders to know that the violation is about to be committed.972 
 
To summarise; diplomatic missions during armed conflicts enjoy double protection based on 
international law and IHL. Within the scope of the latter, diplomats are considered as civilians and 
have the right to protection of civilians afforded under the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 
responsible for the protection of civilians in time of war. According to the principle of 
distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military targets 
during armed conflicts, the parties engaged in the conflict cannot target diplomatic premises or 
diplomats. Targeting civilians is considered a war crime entailing international responsibility, 
as a gross violation of the rules of IHL. The ICJ insists that the VCDR should be applied in times 
of armed conflict, even though several states have claimed that this was impossible. To recap, 
IHL applies alongside the VCDR in times of armed conflict. 
 
 
On the other hand, it should be noted that in accordance with international law, whenever two or 
                                                          
968 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
2005, Volume I: Rules, Rule 149. ‘A State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law 
attributable to it, including: (a) violations committed by its organs, including its armed forces; 
(b) violations committed by persons or entities it empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority; 
(c) violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or 
control; and (d) Violations committed by private persons or groups which it acknowledges and adopts as its 
own conduct’. 
969 Ibid Rule 150. ‘A State responsible for violations of international humanitarian law is 
Required to make full reparation for the loss or injury caused’. 
970 Ibid Rule 151. ‘Individuals are criminally responsible for war crimes they commit’. 
971 Ibid Rule 152’. Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war crimes committed 
pursuant to their orders’. 
972 Ibid Rule 153. ‘Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war crimes committed by 
their subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that the subordinates were about to commit or were 
committing such crimes and did not take all necessary and reasonable measures in their power to prevent their 
commission, or if such crimes had been committed, to punish the persons responsible’. 
220  
more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the one that is more 
specific.
973 The doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generalis states that when two pieces of 
legislation, or in this case two separate bodies of law, purport to legislate on the same issue, the 
more specific legislation is overriding. IHL is exclusively applied during times of armed conflict, 
while the VCDR is applied during both armed conflict and peacetime. IHL is a general law applied 
for all injured people during the conflict, while the VCDR specialises in diplomatic cases. The 
rationale is that special law (VCDR) has priority over general law (IHL), justified by the fact that 
such special law (VCDR), being more concrete, often takes better account of the particular features 
of the context in which it is to be applied than any applicable general law (IHL). Its application may 
also create a more equitable result and better reflect the intent of the legal subject974 This means 
that the case of diplomats injured during armed conflict is exclusively a matter for the VCDR (as 
lex specialis), which overrides IHL. 
 
To put the responsibility for the action or omission on the state, the action needs to be attributed 
to the state, in which case the states incurs tort responsibility. Although this responsibility in local 
laws often refers to reparation or restoring relationships to their status before the action, under 
international law the tortious liability implies much more. This includes an apology to the injured 
state, expression of regret, disapproval by the receiving state of the acts in question, or any other 
deeds to satisfy the state of the injured diplomats. 
 
 
5.7 Armed Non-State Actors Responsibilities for Reparation 
 
The most recent attacks on diplomats have involved armed criminal groups, albeit motivated by 
different objectives. Such attacks are not new. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the US Ambassador 
John Gordon Mein was killed in 1968 i n  a bungled kidnapping attempt in Guatemala by the Rebel 
Armed Forces (RAF).975 Similarly, in 1969, Charles Burker Elbric, the US Ambassador to Brazil, 
was kidnapped and later released after the demands of the group were met.976 In most cases of 
the kidnapping of diplomats by organised groups, an exchange of political prisoners is involved. 
 
1970 proved to be a significant year for diplomatic kidnappings. In Brazil in December of that 
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year Giovanni Enrico Bucher, the Swiss Ambassador, was kidnapped by members of the Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Vanguard. In response, the Swiss Government demanded that  the Brazilian 
Government take immediate steps to secure the release of Ambassador Bucher, and close contact 
was maintained between the Swiss and Brazilian authorities.977 Such instances were common 
in Brazil until an amnesty was agreed whereby the Brazilian government released 129 political 
prisoners.978 The unusual selection of a Swiss diplomat as a target was perhaps inspired by learning 
the concessions that could be achieved by kidnapping diplomats from ‘imperialist’ countries, 
particularly the US, which gave them greater leverage in influencing the government of the host 
state. 
 
For instance, the kidnapping of Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, an Air Attaché at the US Embassy in 
Santo Domingo in 1970, was undertaken to extort the release of 20 political prisoners; he was 
subsequently released unharmed following negotiations by the Dominican Republic979. Also in 
1970 in Guatemala, five armed men of the guerrilla RAF group kidnapped Sean M. Holly, a 
political secretary in the US Embassy. This armed group demanded that governments (typically 
the host country) meet their requests for the release of four political prisoners, otherwise they 
vowed to kill the captive; they honoured their pledge and released him after the demand was 
met.980 Similarly, Brazilian terrorists kidnapped the Japanese Consul-General in Sao Paulo; 
however, he was released after the Government released five political prisoners and allowed them 
to seek political asylum in Mexico.981 In 1979, in Turkey, the Israeli Consul-General was shot 
dead by kidnappers when Turkey did not meet the demands of the kidnappers.982 
 
As can be inferred from this brief catalogue of some notable instances, terrorist groups learn and 
dynamically respond to the ways in which states respond to their activities, explaining the increased 
number of attacks on diplomats when they learned they could extort concessions, particularly the 
release of political prisoners. The act of kidnapping itself, and the implied threat of intent to murder 
if demands are not met, is an intense format of violence compared to general paramilitary activities, 
which is why it is so closely associated with the release of prisoners, with perceived equivalency.  
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Regardless of the dubious ethical framework within which terrorists and other criminals operate, 
states are obliged by the VCDR to protect diplomats and take all appropriate steps to protect 
them, rendering them liable for their safety and ultimately culpable for their failure to protect 
diplomatic personnel from non-state violence. That is why the receiving states make every effort 
to ensure the release of diplomats, especially when the latter represent locally or internationally 
important states and interests (which is why personnel from such countries are typically targeted). 
In the examples cited above, US diplomatic personnel are universally considered as the holy grail 
of kidnappers due to the leverage implied by US international political hegemony, which 
kidnappers hope to wield against the host state government, or against the US itself. Japan is a 
particularly important trading partner for Brazil, and Turkey’s diplomatic relationship with Israel 
is especially fragile and acutely important in the Middle East peace process. 
 
While receiving states generally take all reasonable efforts to protect diplomatic personnel in good 
faith, clearly it is impossible to prevent all possibility of attack; however, the line between 
unavoidable events and failure to protect diplomats according to the terms of the VCDR is 
ambiguous. For instance, as stated in Chapter 1, in 1970 Guatemala refused to meet the demands 
of the kidnappers responsible for taking the West German ambassador Von Spreti, which 
ultimately led to his death. This resulted in the severance of diplomatic ties between Guatemala and 
West Germany.983 
 
While there is a perfectly sound argument against negotiating with terrorists that runs contrary to 
the fundamental premise of the post-event duty to protect under the VCDR, the OAS delineates 
proper responses to terrorism, such as taking a hard-line approach to dealing with kidnappers; this 
is regarded as fulfilment of the host state’s duty to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomats 
under the VCDR. The OAS thereby acknowledges that acceding to the demands of kidnappers 
encourages such criminal activities, and tries to establish the expectation that kidnappers will not 
have a free hand in negotiating with host states; however, in terms of pure protection, meeting the 
demands of kidnappers has been found to be the surest way to guarantee the safety of kidnap 
victims. The OAS was thus essentially preoccupied with holding armed groups to account for 
attacks on diplomats rather than with resolving primary hostage-taking crises, with a long-term 
view of protecting diplomats during conflict between armed groups and their own governments and 
making diplomats less attractive targets984 
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In practice, however, while generally espousing a position of not negotiating with terrorists in 
order to deter activities such as the kidnapping of diplomats, it appears that most states engage in 
behind-the-scenes haggling in order to resolve hostage crises. For example, Turkey was the scene 
of three major incidents of political kidnapping involving foreign hostages during the years 1971-
1972, all of which were perpetrated by local terrorist groups drawn from leftist student activist 
movements (specifically, the Turkish People’s Liberation Army and the Turkish People’s 
Liberation Front) opposed to US economic, military and political influence in Turkey. The victims 
included four US airmen, an Israeli diplomat, two British and one Canadian civilian employee 
of NATO. The US and Turkish governments claimed that no ransom had been paid in any of these 
cases, but the peaceful resolution of the crises was not accounted for.985 
 
Similarly, in July 2013, an Iranian diplomat was kidnapped in Yemen; no group publicly claimed 
responsibility, and Iran announced its refusal to deal with the kidnappers, but the ambassador was 
subsequently released.986 
 
While it is possible that in such cases the frustrated kidnappers release their victims to avoid later 
prosecution, it seems more likely that some kind of accommodation has been reached. 
 
The number of cases increased throughout the period 1961-1979, particularly after enactment of 
the VCDR (1969), raising the question of states’ responsibilities when faced with the prospect 
of negotiating with armed groups.987 
 
Under international law, as explained previously, the state has to take all appropriate steps to 
protect diplomats. Under Article 29 of the VCDR, receiving states are obliged to prevent any 
attack occurring against a diplomat, in terms of his or her person, freedom or dignity. Based on 
this, the West Germany claimed then the Guatemala was in breach of International Law by refusing 
to deal with the kidnapper of the West German ambassador, who was subsequently murdered. 
However, others have alleged that the responsibility of the receiving state is limited to securing the 
proper function of diplomatic relationships, not the safety of the person of the diplomat.988 
 
Under this approach, if the state fails to protect the diplomat from kidnapping, despite having taken 
all appropriate steps, the state does not need to negotiate with the kidnapper or put its national 
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interest at stake.989Hence, according to this view, the receiving state does not breach international 
law by washing its hands of the unfortunate diplomat. Although this approach is rationally 
responsible, it has only occasionally been taken by the receiving state, as the life of diplomats is 
too important to be dismissed so lightly, both as the human representative of the sending state, 
and in practical terms due to the importance of their role in mediating conflicts. International law 
therefore needs to take into account the humanitarian aspect of this matter, which pertains to the 
meaning of special protection, requiring that the receiving state is under a duty of due diligence 
rather than achievement of ideal results. 
 
While receiving states are held responsible for the protection of diplomats, the accountability of 
paramilitary organisations such as armed militias and terrorists is a complex issue; this is 
particularly the case in MENA and other areas with relatively weak state institutions and strong 
political and military factions, ranging from the comparatively mild case of fractional interests in 
countries such as Lebanon (where the Shia political party Hezbollah has a democratically elected 
parliamentary presence and an associated paramilitary organization that is active both nationally 
and internationally) to cases such as Egypt (and Iraq prior to 2003), where the political system is 
a fiefdom of the armed forces. While states dominated by strong military factions with effective 
control over the country can function as conventional states with regard to the duty to protect 
diplomats, the situation is more complex when the state is a political institution whose power 
does not match that of external military factions, as in the case of Libya. 
 
Since 2011 Libya has seen numerous attacks on diplomats by armed groups, mainly on US and 
Arab nations’ personnel, but it is impossible for the ‘state’ to take punitive action against these 
groups because the power of the latter effectively exceeds that of the local government.990 Even 
in cases where the state has extensive military capabilities, such as Iraq after 2003, concerted 
efforts by well-armed, coordinated and financed non-state actors can result in the situation of 
foreign diplomats becoming untenable due to the persistent threat to their lives and safety. For 
instance, the Philippine Embassy staff were relocated from Iraq to Jordan following threats from 
Al Qa’ida. A more comprehensive explanation of the course of violence against diplomats in Iraq 
was given in Chapter 1.991 
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The case of Libya is particularly illustrative as it pertains to the international proliferation of 
Islamist terrorism since the year 2000. For instance, in April 2014 two cars attacked the Jordanian 
Ambassador’s convoy and kidnapped the personnel, with no obvious motive for this coordinated 
attack. Jordan is internationally respected for its diplomatic expertise and uncompromising 
foreign policy stance, having an extensive history of mediating conflicts, assisting refugees and 
brokering peace (e.g. in the Israel-Palestine conflict, as well as opposing the US invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, despite being a key US ally). It could be that the Jordanian convoy was the only one 
available, opportunistically attacked by a zealous militia; however, it could equally be part of the 
general pan-Arab insurgency against all governments, possibly linked to Libyan prisoners in 
Jordan. The Libyan and Jordanian governments have not commented on such links.992 
 
While this and other attacks appear to have no rhyme or reason – such as the unexplained 
kidnapping of staff from the Egyptian and Tunisian embassies in January and March of 2014 
(respectively),993 the kidnappers’ demands in June 2014 for freeing the Tunisian diplomat included 
the release of Libyan terrorist suspects in Tunisia. This resulted in the closure of the Tunisian 
mission in Libya; the Foreign Minister Taieb Baccouche noted that the Tunisian government 
‘decided to close the consulate in Tripoli because they [the Libyan government] are unable to 
provide protection for our staff, and as long as armed groups are not deterred by the law in 
Libya’.994 
 
Armed groups have long attacked and continue to attack diplomatic personnel, but the problem 
becomes more risky when the host states lose control over the situation and armed groups control 
part (or indeed all) of the state territory during internal political tensions and disturbances. Such 
scenarios have become increasingly prevalent or potentially likely throughout MENA since the 
beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010, with a spate of abductions and murders of diplomats 
throughout the region; clearly diplomats have become a favourite target for armed groups as they 
present a relatively easier prospect than the conventional armed forces of targeted countries. 
 
The accountability of armed groups can only be enforced under conventional criminal law when 
the state has effective control over the situation, which includes military force as well as legal 
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jurisdiction over the perpetrators of crimes. For example, in the event mentioned above, when the 
Palestinian Black September stormed the Saudi Arabian embassy in Sudan, the offenders were 
ultimately apprehended and punished; 1006 this was possible largely because the group had no 
international political support (unlike for instance the IRA in the UK, which was protected by the 
Sinn Fein political party), and no logistical base in Sudan to prevent capture. 
 
Several scholars have tried to draw the attention of the international community to the 
responsibility of armed groups as a part of conflict, but this research is concerned with their 
specific responsibility for reparation of victims (diplomats). International law deals with the 
responsibility of both states and individuals for reparation, but it has neglected reparation for harm 
by the institution of armed groups. Based on the cases of Northern Ireland, Colombia and Uganda, 
Moffet found that much more effort was needed to bring issues of reparation to victims of armed 
groups to the attention of the international community, particularly when the proliferation of armed 
conflicts makes such harm more common. However, even if legal provision were made for the 
accountability of armed groups, actually bringing the latter to justice is a difficult challenge. Moffett 
pointed out that implementation of legal obligations such as the protection of diplomats by armed 
groups is difficult but not impossible, with a comprehensive approach and state support. He added 
that the main elements of an internationally accepted wrongful act of armed groups are: 
acknowledgment of the wrongful act against a victim; reparation of such wrongful act; and 
attribution of the wrongful act to an armed group.995 
 
Under secondary rules of international law, it is difficult to hold armed groups responsible for 
reparation. For example, Article 10 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) confirms the responsibility of the armed group to make 
reparation on the condition that they subsequently gain power (i.e. become state actors). This 
means that the Article does not cover the multiple parties in any civil conflict who do not later 
assume power. Furthermore, during the debate on the allocation of responsibility of armed groups 
by the International Law Commission under Draft Article 14(13), such allegations were found to 
have exceeded the limit to the articles on state responsibility. Article 10(1) of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) described the responsibility of 
armed groups in the following terms: ‘The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes 
the new Government of a state shall be considered an act of that state under international law’. 
This means a state is responsible for the wrongful acts committed by armed groups once the state 
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has general control over the situation. Hence, under Article 10 (2) of this law, the acts of these 
armed groups are regarded as the actions of states when those groups gain power and grant the 
authority ‘The conduct of a movement, instructional or other, which succeeds in establishing a 
new state in part of the territory of a pre-existing state or in a territory under its administration, 
shall be considered an act of the new state under international law’. 
 
Clearly such provisions are pertinent only to insurrectional movements who succeed to power and 
create a new state. This was confirmed by the ICJ, which found in US v. Iran996 that the Iranian 
regime was retrospectively responsible for the wrongful acts of revolutionaries prior to seizing 
power (i.e. for crimes committed before they became the governing regime). As the previous regime 
(in this case, that of the Shah) had lost control over the situation, the subsequent losses and damage 
were attributed to the new state authorities who established a government. This ICJ judgment is in 
line with the customary international law doctrine of state succession. 
 
However, other areas of international law have always considered the responsibilities of armed 
groups; for instance, they are generally held accountable for respecting international humanitarian 
law. For example, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions997 deals with parties of conflicts 
which include armed groups, while Additional Protocol II on Internal Armed Conflicts deals with 
such groups under two conditions: first, responsible command has to be organized; and second, 
part of the group has to have effective territorial authority. This means that this article will not apply 
in all circumstances, although all individuals are responsible under customary law.998 
 
Under Article 91 of Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention, the parties to an internal 
conflict are responsible for reparation if they breach the rules, but that does not pertain to internal 
conflict.999 The ILA Committee on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict stated the 
responsibility of armed groups in violation of breaking the IHL, but despite advocating remedy to 
victims, there are no appropriate legal procedures to confirm such remedy. This responsibility has 
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been developed under the IHL. However, the situation of this group is still unclear under this law. 
Despite the fact that these groups are not parties to humanitarian treaties, they become liable when 
they establish territorial authority; however, in practical terms, these groups may have difficulty 
in paying compensation due their lack of resources. 
 
Sometimes states do not acknowledge the obligations of armed groups to incur responsibility, in 
order to avoid granting them statutory rights. The violent activities of non-state armed groups have 
been escalating since the year 2000.1000 Although their responsibility is debatable, International 
Criminal Law (ICL) confirms that they have responsibility, and it does not distinguish between 
non-state armed groups and state agents in terms of accountability under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.1001 However, this accountability of members and leaders of armed 
groups does not include reparation for victims. The members and leaders of armed groups were 
subject to the ICC as of April 2011. 
 
In 2014 the ICC initiated investigations into how successful prosecutions of human rights 
violations could be implemented. For instance, in 2014, in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo who 
had been found guilty in 2012 of the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the 
age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the DRC, the ICC confirmed the 
verdict and sentenced him. 1002Furthermore, ‘Germain Katanga, commander of the Force de 
Résistance Patriotique en Ituri, was found guilty of crimes against humanity’.1003 This criminal 
liability arises from the responsibility of commanders for the actions of their subordinates.  
 
Therefore, armed groups are accountable for crimes they commit during conflicts, and these may 
be tantamount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as the reported atrocities committed 
in the Central African Republic.1016 
 
To summarize, armed groups have responsibility in respect of IHRL and IHL and should obey 
these laws during the armed conflict; conflict; however, this does not confer legitimacy on armed 
                                                          
1000 J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict, (Paradigm 
Publishers, Boulder CO, 2010) 27. 
1001  
1002 Art 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force 
on 1 July 2002. 
1003 Amnesty International ‘International Criminal Court: Bemba verdict a historic step forward for 
Victims of sexual violence’ (21 March 2016). Available at <https://www.amnesty 
.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/international-criminal-court-bemba-verdict-a-historic-step-forward-for- victims-






Diplomats are under the protection of international law, including the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations (1961), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 1973, and the International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979. 
 
However, despite the existence of protection for diplomatic staff, diplomats are frequently specifically 
targeted, especially in a time of internal armed conflict. States under international law incur 
responsibility for any attack on diplomats; even in a time of armed conflict between the receiving and 
sending states, the former needs to secure the departure of the latter’s diplomats from its territory. 
 
The state is responsible for protecting diplomats and preventing crimes against them; this means 
exercising due diligence to prevent such crimes, and states are not necessarily culpable if attacks 
against diplomatic personnel materialize after they have taken all reasonable measures. The state 
is directly responsible for acts committed against diplomats by the state itself (e.g. by its armed 
forces or security personnel), its officials or organs, or by other parties with the knowledge and 
tacit acceptance of the state. 
 
When private individuals or unknown persons commit actions against diplomats it is their own 
private criminal responsibility. However, the state has indirect responsibility for prosecuting and 
punishing such criminals and providing proper court remedy for the injured diplomat. In cases 
where diplomats are attacked, the host state needs to punish offenders through its local laws. This 
explains why some receiving states have enacted legislation in advance for punishing such 
criminals. In the case of the non-existence of such private laws, the receiving state depends on its 
general criminal laws. 
 
Attacks on diplomats, whether by a particular state’s organs or by individuals, are generally a state 
responsibility under international law. However, diplomats are required to ensure that they are not 
legitimate targets in any conflict, as in such cases they would no longer enjoy immunity and 
privileges; for example if their actions put them in jeopardy by withdrawing the assumption of 
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non-participation in violence. Examples include where diplomats take sides in the conflict, such 
as by engaging in espionage or arming rebels, or generally encouraging opposition and sedition 




Chapter 6: General Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Research Findings 
 
Diplomacy is important, not only for the strength of relationships between the sending and receiving 
state, but also for the safety of the international community. Diplomacy is as old as humanity’s 
beginnings; it originated with the needs of the individual (especially relating to food), and gradually 
developed towards different purposes, such as economic, social, exchange and culture. The diplomat 
is a professional person who conducts diplomacy between the considered states. His/her duty, 
according to Article 3 of the VCDR, is to strengthen the relationships between the states, protect 
the interests of his/her country, express protest, request explanations or clarification of a situation, 
or the attitudes of the receiving state, among many other duties. 
 
However, this duty is considered to be legal and is far-removed from the duties of a spy. Diplomats 
have had important roles throughout history in bringing conflict to an end. The states, therefore, 
grant him or her immunity and privileges. Diplomats, however, are a favoured target of terrorism 
and other acts of violence, which is w h y  the international community has tried to find the best 
mechanism to protect diplomats throughout history. International law, as a result of this targeting 
of diplomats, enacted the VCDR in 1961. Despite the enacting of this convention, the diplomats 
are still targeted. Thus, the international community tried another mechanism to protect diplomats, 
namely, to ask states to cooperate between themselves and to criminalize action against diplomats 
in their local legislation. The sending states themselves tried to find mechanism to protect their 
diplomats. An important example of this is what the US has done - i.e. training their diplomatic and 
consular staff to face any attack against them as well as have its officers protect all their staff in US 
embassies and consular offices all over the world. For example, the last event in Libya (of killing 
an American ambassador to Libya) is a worthy example of how this mechanism may not be 
adequate enough to protect diplomats. Such mechanisms needs more effort and more finances. 
Hence, it may not work with other countries, especially developing countries. As per 
international standards, the receiving state has responsibility for any attacks on diplomats. The 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 confirms this responsibility. Also, such 
responsibility is confirmed by draft articles on the responsibility of states for internationally 
wrongful acts, 2001. Furthermore, there are other laws that deal with terrorism that also indirectly 
dealt with the protection of diplomats. This includes the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 
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1973 and International Convention against the Taking of Hostage 1979. 
 
Recently, there has been an increase in the number of internal disturbances and political tensions, 
as well as internal conflict. It is difficult to recognize a difference between these two situations. 
However, the time when an American ambassador to Libya, Steven, was killed during the time of 
internal conflict when the Libya government lost control over the territory. This circumstance is 
sometimes compared with an attack against diplomats. It is a clear signal to the international 
community that the diplomats have become the most favourite target of rebels or armed groups. 
There are many reasons for this kind of targeting. One of the most important purposes of such 
targeting is to ensure their requirements are met. In many occasions, the kidnapper succeeds to 
pursue the states to meet their requirement. That is why the number of killing or kidnapping of 
diplomats has increased. The receiving states under international law have a responsibility to take 
all appropriate steps to protect diplomats. That is why the receiving state mostly deals with 
kidnappers and attackers. However, sometimes, receiving states avoid dealing with the abductors, 
which often leads to killing the diplomats. 
 
When merely an attack on diplomatic agents occurs, this is not enough to incur the receiving state 
responsible. The violation of the rules of international law must be proved. The receiving states 
might be suffering from internal disturbances and political tensions or internal armed conflict, and 
may have lost control over territory. In this case, the receiving states need to proof it did all it could 
to protect diplomats. For example, the circumstances surrounding the issue of Libya are totally 
different from others. Libya lost control of the entire country after the defeat of the former 
government of Al-Gadhafi. 
 
The state is obliged to make an effort, but this may not necessarily end in a desired result. Libya 
took all appropriates steps to protect diplomats or the premises of the mission. According to the 
above, it can be concluded that no wrongful act can be attributed to Libya under these 
circumstances. 
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However, that does not mean there is not any accountability for those who acted out the violations. 
That is why Libya began to deal with this problem by enacting the Anti- Terrorism Law 2013. 
This law clearly criminalizes the actions against the d i p l o m a t s  and their premises. This law 
considers these kinds of crimes against diplomats a s  terrorist offences. This is the first law in the 
Middle East and South Africa that provides direct punishment provisions for crimes against 
diplomats. 
 
However, Libyan authorities also enacted the law of Transitional Justice. This local law provides 
the victim of human rights abuse with guarantees for justice. The TJ mechanism is preferred because 
of its unique characteristics. The TJ approach includes judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. These 
mechanisms give an opportunity to the victims or their families to tell their story about the violence 
that they faced, ensuring this provides effective redresses to victims. This law enables the victims 
or their families to know who conducted the violation, what the reason for these wrongful acts 
was, ensuring reparation to the victim and guaranteeing there is no repetition of such acts. It is 
recognized that such a law is important to ensuring the redress to victims. However, this law does 
not include foreign diplomats caught up in similar circumstances as victims and does not include 
them in the TJ process in the same as nationals who are victims of such violence. It is important for 
such a law to deal with this problem and also include clear punishment for those who are involved 
in acts of violence against foreign diplomats. Such effective measures adopted by receiving states 
may help to enhance the protection of diplomats. However, this TJ law is not international in nature. 
This researcher strongly recommends the international community to set out the minimum standards 
of the rules covering the TJ, in order t o  easily apply these for diplomats. 
 
Most war-torn societies adopt TJ, which is a set of procedures in order to achieve stability in time 
of post-conflict, strife, and/or revolution. The most common challenge that a TJ process might face 
is the impotence or inexperience of new governments, or a lack of serious inducement to achieve 
justice in post-conflict situations. It is the right of the diplomat (victim of hum an rights) to know 
the truth of the reason behind targeting them, to see the punishment of the offenders, and to ensure 
reparations for them or for their state, and to receive guarantees that such action is not repeated in 
the future. The TJ mechanism is not limited to the judicial procedure, but also to non-judicial 
procedure, which mean that the state needs to redress the problem of the injured diplomats under 
the mechanisms of the TJ, which would be much more open and could be according to what the 
receiving state (state of the offender) and the sending state (state of injured diplomat) agrees. More 
or fewer actives might be required by the sending state from the receiving state, (i.e. apology, 
gratification, rehabilitation, non-repudiation in future, etc.). Although, this is important for the TJ 
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mechanism, TJ might face the problem of an unstable situation in the time of post- conflict and the 
control of armed groups in some territory of a state, which facilitates impunity. 
 
Also, the lack of the ability of a government that reaches power after the conflict in a divided 
society, as with what happened in Libya, may enable the procedure of TJ to fall apart. However, 
the researcher believes the TJ could provide a good solution for the injured diplomat, because of 
its variety of approach and flexible mechanism especially in time of tension and disturbance 
when there is no functioning legal framework or judicial institutions except for international 
human right law and internal emergency laws, which in the most cases apply the law of emergency. 
This law does not include the guarantee that any transitional regime could provide remedies for the 
injured diplomat, and it is mostly designed for internal crimes to protect citizens. Also, in a time of 
internal armed conflict, when the state loses control over all, or part of the territory which was not 
covered by international law, this gives the state a good opportunity to apply the TJ mechanism. 
 
Also, in a time of internal armed conflict, when the state loses control over all, or part of the territory 
which was not covered by international law, this gives the state a good opportunity to apply the TJ 
mechanism. Whereas countries ruled by a dictator in developing countries may not have a good 
environment for applying TJ. Moreover, the availability of means to apply TJ mechanisms and 
the ability of states in developing countries to do so might not satisfied. However, in accordance to 
the VCDR the receiving state, under any circumstance, needs to take all appropriate steps to 
protect the diplomats, (e.g. Article 44) and this would even be the case after the events of an attack 
on the diplomat. This was confirmed by the decision of ICJ in Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980) (Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, p6 stated that 
‘Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of al1 United States nationals 
… and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed 
to leave Iran safely’ 
 
Although the Libyan authorities adopted anti-terrorism laws, which refer to the injured diplomats 
and sets out the punishment for the crimes against them, the researcher finds that the TJ, with its 
variety mechanisms, could be a good solution for the rights of injured diplomats. The punishment 
of the offenders will already be one of its mechanisms. However, there are relationships between 
IHL and IHRL and TJ mechanisms in their aim of finding justice for the victims of human rights 
abuse and violations of international law. 
 
The discussion revealed that Libya faces many obvious barriers to protecting diplomats, including 
lack of experience, loss of control, control of armed groups, and lack of implementation of laws. 
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Libya as an Islamic country is obligated not only by international law (VCDR 1961 and VCCR 
1963) but also by the Sharia to comply with the term and condition of the treaties that are entered 
into and signed by the head of state. As discussed at length in Chapter 2, Sharia has an unassailable 
emphasis on the duty to protect diplomats, yet modern Islamist groups specifically target 
diplomats while claiming to be attempting to implement Sharia, as in the case of the attack on 
the US Ambassador to Libya in 2012. In fact, these groups lack any legal or political expertise and 
the situation on the ground in Libya is one of chaos and incoherence, with the government unable 
to wield conventional state authority across the country. In this case, alternative sources of justice 
for injured diplomats such as TJ can be considered. The fundamental advantage of TJ in this case 
is that it has judicial procedures and mechanisms not available in customary international or national 
law, which can be expedient to conflict and post-conflict situations. This can facilitate the fulfilment 
of international obligations by states through truth commissions investigating the crimes against 
diplomats to reveal the truth. The circumstances of the killing of the US Ambassador to Libya are 
still unclear, and the investigation – if it is being conducted at all – is ongoing. 
 
The situation in Libya leads us to several questions about the difficulties of trying the accused within 
the state and the lack of control over armed groups that have the greatest influence in Libya. The 
implementation of domestic laws, such as the Libyan Criminal Code 1956 or the Libyan Anti-
Terrorism Law of 2014, which criminalises  assaulting diplomats, is not easy in times of armed 
conflict when the state loses effective control over the territory (while retaining nominal 
sovereignty under international law). Therefore, the researcher sought to propose TJ for the 
availability of elements to enable justice for the diplomat. As explained in Chapter 4, TJ is a national 
law concept and was never meant for integration into international law. The application of TJ to 
diplomats can therefore only be optional as a way o f  complementing other international law 
mechanisms, not to replace them. To be specific, in the international law context, TJ can be used 
as an optional mechanism to complement criminal law in terms of evidence gathering and truth 
finding. States can claim reparations through diplomatic channels or legally by the ICJ. 
Consequently, the US can ask Libya to prosecute and punish the offenders who attacked the US 
Embassy and diplomatic staff; if Libya could not (or would not) undertake this then prosecution 
could take place at the ICC. 
 
Investigation by commissions of inquiry does not remove the criminal aspect of the case, 
therefore, after making sure that the amnesty laws are not provided against the perpetrators of the 
violations against the safety of the diplomat and embassy security, it is possible to adopt these 
investigations whether in the internal courts if the state is capable of conducting the trial. If the state 
236  
is not capable, in Libya, the case must be referred to the ICJ. It should be noted that states cannot 
be expected to declare their own impotence in prosecuting such cases for political reasons, and 
indeed they may be hostile to such measures. This was clear in the face-saving attempt by the 
government of Libya to object to the US security intervention regarding the attacks in 2012, as 
explained previously (i.e. Libya claimed it was a violation of sovereignty etc.). Where the state is 
capable of prosecuting, it might establish a special court to charge those accused of crimes against 
diplomats. It should be noted that as of 2017 Libya was moving towards adopting a hybrid 
judiciary to develop and promote TJ in Libya. 
 
Truth commissions are not focused on a specific event but attempt to paint the overall picture of 
systematic human rights abuses over a period of time. There is no universal guide of exactly what 
to do in those situations, the important thing is that the receiving state provides protection 
proportionate to the threat. However, even if the host state does not believe there will be a 
disturbance of the peace or impairment of the dignity of the diplomatic mission, they should still 
exercise reasonable due diligence to try and prevent the injury to diplomats. It is appropriate to do 
as the Libyan authorities did on 11 September 2012 in the event of the killing of American 
diplomats to Libya , in the matter of demonstrations and attacks on diplomatic missions: Libya 
had exercised reasonably due diligence to try and prevent the injury of diplomats with ‘Libyans 
fighting alongside US personnel during the assault’. The Libyan authorities also apologized to the 
US over the murder, and took serious steps after the murder to make sure such crimes would not 
be repeated in future. This includes the Libyan Anti- Terrorism law 2013, which stipulates particular 
punishments for attacks on diplomats and their premises, as explained in Chapter 3. This law is 
unique in the MENA region as Libya is the first and only receiving state in that region so far to take 
steps to improve the protection of diplomats and seek redress for them. The Libyan authorities 
took these important steps to avoid breaching its international obligation to protect diplomats, even 
though the actions against the US diplomats were committed by Libyan non-state actors without 
knowledge and approval of the Libyan authorities (unlike in the case of the US Embassy in Iran, 
as discussed previously). 
 
Given these steps taken by Libya, the question arises of what role is left for TJ to play. The role of 
TJ in the Libyan case would be searching the truth of what has been happened in September 2012 
and why the armed groups targeted the US Ambassador. Applying TJ mechanisms can make it 
easier for Libya to meet its obligations under international law in respect of knowing the truth about 
the events of the attack on the US Embassy in 2012. For example, the reason behind been targeted 
would be given to the injured diplomats, their families, the US and indeed Libya itself and its people. 
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Although, TJ mechanisms could offer a good resource of providing justice for injured diplomats, 
the researcher further suggests another mechanism to protect diplomats during the internal armed 
conflict or time of tension and disturbances, especially when states lose control over their territory, 
as in Libya in 2012, by relying on virtual embassies. The problems of attacks on diplomats can be 
resolved by adopting preventative measures such as virtual embassies. The virtual embassy in the 
absence of formal relations between the sending and receiving states has been attempted by many 
states when relationships between them deteriorate, as in the case of Iran and US, or when there 
is no existing embassy in a state, as in the case of Israel in the HCC. 
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This thesis finds that the protection of diplomats might be achieved using digital diplomacy and 
virtual embassies to conduct diplomacy between states during a time of armed conflict when a 
state loses control over its territory. In this regard, the development of technology can play an 
important role for diplomatic relationships. These new methods and modes of conducting 
diplomacy are done with the help of the Internet. Diplomatic activities are increasingly supported 
by the Internet and digital tools, and other information and communications technologies. 
Diplomats already rely on the Internet to find information, communicate with colleagues via e-mail, 
and negotiate draft texts in electronic format; diplomats are also increasingly using new social 
networking platforms such as blogs, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. 
 
Since time immemorial the defining characteristic of diplomacy has been establishing the 
credentials of individuals based on documents establishing their official status, including that of 
diplomatic representatives chosen by a state to be represented in another state. However, the 
concept of the virtual embassy eliminates these norms. e- Diplomacy may become a future 
alternative for diplomats, entailing a redefinition of diplomacy. During armed conflict, states need 
to be more active in their efforts to protect diplomats, which can be facilitated by removing the 
physical presence of diplomats altogether and relying on e-diplomacy. This saves immense costs 
incurred in contracting and deploying elite security forces to protect diplomatic missions and 
provides the optimum protection for diplomatic staff. 
 
As reiterated throughout this thesis, there is no guide or existing international law specifying what 
host states should do when they lose control over their territory during a time of tensions and armed 
conflict, yet the state is still obliged to protect diplomats. This is conventionally interpreted as 
obliging states to exercise due diligence. Although the Libyan authorities meet the obligations of 
due diligence, by enacting several laws to protect diplomats, there is still the problem of 
implementation of these laws. It is not only because of the lack of mechanisms for 
implementation in developing countries in general, but also because of the weakness of the new 
government in Libya and the control of the armed groups over several territories and control of 
important offices dealing with implementation. For example, some armed groups control prisons 
and courts. That is why the suggestion of applying the TJ mechanisms and law in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis might be difficult in the situation of Libya. 
 
Consequently, it was suggested that it is necessary to use a virtual embassy to protect diplomats. 
Chapter 3 explained examples of existing virtual embassies in MENA. The rapidly developing 
technology affects the current diplomacy system by facilitating the functions undertaken by 
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diplomats. A potential problem which could arise from e- diplomacy is that the use of social media 
tools such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube etc. gives foreign diplomats direct access to local 
citizens, which this could lead to interference in the domestic affairs of countries (e.g. Trump’s tweets 
about demonstrations in Iran). A possible solution would be to adopt international protocols on e-
diplomacy, maybe through revision or amendment of the VCDR. 
 
There are varied laws that can apply to crimes against diplomats. The laws that apply are different 
from one situation to another. However, IHRL is the common law that applies to all situations. For 
example, in a time of peace, the laws that could apply is VCDR, and internal laws - mostly the 
internal criminal laws and civil laws of the concerned state. However, these laws often do not cover 
crimes against diplomats directly. In a time of internal tensions and political disturbance, the VCDR 
can still be applied along with IHRL and the internal laws; mostly the law of emergency and martial 
law. The main flaw of this law is that it does not extend to diplomats and their protection, and it is 
difficult to apply this law and prosecute the offenders because sometimes the armed groups seize 
control over several territories and the state might lose control over this territory. In addition, such 
armed groups may exercise control over important institutions of in the state, such as judiciary, the 
police and prisons. 
 
Furthermore, there is no justice in applying these laws, since these laws might apply only to ordinary 
citizens, but may not apply to powerful individuals or corrupt officials. Therefore, finding justice 
for diplomats within the context of these internal laws might be impossible in most cases. For these 
reasons, the researcher argues for the importance of the internationalization of the TJ in order to 
make it possible to apply the concept to diplomats, which can then provide justice for them as 
has been  explained earlier. The researcher’s reason for arguing in favour of TJ law is because of 
its mixed approach of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. However, the relationship between 
international law and this mechanism is still non-existent. This mechanism has not dealt with the 
breakdown of IHLR that accompanies conflict. Transitional justice processes need to include the 
issues of gross human rights violations. In order to do this a connection needs first to be 
established between international law and TJ – e.g. TJ could be extended, internationalised and 
made a concept of international law specifically for use when dealing with cases involving 
diplomats. 
 
The private individuals responsible for war crimes, including diplomat targeting crimes during 
armed conflict, is not limited to those who just conducted a war crime, but also extends to all those 
who incite them or have issued orders. Despite these differences in law which can apply to each 
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conflict, there are several laws that can be applied for both kinds of conflicts. Hence, recently, it 
has become generally accepted that some rules of international law can be applied to both internal 
and international conflicts. Several laws can be applied in these two types of armed conflicts. For 
example, most rules of customary international humanitarian law that might be applied to 
international armed conflicts can be applied also to non- international armed conflict. 
Furthermore, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and IHRL apply to both 
kinds of conflicts. 
 
However, it can be noted that the number of rules set out in international humanitarian law 
treaties which govern internal armed conflict are much fewer than those applicable in international 
armed conflicts. Furthermore, there is no international law governing the time of internal tensions 
and political disturbances. In a time of armed conflict, the receiving state incurs the responsibility 
for reparation of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). This violation of (IHL) is 
attributable to a state: in case the actors of a state committed this violation, or violations committed 
by persons or entities empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority; persons or 
groups acting under the direction or control of the state or under instruction of the state, and if this 
act was under acknowledgement of the state or the state adopted such act. In the case that the 
violation was attributed to the state, then the state is responsible for reparations for the loss or injury 
caused. Meanwhile, individuals are criminally responsible for violations of IHL. This violation is 
regarded as a war crime. Similarly, the commanders are criminally responsible for violations of 
IHL if this violation is committed following their orders. Also, commanders are criminally 
responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, 
that the subordinates were about to commit or were committing such crimes. However, they did 
not take all necessary and reasonable measures in their power to prevent this crime from occurring. 
 
The inviolability of diplomatic staff and premises is required even in the situation of armed conflict 
between the sending state and receiving state. The receiving state is obligated to facilitate and 
secure the departure of the diplomats from the receiving state. Also, in cases of revolutionary 
activities by persons against the diplomat, the receiving state is under the obligation to afford 
diplomats with the same security grants to others residents. Furthermore, in the time of 
insurrections and civil wars, the responsibility of the state is determined in accordance with and on 
with the basis of due diligence and by the existence and effectiveness of local remedies and justice. 
Whether due diligence has been exercised in the attempted preclusion of injuries caused by civil 
wars is essentially based on the presumption that the government is rationally well-ordered, and 
that the insurrection and disturbances are unusual circumstances. 
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Although, international law states that the parties to conflict should respect the law, under 
International Law, the rioters or rebels are not responsible for their wrongful acts unless they gain 
power. The state is under an obligation of due diligence. Consequently, the state is not responsible 
for the wrongful acts committed by the rioters or rebels if it is proven that they have acted in good 
faith and without negligence. Therefore the receiving state may not be held directly responsible for 
the action taken by the rebels. In a time of insurrections and civil war, and especially when a 
government is unable to prevent injurious acts by individuals in conditions of civil commotion, they 
are not technically responsible for injuries which may be received by diplomats in the course of 
such struggles. This requires careful observation of the efforts taken by the receiving state in order 
to decide the responsibility of the state is very important. Therefore, to determine the responsibility 
of Libya for the killing of an American diplomat requires an investigation as to whether Libya took 
all appropriate steps to protect the diplomats and their premises. The research explained 
previously that Libya had made efforts to protect the diplomats but the weakness of the new 
government and the existence of armed conflict prevented this. Armed groups are under an 
international obligation to respect both the IHRL and the IHL. However, there is no written law to 
provide their responsibility. The international community still avoids incurring the armed group’s 
responsibility, because they are concerned about giving them legitimacy. These armed groups were 
not responsible for their actions until 2014, when ICC attempted to find a resolution for such 
problems of violation of human rights by armed groups. However, this prosecution did not include 




The main contribution of the thesis is as follows: 
 
1. Using e-diplomacy to prevent attacks against diplomats occurring, as explained in 
Chapter 3. If this method does not prevent attacks occurring, TJ could be applied 
to find justice to injured diplomats. 
2. TJ could be Serve as a complement or support to state responsibility and criminal 




In view of the findings of the research as summarised in Section 6.1 above, the researcher would 
like to make the following recommendations with the objective that they may help to improve the 
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legal framework for the protection of diplomats in times of internal conflicts and political tensions. 
 
 
1. The International Law Commission (of the General Assembly of the UN) should include in 
its agenda an item concerning the protection of diplomats in the course of armed conflicts 
and internal tensions and political disturbances, when the state loses control over certain 
areas in order to reach a framework of agreement in this regard. 
 
2.  The researcher recommends applying the TJ mechanisms as a supporting tool to redress 
the problem of attack on diplomats and to find justice to injured diplomats as a victim of 
human rights. The mechanisms of TJ can be an important resource for finding justice and for 
making the diplomats and their family or state know the truth as to why they were the victim 
of human rights abuse. The state, therefore, needs to apply the TJ instead of other internal 
laws, which may be limited simply to the punishment of offenders. 
 
 
3. The USA possesses a system of diplomatic security training. This t r a i n i n g  teaches the 
diplomats how to protect themselves against any attacks. The killing of ambassador Chris 
Stevens, despite this system, sends a clear signal to the international community that more 
effort needs to be paid to protect diplomats. This requires new mechanisms of protection. 
4. It is recommended to use virtual embassies to conduct diplomacy between states to save the 
lives of diplomats during armed conflict, especially when states lose control over the territory. 
Specific protocols need to be developed to avoid problems such as interference by diplomats 
in the domestic affairs o f  the receiving state. 
 
5. It is necessary for armed groups to incur responsibility for reparations due to diplomats who 
are victims of attacks or abuse, particularly when states lose control over the administration 
of the part of their territory in which the attacks or abuse have taken place. This has to be 
through national law (i.e. the receiving government pays reparations and then seeks to 




6. The responsibility of armed groups needs to be regulated by written law in the form of an 
international convention rather than be left to customary international law. This may help to 
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lessen the problem of targeting diplomats, by dissuading any other groups or individuals 
who may consider such as course of action in the future. 
 
7. According to Sharia, foreign embassies and personnel are protected; this position is 
beyond dispute in the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence and historical experience – where 
diplomats have been mistreated in ostensibly Islamic states, this has been in violation of and 
not accordance with Sharia. However, the marginalisation of traditional Islamic institutions 
of learning and law in Muslim- majority countries during the colonial and post-colonial eras 
has drowned out the voice of reason, leaving populist political actors to exploit the masses 
with emotive appeals to brute violence specifically targeted to minorities and diplomats. 
Such factors include Islamist parties, paramilitary organisations and terrorists, who are united 
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